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INTRODUCTION 
EPA’s decision to list a carcinogenic substance as a “hazardous 
waste,” subject to stringent regulation under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, depends on the fatality risk that the substance 
would impose upon highly exposed individuals if discarded in unregu-
lated landfills.  If this risk exceeds 1 in 10,000, the substance is listed.1  
EPA’s rule for cleanups under the Superfund statute is similarly risk-
based:  toxic waste dumps are to be remedied so that the lifetime fatal-
ity risk to the “maximally exposed individual” from carcinogens in the 
 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 116-19. 
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dump is within the range of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million.2  FDA has 
traditionally used a 1 in 1 million threshold in determining whether 
carcinogenic food constituents exempt from the Delaney Clause pose 
a de minimis safety threat to consumers and thus should be permitted 
to enter or remain in the food supply.3  OSHA, which is statutorily au-
thorized to regulate workplace toxins that pose “significant” threats to 
safety, is more permissive than FDA and EPA but also focuses, in part, 
on individual fatality risks:  the agency has generally followed the rule 
that carcinogens creating more than a 1 in 1000 risk for any worker 
are “significant,” for statutory purposes, and that toxins creating a 
substantially smaller risk are not.4 
In all these cases, health and safety agencies have decided to key 
regulatory choices to the level of “individual risk” (specifically, the 
“individual risk” to the maximally exposed individual or some similar 
construct) without any explicit statutory mandate to do so.  But such 
mandates do exist.  A salient one:  when Congress in 1990 overhauled 
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, the section covering carcinogens and 
other “hazardous air pollutants,” it put in place a hybrid regulatory 
regime that first requires polluters to use the best currently available 
technology for reducing emissions, and then requires EPA to consider 
promulgating yet more stringent emissions standards if “excess cancer 
risks to the individual most exposed to emissions . . . [exceed] one in 
one million.”5  The 1 in 1 million risk level is also invoked in another 
provision of the amended Clean Air Act.6  And when the legislative re-
gime for pesticide licensing was reworked in 19967—the ban on cer-
tain carcinogenic pesticides was replaced with a “reasonable certainty 
 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 123-27.  As explained below, EPA in the Su-
perfund context focuses on risk given a “reasonable maximum exposure” rather than 
looking to the single maximally exposed individual.  See infra Part II.A.1.c. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 44; 166-76. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 186-88. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).  See infra text accompanying notes 94-102 
(discussing Clean Air Act section 112). 
6 See 42 U.S.C § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) (2000) (permitting EPA to remove a category of 
sources from the list of sources subject to pollution controls under section 112 if “no 
source in the category . . . emits . . . hazardous air pollutants in quantities which may 
cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one in one million to the individual in the 
population who is most exposed to emissions of such pollutants from the source”). 
7 See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 21 U.S.C.); infra text accompany-
ing notes 136-41 (discussing the effect of the Food Quality Protection Act on pesticide 
regulation). 
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[of] no harm”8 standard both for possible carcinogens and for pesti-
cides that might cause other toxic effects—the official House Commit-
tee report explained that this new statutory standard ought to be con-
strued as an “individual risk” test: 
[T]he Committee expects . . . that a [pesticide] tolerance will be consid-
ered to provide a ‘reasonable certainty of no harm’ if any increase in 
lifetime risk, based on quantitative risk assessment using conservative as-
sumptions, will be no greater than ‘negligible.’ . . . [A] negligible risk 
[is] a one-in-a-million lifetime risk.
9
 
In short:  individual fatality risk plays a major role in our current 
system of health and safety regulation.  Some examples have just been 
provided.  Many more will be furnished below.  In particular, “indi-
vidual risk” is absolutely central to federal regulation of toxic chemi-
cals.  EPA employs an “individual risk”-based approach in administer-
ing all of its major statutes:  the Clean Air Act (which addresses toxins 
present in air), the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act 
(toxins in water), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (toxins that leach into the ground from waste sites), the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (toxic pesticides), 
and the Toxic Substances Control Act (a backup statute authorizing 
EPA to take measures not authorized by the media-specific statutes).10  
FDA and OSHA follow a similar approach, as we have seen.  But the 
focus on “individual risk” is not limited to toxins, or to federal agen-
cies.  For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has 
long taken the position that the ultimate safety goals governing its li-
censing and regulation of nuclear power plants partly concern the 
“individual risk” of immediate death, resulting from an accidental re-
lease of radiation, incurred by the average person living near a plant.11  
FDA sets acceptable levels of microbial contaminants in foods with 
reference to the “individual risk” of illness of a high-end consumer.12  
Although OSHA traditionally focuses on aggregate fatalities or lost 
days of work in regulating workplace conditions that cause injury (as 
opposed to illness), it has recently begun to consider the “individual 
risk” of injury—the rate at which workers in particular industries are 
injured by electric shock, falls, explosions, fires, and other such indus-
 
8 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
9 H.R. REP. NO. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996). 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 202-08. 
12 See infra text accompanying note 165. 
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trial accidents.13  And environmental agencies in some states have fol-
lowed EPA’s lead and employ “individual risk” tests in regulating tox-
ins.14 
What accounts for this regulatory focus on “individual risk”?  One 
answer is tempting, but wrong.  The temptation is to say that regula-
tory agencies inevitably take the maximal level of “individual risk” as 
the test of safety, at least for substances and activities that cannot be 
removed from our lives without massive cost.  Many, many chemicals 
cause cancer to animals at large enough doses, and can be predicted 
to cause some human deaths at actual doses in a sufficiently large 
group.15  How else to determine which toxic exposures merit a regula-
tory response except by setting an “individual risk” threshold which 
seems very low—say, 1 in 1 million to the maximally exposed individ-
ual—and taking that as the trigger for regulatory intervention?  But 
this response overlooks a crucial deficit in “individual risk” tests of this 
kind:  their insensitivity to population size.  Compare an isolated toxic 
waste dump that (under worst-case modeling) leaches contaminants 
to a radius of ten miles, affecting a population of 10,000; a workplace 
toxin employed in certain industries, to which one million workers are 
exposed; and a chemical in drinking water that is consumed by 100 
million.  For simplicity, assume that in each case every person in the 
exposed population incurs a 1 in 1 million risk of dying from the haz-
ard.  Then in the waste-dump case it is overwhelmingly likely that the 
hazard will cause no fatalities; in the workplace case it is reasonably 
likely that the hazard will cause one or more fatalities, with one in-
cremental death the expected outcome; and in the drinking-water 
case it is overwhelmingly likely that the hazard will cause one or more 
fatalities, with 100 incremental deaths the expected outcome.16 
 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 191-97. 
14 See infra note 89. 
15 See John D. Graham, Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in the Federal Govern-
ment, 102 TOXICOLOGY 29, 33-35 (1995) (explaining that carcinogens traditionally 
have been seen to lack safety “thresholds,” and describing how this no-threshold view 
prompted regulatory agencies to adopt “individual risk” tests for determining when 
exposures to carcinogens are de minimis); Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. 
Health Risk Assessment:  How Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK 283, 284 (1995) (“[O]ver 300 of 
about 5,000 chemicals routinely used in industry have been labeled carcinogens as a 
result of animal studies.”). 
16 See, e.g., JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS?:  THE SPATIAL 
AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 1-23 (1999) (criticizing EPA’s 
policy for remedying Superfund sites, in part because the policy employs “individual risk” 
criteria that are insensitive to the size of the populations exposed to the sites). 
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Risk assessors typically distinguish between “individual risk”—the 
risk of death borne by a particular individual, either a named person 
or someone identified by her exposure characteristics—and “popula-
tion risk.”17  “Population risk” (also sometimes called “societal risk”) is 
the total number of fatalities resulting from a toxin, a hazardous activ-
ity, or some other threat to human life.  To quote a leading textbook 
on risk assessment: 
[Risk assessments typically] include several common measures of indi-
vidual and societal risk, in particular: 
• Individual risk, which is the probability of a specified individual dying 
prematurely as a result of exposure to the risk agents. . . . 
• Individual risk contours show the geographical distribution of individ-
ual risk . . . . 
• Maximum individual risk is the individual risk to the person experienc-
ing the highest risk in the exposed population. . . . 
. . . . 
• Various measures of societal risk, such as . . . the expected number of 
fatalities as a function of location or population subgroup . . . .
18
 
Regulatory agencies might use the level of “population risk,” 
rather than the level of “individual risk,” as their measure of health 
and safety.19  This is true both for agencies operating under statutes 
that accord high priority to the avoidance of death, illness, and injury, 
as opposed to other goals, as well as for agencies operating under cost-
 
17 See VINCENT T. COVELLO & MILEY W. MERKHOFER, RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS:  
APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 230-34 (1993); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 69-70 (1994); Pamela 
R.D. Williams & Dennis J. Paustenbach, Risk Characterization, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGI-
CAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 293, 322-23 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 
2002). 
18 COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 231.  The term “population risk” is, 
admittedly, ambiguous, and is not always used to mean the total number of deaths.  It 
might be used, instead, to mean the total number of individuals at various levels of 
“individual risk,” see id., or more generally to refer to a variety of population-size sensi-
tive criteria for evaluating hazards.  In this Article, I use “population risk” to mean ag-
gregate deaths or other adverse cases (illnesses, injuries), and nothing else. 
19 See Frank B. Cross et al., Discernible Risk—A Proposed Standard for Significant Risk in 
Carcinogen Regulation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 73-75 (1991); cf. National Emissions Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,044-46 (EPA Sept. 14, 
1989) (considering, but rejecting, a proposal to define a safe emission level of air pol-
lutants as that amount causing one cancer case per year). 
  
2005] AGAINST “INDIVIDUAL RISK” 1127 
benefit statutes or other “balancing” statutes that permit a wider array 
of considerations to trump the goal of physical integrity.20  Indeed, as 
we shall see, federal programs concerned with safety rather than 
health hazards generally seem to focus on “population risk” rather 
than “individual risk,” and even health threats such as toxins, radia-
tion, and pathogens are sometimes regulated with reference to “popu-
lation risk.”21 
So the question just posed remains unanswered:  why do EPA, 
OSHA, NHTSA, and many other agencies, federal and state, employ 
some variation on the “individual risk” construct—be it “individual 
risk” to the maximally exposed individual, to a highly exposed indi-
vidual, to the median or average individual, or to some other per-
son—in administering statutes that make human health and safety a 
(high-priority or ordinary-priority) regulatory goal?  Why not use a fa-
tality-based metric instead, for example one that looks at the effect of 
regulatory intervention in reducing the total number of deaths caused 
by fatal illnesses or injuries? 
One plausible answer points to a seminal 1980 Supreme Court 
case, Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute.22 This 
case, more than any other single event, triggered the rapid growth of 
risk assessment in the federal government.23  And it may well have 
caused or at least supported the regulatory focus on “individual risk” 
rather than “population risk.”  In Industrial Union, a plurality of the 
Court invalidated an OSHA regulation lowering the maximum per-
missible workplace exposure to benzene, a carcinogen, from ten parts 
per million (ppm) to one ppm.  The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, as the plurality read it, authorized OSHA only to regulate “signifi-
cant” risks—not to ban workplace chemicals or activities based on the 
mere possibility of an injury or fatality.24  Note that this aspect of the 
 
20 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm:  The Normative Foundations of Risk 
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1391-92 (2003) (describing the variation in risk 
regulation statutes, some of which give priority to health and safety, others of which 
permit or require cost-benefit analysis). 
21 See infra Part II.C. 
22 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
23 See, e.g., Cross et al., supra note 19, at 68 (describing Industrial Union as “[t]he 
seminal decision in carcinogen regulation”); John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 382, 386 (1995) (describing Industrial Union as “[t]he turning point 
for quantitative risk assessment”); Randall S. Wentsel, Application of Risk Assessment in 
Policy and Legislation in North America, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESS-
MENT AND MANAGEMENT 261, 262 (Peter Calow ed., 1998) (stating that Industrial Union 
generally encouraged federal agencies to engage in risk assessment). 
24 See 448 U.S. at 642-52. 
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Industrial Union opinion does not entail a preference for regulatory 
attention to “individual risk.”  After all, in implementing the “signifi-
cant risk” threshold, OSHA could look to aggregate premature deaths 
resulting from the workplace toxin or activity at issue, not “individual 
risk” to the maximally exposed or average worker.  But, in the final 
portion of the opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that the statutory re-
quirement of “significant risk” be implemented through an “individ-
ual risk” test. 
 Contrary to the Government’s contentions, imposing a burden on 
the Agency of demonstrating a significant risk of harm will not strip it of 
its ability to regulate carcinogens, nor will it require the Agency to wait 
for deaths to occur before taking any action.  First, the requirement that 
a “significant” risk be identified is not a mathematical straitjacket. . . . 
Some risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable.  
If, for example, the odds are one in a billion that a person will die from 
cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated water, the risk clearly could not 
be considered significant.  On the other hand, if the odds are one in a 
thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% benzene 
will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant 
and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it.
25
 
To this day, OSHA carefully follows this dictum from Industrial Union.  
The agency still uses the 1 in 1000 level of “individual risk” identified 
by Justice Stevens as its cutoff for regulating a workplace carcinogen.26  
More generally, although EPA and FDA do not employ that cutoff—a 
cutoff which Stevens characterized as a reasonable construal of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, not the only acceptable con-
strual—the Stevens dictum may well have prodded EPA, FDA, and 
other agencies to focus on individual, not population, risk.27 
A second explanation for the wide use of “individual risk” tests by 
regulatory agencies points to the norms of risk assessment.  Risk as-
sessment is a set of techniques for quantifying health and safety 
threats, paradigmatically but not exclusively threats from toxic chemi-
cals.28  Risk assessments are very widely employed by government 
 
25 Id. at 655. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 186-88. 
27 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en 
banc) (quoting Industrial Union in construing the “ample margin of safety” language of 
the Clean Air Act); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 38,044, 38,044-46 (EPA Sept. 14, 1989) (responding to National Resources Defense 
Council by adopting a test focused, at least presumptively, on “individual risk”). 
28 Good general introductions to risk assessment methodology include:  COVELLO 
& MERKHOFER, supra note 17; DOUGLAS J. CRAWFORD-BROWN, RISK-BASED ENVIRON-
MENTAL DECISIONS:  CULTURE AND METHODS (1999); WILLIAM H. HALLENBECK, 
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agencies in setting priorities and evaluating interventions,29 and are 
also used in other contexts.30  Risk assessment techniques have be-
come quite standardized, both as a result of governmental standardi-
zation (for example, EPA’s various guidelines)31 and because of the 
standardization internal to the emerging professional community of 
risk assessors.32  The core of risk assessment for toxins consists of two 
steps:  drawing a dose-response curve and predicting individual expo-
sures.  As we shall see, dose-response curves and exposure assessments 
can be integrated to generate predictions of aggregate deaths—and 
sometimes are—but they are also naturally deployed to generate pre-
dictions of “individual risk.”33 
In any event, whether as a result of Industrial Union, the profes-
sionalized techniques of risk assessment, or other factors, governmen-
tal agencies in the United States, in a host of different contexts, em-
ploy the test of “individual risk” to the maximally exposed individual 
or some similar test as a criterion for regulatory choice.  As traditional 
economic regulation has become less important, particularly at the 
federal level, an increasing proportion of regulatory activity concerns 
 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
(2d ed. 1993); Susan P. Felter et al., Assessing Risks to Human Health from Chemicals in the 
Environment, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 23, at 9, 9-23; Dennis J. Paustenbach, Hazard Identification, in HUMAN AND 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 85, 85-149; 
Dennis J. Paustenbach, Exposure Assessment, in HUMAN & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 189, 189-291; Williams & Paustenbach, Risk 
Characterization, supra note 17. 
29 On the role of risk assessment in regulation, see generally CARL F. CRANOR, 
REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES:  A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAW 103-51 
(1993); QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION (Lester B. Lave ed., 1982); 
Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 
89, 95-126 (1988); Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assess-
ment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 417-68 (1995); Symposium, Risk Assessment in the 
Federal Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995); infra text accompanying notes 40-
53, Part II, and sources cited infra note 88. 
30 See Charles A. Pittinger et al., Corporate Chemical Management:  A Risk-Based Ap-
proach, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra 
note 23, at 379, 379-401. 
31 See Dennis J. Paustenbach, Primer on Human and Environmental Risk Assessment, in 
HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 
3, 28-29 (citing EPA’s main guidance documents). 
32 See Graham, supra note 23, at 386-87 (describing the emergence of an institu-
tional framework for risk analysts, such as journals and scientific organizations); Paus-
tenbach, supra note 15, at 286-87, 289-90 (describing the emergence of shared under-
standings among risk analysts concerning various aspects of the risk assessment 
process). 
33 See infra text accompanying note 63. 
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the avoidance of death and, to a lesser extent, nonfatal injury and dis-
ease.34  In turn, “individual risk” tests have become a linchpin of gov-
ernment’s health and safety efforts.  This is misguided.  In this Article, 
I shall launch a sustained critique of the use of “individual risk” tests 
by health and safety agencies.  This critique does not depend on con-
troversial normative commitments.  My own commitments are welfa-
rist and consequentialist,35 and I have argued elsewhere in favor of 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA).36  It is true that “population risk,” not “in-
dividual risk,” is the input to CBA as currently practiced.37  But it 
emerges that normative frameworks directing agencies to accord 
higher priority to safety than CBA would countenance are also best 
specified in terms of “population risk” or cognate tests.  Or so I shall 
argue below. 
Parts I and II of the Article set the stage.  Part I is a primer on risk 
assessment.  It explains the structure of risk assessment, describes its 
rise to prominence as a tool for health and safety regulators, and then 
explores the nature of the “individual risk” numbers so central to the 
technique.  What exactly does it mean to say that some toxin, sub-
stance, activity, or, more abstractly, some object or event imposes a 1 
in x risk of death upon a particular individual?  What concept of “risk” 
is being invoked here?  The standard interpretation of the “individual 
risk” numbers generated by risk assessment invokes the frequentist view 
of risk.  On the frequentist view, to say that E imposes a 1 in x risk of 
death upon P is to say this:  over the long run, when people similar to 
P are exposed to events similar to E, a 1 in x fraction of those indi-
viduals will die prematurely as a result of those exposures. 
Part II describes, in detail, the widespread use of “individual risk” 
tests by federal agencies.  The practices I describe should be familiar 
to environmental lawyers, food and drug specialists, workplace safety 
scholars, and others who have specialized knowledge about EPA, FDA, 
 
34 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1317-18 (1986). 
35 Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure:  A Welfarist Theory of Regula-
tion, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241 (2000) (arguing for the moral weight of overall well-
being, but bracketing the question whether morality has a consequentialist structure 
or, instead, incorporates some deontological norms). 
36 See Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1371 (1998); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when 
Preferences Are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:  LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSO-
PHICAL PERSPECTIVES 269 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); Matthew D. 
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999). 
37 See infra text accompanying note 300. 
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OSHA, or similar agencies.  These important practices will not be as 
familiar—I hazard to guess—for public law generalists, law and 
economists, legal philosophers, and other scholars who may have a 
deep interest in the regulatory state but have not read the latest issue 
of Risk Analysis or the latest version of EPA’s Guidelines for Carcinogen 
Risk Assessment.38  And even risk-regulation specialists might be sur-
prised to learn just how widespread the focus on “individual risk” is.  
In any event, Part II seeks to show that administrative decision making 
across a wide swath of significant governmental programs conforms to 
a problematic recipe.  This recipe specifies the safety of a workplace, a 
toxic dump, a water source, a radioactive emission, a consumer prod-
uct, or some other regulatory target in terms of the frequentist “indi-
vidual risk” the targeted substance, activity, or product imposes on the 
maximally exposed individual or some other person (with 1 in 1 mil-
lion most widely used as the “safe” level). 
The remainder of the Article provides a rigorous, normative cri-
tique of the frequentist “individual risk” tests described in Part II.  I 
seek to show that “individual risk” in the frequentist sense is norma-
tively irrelevant across a range of plausible moral theories.  Part III 
looks at welfarist consequentialism:  the moral view undergirding welfare 
economics and cost-benefit analysis.  It argues that the kind of risk 
relevant to welfarist consequentialism is Bayesian risk, not frequentist 
risk.  Bayesian risks are measures of belief, not measures of frequency.  
On the Bayesian view, to say that some individual has a 1 in x probabil-
ity of death means that the risk analyst, the individual herself, or 
someone else believes to degree 1 in x that the individual will die.  
Part IV explores the subtle, but crucial differences between Bayesian 
and frequentist risk. 
Part V moves beyond welfare consequentialism and examines al-
ternative moral views:  safety-focused views that accord special priority to 
physical integrity; deontological views that recognize the existence of 
moral rights (specifically, a right not to be killed and perhaps an in-
dependent right not to be put at risk of death); contractualist views that 
evaluate governmental choices by asking whether citizens in a suitable, 
hypothetical contracting scenario would approve the choices; and de-
mocratic views that see democratic responsiveness (including respon-
siveness to popular judgments about risk) as morally important.  Part 
 
38 See Notice of Availability and Opportunity to Provide Comment on the Draft 
Final Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,012 (EPA Mar. 3, 
2003); Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (EPA Sept. 24, 
1986). 
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V argues that none of these moral views warrants regulatory attention 
to “individual risk” in the frequentist sense. 
Part VI shifts critical focus to a different feature of the current 
regulatory practices described in Part II.  Those practices are, in ef-
fect, doubly misguided.  First, they make “individual risk,” in the fre-
quentist rather than Bayesian sense, a determinant of regulatory 
choice.  Second, they are insensitive to population size.  Whether 
regulators should intervene to abate some hazard depends, morally, 
on the number of persons at risk from the hazard.  A specialty food 
consumed by a very small group, an industrial toxin with which many 
more workers come into contact, and an airborne pollutant that we all 
breathe might impose the very same “individual risk” on the maxi-
mally exposed, high-end, median, and average exposed individual.  
But the morally warranted regulatory responses in these cases will, or 
at least may, be very different.  Part VI argues that both welfare conse-
quentialism and alternative moral views (safety-focused, deontological, 
contractualist, and democratic views) demand risk assessment proce-
dures that are sensitive to population size. 
What this Article offers, in short, is a sympathetic critique of risk 
regulation and risk assessment.  Much of the legal scholarship in this 
area is more radically critical.  Regulation guided by risk assessment is 
allegedly flawed to the core—for example, because it is undemocratic, 
or because it is beset with uncertainties about the mechanisms of can-
cer, dose-response relationships, and exposure pathways.  The very en-
terprise of quantifying safety is seen as misguided.39  I do not believe 
that the very enterprise of quantifying safety is misguided.  Risk as-
sessment represents a giant leap forward for public rationality, in my 
view.  Dose-response curves and exposure assessments are, properly, 
central for the regulation of toxins; parallel techniques are central for 
agencies that focus on other threats to life and limb.  But these im-
pressive techniques should be used to illuminate what is truly at stake 
in risk regulation, not to distract us with morally unimportant infor-
mation.  Risk regulation needs to be changed in two ways.  First, it 
should adopt a new understanding of risk, Bayesian rather than fre-
 
39 Scholarship in this vein includes:  Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environ-
mental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119 (2003); Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael J. Tre-
bilcock, Risk Regulation:  Technocratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 
MCGILL L.J. 835 (1998); Eileen Gay Jones, Risky Assessments:  Uncertainties in Science and 
the Human Dimensions of Environmental Decisionmaking, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (1997); Latin, supra note 29; Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 
ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998); Shere, supra note 29; Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in 
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995). 
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quentist.  Second, it should adopt choice criteria that are sensitive to 
population size—paradigmatically, “population risk” criteria.  Risk as-
sessment, in turn, must be reworked so that it can inform regulatory 
choice thus revised. 
I.  RISK ASSESSMENT:  A PRIMER 
A.  History and Structure 
Risk assessment, generically, is a set of techniques for quantifying 
the fatalities or fatality risks resulting from various hazards.  These 
techniques can also be used to quantify nonfatal illness or injury, or 
the risk of nonfatal illness or injury.  However, because death is the 
central and paradigmatic harm addressed by health and safety regula-
tors, my presentation will focus there.  The best-developed variant of 
risk assessment, in current regulatory practice, is toxic risk assessment:  
a quantitative description of the fatalities and fatality risks caused by 
toxic chemicals.  But risk assessment with respect to a much wider ar-
ray of death’s causes is also possible and, to some extent, practiced. 
Let’s start with the toxins.  Toxic risk assessment is, in effect, 
quantitative toxicology and dates from the nineteenth century.40  
Toxic risk assessment by U.S. governmental entities is more recent 
than that, but still has a substantial history.41  Toxic risk assessment at 
the federal level was pioneered by FDA.  This agency is charged with 
implementing a statute that generally precludes foods containing 
“poisonous or deleterious” substances42 and that imposes even stricter 
standards on “food additives”:  such additives must be “safe,”43 and 
carcinogenic food additives are flatly prohibited by the (in)famous 
“Delaney Clause.”44  FDA began systematically to engage in the risk as-
sessment of the noncancer toxicity of food constituents in the 1950s, 
developing the so-called NOAEL/safety factor method which is the 
 
40 See Graham, supra note 15, at 31. 
41 See id. at 33-40. 
42 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2000). 
43 Id. § 348(c)(3)(A). 
44 See Food Additives (Delaney) Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, sec. 2, § 
409(c)(3)(A), 72 Stat. 1784, 1786 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000)) 
(“[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when in-
gested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the 
evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal . . . .”). 
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standard method for noncarcinogens today.45  As for the threat of 
cancer:  there are various escape routes around the absolutism of the 
Delaney Clause—for example, FDA takes the position that the Clause 
does not apply to the nonfunctional carcinogenic constituents of ad-
ditives46—and in the 1970s FDA commenced a practice of quantifying 
the potency of certain food carcinogens.  The 1 in 1 million cutoff for 
individual cancer risk derives from FDA practice during this period.47 
The widespread use of toxic risk assessment at other federal agen-
cies began in the 1980s.  This development had multiple triggers, in-
cluding three apparent ones:  (1) the Industrial Union case, which 
forced OSHA to follow FDA’s lead and, more generally, made clear 
that the courts would not permit federal agencies engaged in health 
and safety regulation to impose large costs on the regulated entities 
without some effort to justify such costs through a quantification of 
benefits, even in cases (as with OSHA) where the underlying statute 
was quite pro-safety;48 (2) the 1983 appointment, as EPA administra-
tor, of William Ruckleshaus, who made risk assessment his top priority 
and actually succeeded in infusing such techniques into administrative 
routines throughout the large EPA bureaucracy;49 and (3) the publica-
tion, also in 1983, of a seminal study by the National Research Coun-
cil, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:  Managing the Process50 (the 
so-called Red Book), which further popularized the practice of risk as-
sessment and, perhaps more importantly, did much to standardize it.  
By the 1990s, risk assessment had become such a familiar feature of 
the regulatory landscape that OMB, in its guidance to federal agencies 
regarding Executive Order 12,866,51 instructed that the regulatory im-
pact analysis required by this Executive Order prior to the issuance of 
major rules should include a “risk assessment”:   
 
45 See Graham, supra note 15, at 32.  See infra Part II.B.1 for a detailed description 
of current FDA risk assessment practices. 
46 See infra text accompanying notes 167-68. 
47 See Graham, supra note 15, at 34-35; Joseph V. Rodricks et al., Evaluating the 
Safety of Carcinogens in Food—Current Practices and Emerging Developments, 46 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 513, 533-35 (1991). 
48 See supra text accompanying notes 22-27. 
49 See Graham, supra note 15, at 39. 
50 COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. 
HEALTH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:  
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter RED BOOK]. 
51 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645-46 (1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
  
2005] AGAINST “INDIVIDUAL RISK” 1135 
 Estimating the benefits and costs of risk-reducing regulations [re-
quires, inter alia] . . . a risk assessment that . . . characterizes the prob-
abilities of occurrence of outcomes of interest . . . . 
 . . . The risk assessment should generate a credible, objective, realis-
tic, and scientifically balanced analysis; present information on hazard, 
dose-response, and exposure (or analogous material for non-health as-
sessments); and explain the confidence in each assessment . . . .
52
 
So risk assessment is now standard practice for federal agencies 
that regulate toxins, as well as other health and safety agencies, at the 
major rulemaking stage.  But the practice of toxic risk assessment is 
really much broader than that.  For example, the overwhelming ma-
jority of EPA risk assessments do not involve major rules, but other 
categories of administrative decision, such as clean-up decisions with 
respect to individual Superfund sites.53 
The Red Book framework for toxic risk assessment has been the ca-
nonical framework54 since its publication and runs as follows.  There are 
four parts to toxic risk assessment:  hazard identification, dose-response 
 
52 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at § III.A.4 (1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/inforeg/riaguide.html. 
53 Robert Hahn and coauthors collected all the regulatory impact analyses that 
were prepared for nontransfer major rules finalized between April 1996 and July 1999.  
Since impact analyses are typically not undertaken for transfer rules, this collection 
should include most of the major rule impact analyses completed during this three-
year period.  See Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses:  The Failure 
of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 862-65 
(2000).  Of the forty-eight regulatory impact analyses, twenty-three were issued by EPA, 
or less than eight per year.  See id. app. 2, at 881-85 (listing impact analyses by issuing 
agency). 
 By contrast, Hamilton and Viscusi identified at least 268 Superfund sites where 
“Records of Decisions” were signed during 1991 or 1992.  See HAMILTON & VISCUSI, 
supra note 16, app. A, at 245.  At most of these sites, presumably, site-specific risk as-
sessments were undertaken.  See id. app. A, at 247.  Hamilton and Viscusi ultimately 
analyzed a subsample of 150 of the 268 sites; it appears that every site in their subsam-
ple included a site-specific risk assessment.  See id.  For another example of an EPA 
program in which many risk assessments are undertaken outside the major rule con-
text, see Lorenz R. Rhomberg, A Survey of Methods for Chemical Health Risk Assessment 
Among Federal Regulatory Agencies, 3 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1029, 1126 
(1997), noting that EPA undertakes more than 2000 risk assessments annually, albeit 
rudimentary ones, in connection with the premanufacture notice requirement of the 
Toxic Substances Control Act. 
54 See, e.g., Paustenbach, supra note 15, at 289 (“Risk assessment has (by conven-
tion) been separated into four subdisciplines:  hazard identification, dose-response 
assessment, exposure assessment and risk characterization.”); Rhomberg, supra note 
53, at 1085 (stating that EPA and other agencies see the Red Book as providing “over-
arching guiding principles”). 
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assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization.55  Hazard 
identification is a preliminary step:  the risk analyst verifies that the alleg-
edly toxic substance is indeed a toxin, that there is sufficient evidence of a 
causal link to disease and death.56  If so, the analysis moves on to the two 
central parts of the risk-assessment inquiry, namely dose-response assess-
ment and exposure assessment.  Dose-response assessment means quanti-
fying the link between different doses of the toxin and premature death.  
This inquiry is, in effect, physiological:  it seeks to determine how fre-
quently the ingestion, inhalation, or dermal uptake of the toxin, into 
humans’ bodies, leads to cancer or other fatal illnesses.  This physiologi-
cal inquiry is almost always grounded in two types of data—rodent bioas-
says, in which the differing rates of fatal illness in groups of rodents fed 
different doses of the toxin are measured, and human epidemiological 
data—and eventuates in a dose-response curve.57  The X-axis of the curve 
represents human doses of the toxin; the Y-axis, the risk to a person ex-
posed to that dose of dying prematurely as a result. 
Figure 1:  Dose-Response Curve for Carcinogen C 
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55 See RED BOOK, supra note 50, at 19-20. 
56 See Paustenbach, Hazard Identification, supra note 28, at 85. 
57 Good surveys of dose-response assessment methods include:  COVELLO & 
MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 137-79; CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra note 28, at 95-121; 
HALLENBECK, supra note 28, at 33-103; Suresh H. Moolgavkar & E. Georg Leubeck, 
Dose-Response Modeling for Cancer Risk Assessment, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK AS-
SESSMENT:  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 151, 151-88. 
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Exactly how to draw this curve, based on the animal or epidemiologi-
cal evidence, is a technical (but important!) issue in risk assessment. 
While dose-response assessment is physiological, exposure assess-
ment is topographical and demographic.  The aim here is to characterize 
the pattern of exposures to the toxin that will occur under various 
contingencies (for regulatory purposes, as a result of different regula-
tory options, including the status quo option of inaction).58  This as-
sessment depends on where the toxin is located; on how much toxin 
currently exists, and would be produced under various contingencies, 
at the source; on the toxin’s so-called “fate and transport,” i.e., how 
the toxin migrates through the air, the water, and other environ-
mental pathways; and on how the human population is distributed at 
varying distances from the source of the toxin.  What “source” means 
depends, of course, on the toxin and the regulatory program.  It 
might be a single waste dump, a group of smokestacks (for example 
all smokestacks in factories in a given industrial category), a food type 
(in which case the relevant pathway is direct ingestion by food con-
sumers), containers of hazardous workplace chemicals (in which case 
the relevant pathway is air transport to workers or direct worker con-
tact with the containers), and so on.  A relatively complete exposure 
assessment will predict the dose of the toxin that each member of the 
population will receive as a result of the evaluated source.  Typically, 
members of the population will not be identified by name, but rather 
by their doses.  That is:  a relatively complete exposure assessment will 
produce a predicted distribution, by numbers and percentiles, of life-
time doses resulting from the analyzed source, for the status quo op-
tion of regulatory inaction and, ideally, for each regulatory contin-
gency being assessed.59 
 
58 See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 91-125; CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra 
note 28, at 69-93; ALISON C. CULLEN & H. CHRISTOPHER FREY, PROBABILISTIC TECH-
NIQUES IN EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT:  A HANDBOOK FOR DEALING WITH VARIABILITY AND 
UNCERTAINTY IN MODELS AND INPUTS (1999); Paustenbach, Exposure Assessment, supra 
note 28. 
59 An even more complete exposure assessment will present, and ascribe prob-
abilities to, different possible exposure distributions, rather than merely presenting the 
most likely distribution.  See, e.g., CULLEN & FREY, supra note 58, at 217-37, 304-06. 
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Figure 2:  Exposure Assessment for Carcinogen C in Source S 
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To be sure, the toxic exposure assessments produced by regula-
tory agencies or their contractors are often not this detailed.  If the 
agency’s program focuses on risk to the maximally exposed individ-
ual,60 then the full pattern of dosages that will occur in the status quo, 
or as a result of various regulatory interventions, is irrelevant.  The 
analyst might estimate the dosage received by the maximally exposed 
individual by generating a full distribution of doses across the popula-
tion, then using a very high percentile as maximum exposure; or she 
might do so more directly by maximizing the parameters underlying 
her exposure model and determining what dosage results.  Con-
cretely, this might mean estimating the maximum exposure to a toxic 
air pollutant emitted from a factory by looking at the exposure in-
curred by the person living closest to the factory, on the conservative 
assumptions that he lives there for his entire lifetime and that his in-
halation rate is at the high end of the population distribution of such 
rates.61 
 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 94-102 (describing Clean Air Act section 112, 
which focuses on risk to the maximally exposed individual). 
61 To be sure, most federal agencies now focus on risk to average or highly ex-
posed individuals, not maximally exposed individuals, see infra Parts II.A-II.B, but trun-
cated exposure assessments might also be employed in these contexts by using point 
estimates (average or high-end) of the inputs to the exposure model to generate a 
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The final stage of risk assessment, risk characterization, is the 
prime focus of this Article.  “Risk characterization” means combining 
the dose-response assessment (which correlates doses and fatality 
risks) and the exposure assessment (which predicts doses, across the 
population or at least for some segment) so as to generate a predic-
tion of the fatalities and fatality risks resulting from the toxin under 
various contingencies.62  The risk assessment jargon for total fatalities, 
as I have already noted, is “population risk”; the jargon for the risk of 
death incurred by one or another individual is “individual risk.”  Us-
ing the dose-response assessment and exposure assessment to predict 
“population risk” is somewhat laborious.  In general, to do that, the 
analyst needs a full population distribution of doses, and even then 
the analyst cannot simply “read” an estimate of total deaths off the 
dose-response curve, but instead must use probability theory to gener-
ate a probability distribution of total deaths and then a point estimate 
of “population risk” equaling the mean number of total deaths.63 
Generating a prediction of “individual risk” is more straightfor-
ward.  For example, if the analyst possesses a full or truncated expo-
sure assessment showing the dosage of the toxin to the “maximally 
exposed” individual, then the “individual risk” to that person is simply 
the risk corresponding to that dosage given by the dose-response 
curve.  And if the analyst possesses a full or truncated exposure as-
sessment showing the exposure to the “representative” individual—
the person at the median or mean of the dosage distribution—then 
the “individual risk” incurred by this “ordinary Joe” is the risk for his 
dosage predicted by our physiological graph, the dose-response curve. 
I have focused, to this point, on toxic risk assessment, since the 
standard practices in this area readily lend themselves to predictions 
 
point estimate of average or high-end dose.  See CULLEN & FREY, supra note 58, at 2-8 
(distinguishing between “deterministic” exposure assessment, where point estimates of 
inputs to exposure models are employed, and “probabilistic” exposure assessment, 
where variability in, as well as uncertainty about, exposure is characterized). 
62 See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 203-37; Williams & Paustenbach, 
supra note 17, at 322-24. 
63 Cf. COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS 47-59, 59 
(1995) (arguing that the safety of Yucca Mountain repository for high-level waste 
should be assessed in terms of “individual risk” to maximally exposed individuals, 
rather than “population risk,” in part given the “great uncertainty about the number of 
health effects that would be imposed on the global population”).  In the special case 
where the analyst has estimated the average dose, and the dose-response curve is lin-
ear, generating a prediction of total deaths is easier.  See Guidelines for Exposure As-
sessment, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,888, 22,901 (EPA May 29, 1992). 
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of “individual risk” (as I have tried to show) and since (as we shall see) 
many of the important cases of “individual risk”-based decision mak-
ing by agencies involve toxins.  But nontoxic risk assessment—
quantitative assessment of the wide variety of threats to human health 
and safety posed by substances or activities other than toxic chemi-
cals—is also quite important in governmental practice.  A salient ex-
ample here is radiation risk assessment, as pioneered at the federal 
level by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The famous Reactor 
Safety Study (WASH-1400),64 commissioned by NRC’s predecessor 
agency and published in 1975, was the first full-blown, probabilistic 
evaluation of the core damage accidents at nuclear reactors that could 
lead to dangerous releases of radiation.65  This study, together with the 
Three Mile Island accident four years later, prompted NRC to make 
risk assessment integral to the licensing and regulation of nuclear 
plants.66  Reactor risk assessment divides, very roughly, into two parts:  
(1) evaluating the probability of different types of releases (releases of 
various amounts of various radioactive isotopes); and (2) evaluating 
the safety threat for any given release.67  This second component 
closely tracks the standard methodology for toxic risk assessment.  For 
any given release, an exposure assessment can be performed evaluat-
ing the possible fate and transport of the released isotopes and the 
exposure to those substances of various members of the population; 
this information, when combined with a dose-response curve correlat-
ing radiation doses with an individual’s risk of dying as a result of the 
exposure, can be used to predict the “individual risk” of death im-
posed on different individuals by any given release and therewith (if 
desired) a prediction of “population risk.”68 
With the exception of radiation, the norms of nontoxic risk as-
sessment are less well established than for toxics.  NHTSA, for exam-
ple, certainly engages in risk assessment of a sort—the quantitative 
 
64 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY:  AN ASSESSMENT 
OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1975). 
65 See Robert M. Bernero, Probabilistic Risk Analyses:  NRC Programs and Perspectives, 4 
RISK ANALYSIS 287, 287-88 (1984). 
66 See id. at 288-97; Ian B. Wall et al., Recent Applications of PSA for Managing Nuclear 
Power Plant Safety, 39 PROGRESS NUCLEAR ENERGY 367, 367-72 (2001). 
67 See Wall et al., supra note 66, at 369 n.d. 
68 See Thomas E. Widner & Susan M. Flack, Dose Reconstructions for Radionuclides and 
Chemicals:  Case Study Involving Federal Facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in HUMAN AND 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 735, 752-69. 
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evaluation of motor vehicle safety69—but lacks a clear template analo-
gous to the exposure/dose-response framework made canonical, for 
toxics regulators, by the 1983 Red Book.  Extending the “exposure” 
construct from toxins to radiation or certain other health hazards 
(such as pathogens) is straightforward; extending it further, to car 
crashes, industrial accidents, dangerous consumer products, or other 
sources of bodily injury targeted by federal regulators, is not quite so 
easy.  But some such extrapolation is often possible.  As one re-
searcher in the area of occupational injury notes: 
Injuries are acute events associated with the transfer of hazardous levels 
of energy.  A fatality only occurs when the energy source contacts the 
worker in a specific way (e.g., a tree falling on a logger’s leg may cause a 
severe fracture, but probably not death, while the same tree striking the 
logger’s head will usually cause death).  Since the worker is only exposed 
to a potential fatal injury hazard for a portion of the workday, the esti-
mation of exposure for traumatic injuries is complex . . . .
70
 
Implicitly, here, “exposure” is understood as physical proximity to 
some machine or other workplace object that might cause death or 
(yet more abstractly) as the occupying of a certain spatiotemporal lo-
cation in the workplace that makes some type of injury possible (fal-
ling from a high place).  Some such conception of “exposure” can, in 
principle, provide a foundation for “exposure” assessments and “ex-
posure”-response curves for occupational injury as well as car crashes, 
dangerous products, and other safety hazards.71  Safety agencies, par-
ticularly OSHA, are just now beginning to develop risk assessment 
techniques along these lines.72 
 
69 See infra text accompanying notes 245-46 (finding that NHTSA regularly quanti-
fies total deaths and injuries averted by motor vehicle safety standards). 
70 David E. Fosbroke et al., Working Lifetime Risk of Occupational Fatal Injury, 31 AM. 
J. INDUS. MED. 459, 465 (1997). 
71 See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 92 (“Physical risk agents such as 
mechanical force or heat can also be the subject of an exposure assessment.”).  Indeed, 
determining the “individual risk” of traumatic injury associated with “exposure” to dif-
ferent workplace hazards is a cutting-edge topic in occupational risk assessment.  For 
examples or discussion of work in this area, see Fosbroke et al., supra note 70; Special 
Issue, Occupational Injury Risk Assessment, 4 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1255-
1441 (1998); Lauren Zeise et al., Improving Risk Assessment:  Research Opportunities in Dose 
Response Modeling to Improve Risk Assessment, 8 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
1421, 1430-31 (2002). 
72 See infra text accompanying notes 192-99. 
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B.  What Is Risk?  The Frequentist Answer 
What conception of “risk” is involved in risk assessment?  When 
dose-response curves correlate an exposure amount with an “individ-
ual risk,” what precisely does that risk number mean? 
The answer:  risk assessment trades upon a frequentist, rather 
than a Bayesian, conception of risk.  Frequentism and Bayesianism are 
the two great traditions in the intellectual history of risk and probabil-
ity.73  Bayesianism has been hugely influential within economics and 
social science;74 but the frequentist view of risk is the mainstream view 
within experimental science and, derivatively, within risk assessment, 
which has been dominated by toxicologists and other applied scien-
tists.75 
Scientific models are often probabilistic, and bedrock physical 
laws may be irreducibly probabilistic, as is now thought to be true of 
quantum mechanics.76  Generically, scientists need to be able to attach 
a probability to a proposition asserting that some event will have some 
attribute.  The Bayesian suggests that the probability of a proposition 
concerning an event, more generally the probability of any proposi-
tion, is simply someone’s degree of belief in the proposition:  the ac-
tual scientist’s degree of belief, a “reasonable scientist’s” degree of be-
lief, an idealized observer’s degree of belief, etc.77  But scientists and, 
traditionally, statisticians have eschewed the suggestion, because it 
makes essential reference to minds—to beliefs—and thus has seemed 
too subjective for scientific purposes.78 
Instead, following the lead of the great Austrian probabilist Rich-
ard von Mises,79 scientists typically see probabilities as frequencies 
 
73 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1312-15. 
74 See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY 
AND INFORMATION 9-10 (1992) (suggesting that the relevant probabilities for economic 
modeling are Bayesian, not frequentist). 
75 See COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING:  THE BAYESIAN 
APPROACH 224 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that “classical,” i.e., frequentist, statistics “now 
exert[s] an enormous influence on statistical workers and on scientists concerned with 
statistical hypotheses”).  Although there is an emerging Bayesian school within toxic 
risk assessment, this is still quite new, and even here Bayesian probability typically has a 
second-order function—to quantify the analyst’s beliefs about the first-order, frequen-
tist probabilities.  Frequentist probability therefore remains central.  See infra note 328-
31 and accompanying text. 
76 See HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 75, at 7-8; Adler, supra note 20, at 1361 & n.190. 
77 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1312 n.73 (citing sources). 
78 See HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 75, at 11-12. 
79 See RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 1-65 (2d rev. Eng-
lish ed., 1957) (formulating the frequentist account of probability). 
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within reference classes.  Consider a very simple reference class:  for 
simplicity, a class of physical objects (the class of all rocks now exist-
ing, say) rather than a class of events, which constitute a more esoteric 
kind of object.  What is the probability that “rocks weigh 100 pounds”?  
Probability numbers range from zero to one, and have some other ba-
sic characteristics:  if the probability that “rocks weigh 100 pounds” is 
p, then the probability that “rocks do not weigh 100 pounds” is 1 - p; if 
the probability that “rocks weigh 50 pounds” is q, and rocks can’t be 
both 50 pounds and 100 pounds, then the probability that “rocks 
weigh 50 pounds or 100 pounds” is p + q.80  Notice that frequency 
numbers within the class of rocks satisfy just these mathematical char-
acteristics.  The frequency or proportion of 100-pound rocks can’t be 
less than zero or greater than one; because rocks must be either 100 
pounds or not 100 pounds, the proportion of 100-pound rocks plus 
the proportion of not-100-pound rocks is unity; and so on.  Finally, 
note that the proportions here, hence the probabilities, are no more 
mind-dependent than the underlying objects and attributes:  whether 
a rock exists, and has a given weight, does not depend on anyone’s be-
liefs, and neither, then, does the proportion of 100-pound rocks. 
Mises formalized the intuitive connection between frequencies 
and probabilities, by defining probability as the limit of the frequency 
of some attribute within an infinite, sequentially ordered reference 
class of events.81  Imagine the infinite class of {E1, E2, . . . }.  This class 
has a series of segments, each of which includes the one before: {E1}, 
{E1, E2}, {E1, E2, E3}, and so on.  For each such segment, one can cal-
culate the proportion of the events with the attribute of interest A.  If, 
as the segments become longer, the proportion of A-type events ap-
proaches p as a limit, then (on the Misean construct) p is the probabil-
ity of events within this infinite class having attribute A.  Mises’s use of 
infinite reference classes accommodates the intuition that changes in 
observed frequencies in a finite series of experiments do not entail 
changes in the underlying probability, and has been somewhat con-
troversial.82  This controversy need not occupy us.  The important 
point to understand is that Mises’s construct, or some frequentist vari-
ant, is what underlies probability ascriptions within contemporary sci-
ence and therewith quantitative risk assessment. 
 
80 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1312. 
81 See MISES, supra note 79, at 28-29; see also Adler, supra note 20, at 1314 n.79 (cit-
ing sources explicating the frequentist account of probability). 
82 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1314. 
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In the context of toxic risk assessment, it is pretty easy to see how 
this goes.  The events of interest, here, are toxic exposures:  the pas-
sage into a human’s body of a particular dose of some toxin.  For any 
given dose, one can imagine exposing humans to that dose, over and 
over again, indefinitely.  This “dosing class” is an infinite class of 
events, specifically the infinite class of hypothetical human exposures 
to the particular dose.  The relevant event-attribute is “causing death.”  
Each exposure either causally contributes to, or fails to causally con-
tribute to, the death of the person receiving that dose.  For the first 
1000 exposures, say, the number of subjects who die as a result of 
those exposures is five.  For the first 10,000, say, the number is forty-
eight. For the first 100,000, the number is 491.  If the fractions con-
verge, in the limit, to (say) 0.0049, then that is the frequentist, Misean 
probability of an event within this dosing class causing death. 
To be sure, the Misean probability of death-causation within a dos-
ing class cannot be directly observed; it is not within human capabili-
ties to perform an infinite series of experiments.  But by performing 
or observing a finite series of dosings, we can use statistical techniques 
to generate more or less precise estimates of the true frequentist 
probability.83  Whatever epistemological difficulties might attend the 
estimation of relative frequencies, those difficulties will not be the fo-
cus of my normative critique in Parts III through V below.  Rather, my 
focus will be conceptual.  Conceptually, for the frequentist, risk is rela-
tive to reference classes.84  Thus the ascription of risk to a particular 
event is arbitrary—as arbitrary as choosing a reference class, among 
the multiplicity of possible ones, within which to subsume a particular 
event.  This so-called “problem of the reference class” has been much 
mooted by philosophers of science and probability.85  Astonishingly, 
the problem is almost never mentioned within the risk assessment lit-
erature, even within scholarship that is otherwise extremely sophisti-
cated. 
Consider any particular exposure event.  P ingests a 100-gram dose 
of the toxin.  This particular event can be characterized in a multiplicity 
of ways.  First, it can be characterized without a precise specification of 
P  ’s dose.  P has received a dose between fifty and 150 grams.  He has, at 
the same time, received a dose between twenty and 500 grams.  He has, 
 
83 See HALLENBECK, supra note 28, at 33-62. 
84 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1345-48; Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsi-
bility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321, 333-35 (David G. Owen ed., 
1995). 
85 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1345 n.158. 
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at the same time, received a dose between ninety and 200 grams.  Sec-
ond, the event can be characterized with a precise specification of P ’s 
dose, and with further description of him.  P has received a 100-gram 
dose, and P is forty years old.  P has received a 100-gram dose, and P has 
a family history of cancer.  P has received a 100-gram dose, and P has a 
family history of cancer and is a smoker.  Finally, the event can be char-
acterized with a precise specification of P ’s dose, and with no further 
description of him.  P has received a 100-gram dose.  Each of these pos-
sible characterizations of the exposure event generates a different ref-
erence class:  the class of all dosings between fifty and 100 grams; the 
class of all dosings between twenty and 500 grams; the class of all dos-
ings between ninety and 200 grams; the class of all 100-gram dosings to 
forty-year-olds; the class of all 100-gram dosings to those with a family 
history of cancer; the class of all 100-gram dosings to smokers with a 
family history of cancer; and, finally, the class of all 100-gram dosings.  
But the frequency with which toxic exposure causes death, within these various 
reference classes, may well be different.86  Those who receive a dose between 
fifty and 100 grams die as a result less frequently, one imagines, than 
those who receive a dose between ninety and 200 grams.  Smokers who 
are exposed die more frequently than nonsmokers.  And so on. 
The reference class standardly used to calculate “individual risk” is 
the third type of class87—what might be called the canonical dosing 
class.  Canonical dosing classes are composed of all exposures to hu-
 
86 It is universally accepted by risk assessors that the frequency of death within 
groups of persons receiving different doses of some toxin may well be different.  Oth-
erwise, dose-response curves would be flat.  And it is increasingly recognized that indi-
vidual characteristics other than dose, such as age, health history, or genetic makeup, 
may well make a difference to toxicity.  On this latter point, see, for example, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 200-03; Adam M. Finkel, A Quantitative Estimate of 
the Variations in Human Susceptibility to Cancer and its Implications for Risk Management, in 
LOW-DOSE EXTRAPOLATION OF CANCER RISKS:  ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 297, 299-305 
(Stephen S. Olin ed., 1995); D. Hattis & K. Barlow, Human Interindividual Variability in 
Cancer Risks—Technical and Management Challenges, 2 HUMAN & ECOLOGICAL RISK AS-
SESSMENT 194 (1996).  An excellent recent anthology on the issue of variability in sus-
ceptibility to toxins is HUMAN VARIABILITY IN RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL EXPOSURES:  
MEASURES, MODELING, AND RISK ASSESSMENT (David A. Neumann & Carole A. Kimmel 
eds., 1998). 
87 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 206; Finkel, supra note 86, at 
299; Dale Hattis, Human Interindividual Variability in Susceptibility to Toxic Effects:  From 
Annoying Detail to a Central Determinant of Risk, 111 TOXICOLOGY 5, 6-7 (1996).  The 
main exception to the general  practice of calculating risk relative to canonical dosing 
classes appears to be some areas of noncarcinogen risk assessment, where regulators 
have taken account of the fact that certain “sensitive subpopulations” incur a higher 
frequency of death or adverse effect than the general population.  See Finkel, supra 
note 86, at 299. 
  
1146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1121 
mans precisely specified with respect to dose, and otherwise unspeci-
fied.  Consider the exposure of P, a forty-year-old Caucasian smoker 
with a family history of cancer, to a 100 milligram (mg) dose of ben-
zene.  The canonical dosing class subsuming this exposure is the class 
of all events whereby human persons, of any age and with any other 
behavioral or genetic characteristics, are exposed to a 100 mg dose of 
benzene.  Remember the form of the classic dose-response curve.  
This correlates exposures (defined as precisely as possible, in terms of 
a real number) with “risks,” i.e., frequencies.  And the curve is valid 
for all humans, not for a more precisely characterized subset:  risk 
analysts typically use a single dose-response curve per toxin, rather 
than (say) one dose-response curve for forty-year-old smokers with a 
family history of cancer, another for forty-one-year-old smokers with a 
family history of cancer, another for forty-year-old nonsmokers, etc. 
 Thus, when EPA, OSHA, FDA, or a state agency undertakes an 
exposure assessment; determines that the “maximally exposed indi-
vidual” or “highly exposed individual” or “representative individual” 
receives a particular dose; uses the generic dose-response curve to at-
tach a 1 in 100,000 risk to this exposure; and concludes that the 
“maximally exposed” or “highly exposed” or “representative individ-
ual” is subjected to a 1 in 100,000 risk, what this means is the follow-
ing:  by characterizing this individual and exposure in the canonical 
way, abstracting from everything about the exposure except the dose 
received, we generate a class of exposures 1 in 100,000 of which result 
in death.  But viewed another way (subsumed in a different, noncan-
onical dosing class), the “maximally exposed” or “highly exposed” or 
“representative individual” is subjected to a much lower risk.  And 
viewed yet another way, she is subjected to a much higher one.  Con-
sider this analogy:  whether some particular person’s hair color is 
“unusual” depends on how we characterize the color (“bright red,” 
“red,” “within the red-brown range”) and who we compare the person 
to.  The very same adult male might come out as “unusual” if viewed 
as a bright red head and compared to all males, but not “unusual” if 
viewed as a person with hair in the red-brown range and compared to 
all persons in a particular ethnic group.  The canonical “individual 
risk” number ascribed to the individual maximally exposed, or highly 
exposed, or receiving an average exposure from some toxin, is no 
more unique than a description of his hair color as “unusual” or “not 
unusual” generated in some standard way (by using the scheme for 
describing colors, and generating comparison classes, employed by 
the National Association of Barbers, for example).  And once we un-
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derstand this about these canonical risk ascriptions, it becomes seri-
ously questionable why we should care about them. 
II.  RISK REGULATION AND “INDIVIDUAL RISK”:  A SURVEY  
OF GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
The preceding Part was a primer on risk assessment.  In particu-
lar, it showed how the concept of “individual risk” is central to dose-
response curves, a central component of risk assessment as currently 
structured, and it explicated the “frequentist” understanding of “indi-
vidual risk.”  Regulatory programs relying on risk assessment as an in-
put need not be focused on “individual risk”—dose-response curves 
and exposure assessments might instead be used to generate predic-
tions of “population risk”—but the current structure of risk assess-
ment certainly facilitates a focus on “individual risk.” 
This Part shows, in detail, that health and safety agencies do in-
deed place substantial emphasis on frequentist “individual risk.”  This 
is especially true for carcinogens, other toxic chemicals, pathogens, 
and radiation, but also encompasses the regulation of certain other 
hazards.  The relevant “individual risk” is sometimes the risk to a 
maximally or highly exposed individual, sometimes the risk to an av-
erage individual.  And these “individual risk” numbers play a range of 
regulatory roles.  Sometimes they serve as decisional triggers:  a toxin 
or other hazard is placed on the regulatory agenda, as it were, if the 
“individual risk” number is sufficiently high.  Sometimes (a related 
idea) they serve as regulatory triggers:  preexisting standards come 
into play if the hazard is sufficiently harmful, as measured by “individ-
ual risk” to the maximally exposed individual, the highly exposed in-
dividual, or the average individual.  Finally, “individual risk” levels 
sometimes serve as criteria for shaping regulatory measures:  rules, 
cleanups, or other measures should be sufficiently stringent to bring 
the “individual risk” (consequent upon a maximal, high-end, or aver-
age exposure) below some level.  In this last role, “individual risk” 
might serve as a master criterion, or might instead be balanced against 
other criteria (for example, criteria measuring cost, technological fea-
sibility, or “population risk”). 
Section A focuses on EPA, the most important health and safety 
agency in the United States, and the agency where attention to “indi-
vidual risk” is most pervasive.  Section B describes the “individual risk” 
based practices of other federal health and safety agencies, specifically 
  
1148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1121 
FDA, OSHA, NRC, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC).88  Section C briefly discusses the role of “population risk” in 
regulatory choice:  even at EPA, FDA, OSHA, NRC, and CPSC, “popu-
lation risk” considerations do play a role, and they certainly do at 
other agencies, such as NHTSA. 
My ambition in this Part is not to provide a comprehensive over-
view of governmental risk assessment practices.  It is rather to present 
the major examples of current federal89 health and safety programs 
where “individual risk” has a function in regulatory choice.  Unless 
otherwise noted, “individual risk” means the risk of death.90  The prac-
tices here described are the target for the revisionary, normative 
analysis provided in Parts III to VI below. 
Two final preliminary points:  first, as I have already discussed, the 
dominant understanding of “individual risk” within the risk assess-
ment community is frequentist, not Bayesian.  This understanding 
pervades the regulatory practices described in this Part.  “Individual 
risk” is, at least implicitly, understood by EPA, FDA, OSHA, NRC, and 
CPSC as the frequency of death relative to a canonical dosing class or 
some other reference class.91  The methodologies employed by these 
agencies to generate the “individual risk” numbers to which they then 
 
88 In these sections, I rely heavily on three extremely helpful surveys of govern-
mental risk assessment:  Rhomberg, supra note 53; Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Ac-
ceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269 (1992); March 
Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety 
and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 17 (1995). 
89 State agencies also use “individual risk” tests.  See Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, 
at 330-32; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 31-33.  However, it would be a very 
large task to identify the major examples of state regulatory reliance on “individual 
risk,” and a task not necessary for my purposes—namely to show that “individual risk” 
tests are an established practice, worthy of the sustained critical attention provided in 
Parts III to VI below.  I therefore focus on federal agencies in this Part. 
90 And unless otherwise noted, the quantitative risk levels are lifetime fatality 
risks—the exposed individual’s risk of dying as a result of the hazard at some point 
during her lifetime—rather than annual or other periodic risks. 
91 For a description of EPA’s approach to risk regulation, including its risk assess-
ment methodologies, see Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1080-86; OFFICE OF SCI. ADVI-
SOR, EPA, AN EXAMINATION OF EPA RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
(2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/osa/ratf-final.pdf.  FDA’s risk assessment 
methodology is surveyed by D.W. Gaylor et al., Health Risk Assessment Practices in the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, 26 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 307 (1997).  On 
OSHA and CPSC methodologies, see Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1060-80.  NRC’s ap-
proach is generally discussed by the sources cited infra note 200.  See also U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES’ PRO-
CEDURES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND POLICIES (2001) (surveying EPA, FDA, OSHA, and DOT 
methodologies for risk assessment of toxic chemicals), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01810.pdf. 
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attach (some kind of) weight are frequentist methodologies.  This 
point is crucial, but just because it is so general it is stated here, once 
and for all, and will not be belabored below. 
Second, it is possible, in principle, for decisional criteria to make 
reference to “individual risk” yet be sensitive to population size.  For 
example, an agency might calculate the total number of individuals 
incurring different levels of “individual risk” and attempt to minimize 
the totals within each category.92  But, as shall emerge in the following 
survey of agency practice, federal agency consideration of “individual 
risk” typically does not take this form.  Instead, the fact that the “indi-
vidual risk” borne by some person in the exposure distribution lies 
above or below some stipulated level (be it 1 in 1000, 1 in 10,000, 1 in 
100,000, or 1 in 1 million) functions as a deliberational or regulatory 
trigger, or an index of regulatory success or failure, regardless of the 
number of persons in the exposure distribution—regardless of the 
size of the population exposed to the hazard.  This feature of current 
administrative practices—the use of “individual risk”-based decisional 
criteria which are insensitive to population size—is one way in which 
those practices are normatively misguided, as I shall argue in Part VI. 
A.  “Individual Risk” and Agency Practice:  The Environmental 
Protection Agency 
EPA is the largest health and safety agency in the federal govern-
ment, and “individual risk” has a central role in this agency’s decision 
making.  Most risk assessment at EPA concerns environmental toxins, 
EPA’s predominant regulatory target.  Although EPA does also have a 
role in regulating pathogens and radiation, and “individual risk” con-
siderations do come into play here,93 this survey of EPA practice will 
 
92 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 
38,044, 38,044-45 (EPA Sept. 14, 1989) (“In protecting public health with an ample 
margin of safety under section 112 [of the Clean Air Act], EPA strives to provide 
maximum feasible protection against risks to health from hazardous air pollutants by 
[inter alia] protecting the greatest number of persons possible to an individual lifetime 
risk level no higher than approximately 1 in 1 million . . . . ”); infra notes 101-02 and 
accompanying text (discussing the role of this test under the current version of section 
112). 
93 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:  Long Term 2 Enhanced Sur-
face Water Treatment Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,640, 47,669-71 (proposed Aug. 11, 2003) 
(relying on “individual risk” in proposing treatment requirements for pathogen Crypto-
sporidium pursuant to Safe Drinking Water Act); infra text accompanying notes 211-20 
(describing EPA’s use of an “individual risk” approach in setting standards for the 
storage of high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain). 
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focus on toxins.  Risk assessment for toxins falls into two subcatego-
ries:  cancer risk assessment and noncancer risk assessment.  EPA 
practices in these two areas will be described separately since there are 
important technical differences between cancer and noncancer dose-
response curves, to be explained anon. 
1.  Cancer Risk Assessment and “Individual Risk” 
What follows are the central examples of EPA programs where the 
“individual risk” of cancer is determinative, wholly or partly, of the 
agency’s regulatory choices. 
a.  Air pollution (Clean Air Act section 112) 
The chief provision of the Clean Air Act governing carcinogens is 
section 112.94  In its original form, as enacted in 1970, section 112 re-
quired EPA to identify “hazardous air pollutants”; once a chemical was 
thus listed, EPA was required to regulate emissions of the pollutant so 
as to “protect the public health” with an “ample margin of safety.”95  
The agency was slow to implement this provision, in part because of a 
dilemma created by the toxicology of carcinogens.  Carcinogens do 
not have a physiological threshold below which they lack toxicity; in 
other words, at any nonzero dose, the incremental fatality risk (in-
cremental frequency of cancer within that dosing class) is greater than 
zero.  Thus EPA faced the dilemma of either banning all emissions of 
carcinogenic pollutants (with huge economic costs) or allowing some 
emissions and therewith a nonzero probability of some deaths, in ap-
parent violation of the “ample margin of safety” language of section 
112.96 
EPA’s eventual response to this dilemma was to link section 112 
standard-setting to technological feasibility:  for nonthreshold toxins 
such as carcinogens, polluters would be required to employ the “best 
available technology” for limiting emissions.  The D.C. Circuit, in a 
 
94 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 
Stat. 2399, 2531 (1990). 
96 For discussions of Clean Air Act section 112, including its history, see Bradford 
C. Mank, What Comes After Technology:  Using an “Exceptions Process” to Improve Residual 
Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263 (1994); Patricia 
Ross McCubbin, Amending the Clean Air Act to Establish Democratic Legitimacy for the Resid-
ual Risk Program, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2003); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Randy Lowell, 
Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229 (2001); Rhomberg, 
supra note 53, at 1132-34; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 300-04, 323-27. 
  
2005] AGAINST “INDIVIDUAL RISK” 1151 
1987 decision involving the regulation of vinyl chloride, struck down 
EPA’s interpretation of section 112,97 and EPA thereupon settled on a 
new interpretation—one that looked to “individual risk.”  EPA’s new 
test for determining a permissible emission level for carcinogenic air 
pollutants ran as follows:  (1) the risk to the maximally exposed indi-
vidual could not exceed 1 in 10,000; and (2) EPA would consider fur-
ther reductions in the permissible level so as to minimize the number 
of individuals whose risk exceeded 1 in 1 million, but would also con-
sider cost and feasibility considerations at this stage of the analysis.98 
Congress quickly stepped into the fray and overhauled section 112 
in 1990.  The statute still applies to “hazardous air pollutants,” but 
now provides a specific list of 188 pollutants, which EPA can revise 
under certain conditions.  The old “ample margin of safety” test has 
been replaced with a more complicated structure.  Specifically, EPA 
must set emissions limits for carcinogenic pollutants as follows:  (1) 
the limit must be no higher than attainable using the best available 
technology;99 and (2) EPA must eventually consider even lower limits 
if the technology-based limits “do not reduce lifetime excess cancer 
risks to the individual most exposed to emissions . . . to less than one 
in one million.”100  This explicit statutory “individual risk” provision 
seemingly functions as a decisional trigger requiring EPA to consider 
lower limits, not a substantive requirement that the lower limits must 
meet,101 and the statute appears to contemplate that EPA will employ 
its hybrid, pre-1990 test (no “individual risk” above 1 in 10,000; mini-
mize the number of individuals incurring a risk above 1 in 1 million, 
 
97 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(en banc). 
98 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 
38,044-45 (Sept. 14, 1989). 
99 More precisely, limits for “major” sources are to be based on “maximum achiev-
able control technology,” which is in turn defined differently for existing and new ma-
jor sources, while limits for “area” sources are to be based on “generally available con-
trol technology.”  See Reitze & Lowell, supra note 96, at 247, 256-60. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).  The 1 in 1 million level is also explicitly 
employed in a second subsection of section 112, which allows EPA to exempt a cate-
gory of sources from regulation if “no source in the category . . . emits [carcinogenic] 
hazardous air pollutants in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater 
than one in one million to the individual in the population who is most exposed to 
emissions of such pollutants from the source.”  42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) (2000). 
101 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1134. 
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taking into consideration cost and feasibility) as the substantive crite-
rion here.102 
b.  Water pollution (Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act) 
The Clean Water Act103 requires that point sources of water pollu-
tion be licensed, either by EPA or by a state acting as EPA’s delegate.  
License conditions must ensure both that the point source meets 
EPA’s technology-based limitations and that discharges not result in 
violations of state water quality standards.  These standards (which are 
also independently enforced by the states) are reviewed and approved 
by EPA.104  Historically, EPA encouraged states to set standards for car-
cinogens so that an individual consuming a quantity of water (two li-
ters a day) that was seen as somewhat above average but below the 
“high end” of the distribution, and eating a similar amount of fish (6.5 
grams a day), would incur a fatality risk in the range of 1 in 10 million 
to 1 in 100,000.  In effect, then, EPA’s review of state water quality 
standards focused on “individual risk” to an above-average but non-
maximal individual.105  Several years ago, EPA revised this policy to fo-
cus on the 90th percentile consumer, rather than someone whose fish 
and water intake is closer to average, and to adopt the 1 in 1 million 
“individual risk” level as its water quality goal.106  It should be stressed 
that EPA’s articulated “individual risk” goals under the Clean Water 
Act (historically a range of 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10 million, now 1 in 1 
million) are goals rather than rigid requirements, and EPA has been 
 
102 EPA has announced its intention to use the pre-1990 test.  See OFFICE OF AIR & 
RADIATION, EPA, RESIDUAL RISK:  REPORT TO CONGRESS, at ES-11, 124 (1999), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/risk_rep.pdf; National Emissions Stan-
dards for Coke Oven Batteries, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,338, 48,339-40 (proposed Aug. 9, 
2004). 
103 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
104 See 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §§ 13.31-.92 (Sheldon M. Novick et 
al. eds., 2004) (describing the Clean Water Act). 
105 See Revisions to the Methodology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality Criteria 
for the Protection of Human Health, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,444, 66,445-47 (Nov. 3, 2000); 
Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1162-70; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 309-13; 
Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 26-27. 
106 See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., EPA, METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING AMBIENT WA-
TER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH (2000), at 1-8, 2-6, 4-
23, 4-25 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/humanhealth/method/ 
complete.pdf; Revisions to the Methodology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality Cri-
teria for the Protection of Human Health, 65 Fed. Reg. at 66,445-47. 
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willing to approve state water quality standards that are somewhat less 
protective.107 
The other key water pollution statute enforced by EPA is the Safe 
Drinking Water Act.108  Under this statute, EPA directly promulgates 
federal water standards, which apply to virtually all public water sup-
plies.109  These standards are set in a two-step process:  first, for each 
drinking water contaminant EPA sets a maximum contaminant level 
goal (MCLG), namely that level of the contaminant “at which no 
known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur 
and which allows an adequate margin of safety.”110  Then, EPA estab-
lishes the legally permissible level—a higher level—by taking into con-
sideration nonhealth factors.  Historically, the statutory language gov-
erning this second step focused on technological feasibility but also 
adverted to cost considerations:  EPA was enjoined to set the legal 
standards as close to the MCLGs as “feasible,” defined to mean “feasi-
ble with the use of the best technology, treatment techniques and 
other means which . . . are available (taking cost into consideration).”111  
In 1996, the statute was amended to permit a cost-benefit analysis in 
lieu of the feasibility analysis at the second step.112 
EPA relies, in part, on “individual risk” in setting MCLGs.  Where 
EPA has strong evidence that a substance is a carcinogen, it sets the 
MCLG at zero; where it has weaker evidence (say, some evidence of 
carcinogenicity in animal tests and no direct epidemiological evi-
dence), EPA sets the MCLG so that the “individual risk” to the indi-
vidual drinking an above-average amount of water is within the range 
of 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1 million.113 
 
107 See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 106, at 2-6 to 2-7; Revisions to the Meth-
odology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality Criteria for the Protection of Human 
Health, 65 Fed. Reg. at 66,449; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 26-27. 
108 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000). 
109 See 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 104, at §§ 17.1-.24  (de-
scribing the Safe Drinking Water Act). 
110 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2000). 
111 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1(b)(4), (5) (1994). 
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6) (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 104(a)(6), 110 Stat. 1613, 1623-25 . 
113 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,030, 19,051 
n.7 (Apr. 17, 2002); Revisions to the Methodology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality 
Criteria for the Protection of Human Health, 65 Fed. Reg. at 66,445-47; Rhomberg, 
supra note 53, at 1162-70; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 309-13; Sadowitz & Gra-
ham, supra note 88, at 27.  But see National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 68 
Fed. Reg. 49,548, 49,576-79 (proposed Aug. 18, 2003) (proposing non-zero MCLG for 
chloroform after D.C. Circuit vacated zero MCLG). 
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And, historically, EPA has also relied on “individual risk” in deriv-
ing enforceable federal standards from the MCLGs.  Notwithstanding 
the statutory “feasibility” language, EPA typically set enforceable stan-
dards so that “individual risks” to above-average individuals lay in the 
range of 1 in 1 million to 1 in 10,000.114  This practice has been 
changed, although not radically so, by the 1996 amendments.  In re-
cent Safe Drinking Water Act rulemakings, EPA has relied both on the 
traditional “individual risk” test just described and on cost-benefit 
analyses incorporating information about aggregate deaths in setting 
enforceable federal drinking water standards.115 
c.  Solid waste (RCRA and CERCLA) 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)116 and 
EPA’s implementing regulations subject solid, hazardous waste to 
numerous stringent requirements, covering the generation, transpor-
tation, and (most stringently) the disposal of such wastes.  These re-
quirements are generally framed in fairly specific terms—for example, 
requiring disposers to employ certain technologies—and not in risk 
terms.117  Rather, risk assessment comes into play under RCRA in 
EPA’s initial determination whether to “list” particular substances as 
“hazardous wastes,” thereby subjecting those substances to the oner-
ous requirements just mentioned.  Risk assessment also has a role to 
play in specifying generic toxicity characteristics such that substances 
with these characteristics are automatically “hazardous wastes” even 
without being “listed” by EPA.118 
With respect to “listing” decisions, EPA policy has been to catego-
rize a carcinogen-containing substance as a “hazardous waste” if un-
regulated disposal of the substance—specifically, disposal in ordinary 
municipal landfills and subsequent dissemination through groundwa-
ter—would produce an “individual risk” to a highly exposed individ-
ual (an individual in the 85th or 90th percentile of exposure) greater 
than 1 in 10,000.  The agency exercises discretion in the range be-
tween 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1 million.  Previously “listed” substances 
 
114 See sources cited supra note 113. 
115 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7020-23 
(Jan. 22, 2001) (arsenic); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76,708, 76,712-15 (Dec. 7, 2000) (uranium). 
116 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
117 For an overview of RCRA, see JOHN W. TEETS ET AL., RCRA:  RESOURCE CONSERVA-
TION AND RECOVERY ACT (2003). 
118 See id. at 21-43 (discussing the definition of hazardous waste). 
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can be delisted if their “individual risk” level is below 1 in 1 million.  
EPA considers substances to be generically toxic if they leach certain 
chemicals above specified concentrations, and in setting these con-
centrations the agency has employed an “individual risk” level of 1 in 
100,000.119 
RCRA also empowers EPA to order remedial action at active waste-
disposal sites.  The general agency practice, here, is apparently to per-
form a detailed study of remedial options for particular sites produc-
ing more than a 1 in 1 million risk to the highly exposed individual, 
and then to consider cost and feasibility in choosing among these op-
tions but reject remedial options resulting in more than a 1 in 10,000 
risk (again to the highly exposed individual).120  Site-specific risk as-
sessments may be performed, too, for hazardous waste incinerators, 
which under RCRA require licenses.  EPA apparently once took the 
position that a site-specific risk assessment demonstrating an “individ-
ual risk” (to a highly exposed individual) below 1 in 100,000 was a 
precondition for licensure.121  More recently, EPA in a major rulemak-
ing determined that technology-based standards for incinerators re-
quired by the Clean Air Act would generally reduce risks from dioxin 
emissions to individuals in the 90th percentile of exposure below 1 in 
 
119 See Hazardous Waste Management System, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,088 (pro-
posed Feb 13, 2001); Hazardous Waste Management System, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,798, 
11,814-15 (Mar. 29, 1990); Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1170-77; Rosenthal et al., supra 
note 88, at 314-17; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 29-30; see also Hazardous 
Waste Identification Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,382 , 63,440-41 (proposed Nov. 19, 1999) 
(proposing to use chemical-specific exemptions, determined on the basis of “individ-
ual risk,” to exempt listed hazardous waste from RCRA requirements).  EPA once em-
ployed an “individual risk” level of 1 in 100,000 in its listing decisions, but current pol-
icy appears to be that the agency will exercise discretion within the range of 1 in 10,000 
to 1 in 1 million.  See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1177. 
120 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1170-77; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 314-
17; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 29-30.  EPA proposed adopting this policy as 
part of a comprehensive corrective action rule for RCRA, but eventually decided not to 
promulgate such a rule.  See Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units at 
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,804 (proposed July 
27, 1990); Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units at Hazardous Waste 
Management Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,604, 54,606 (Oct. 7, 1999).  However, in decid-
ing not to promulgate the rule, EPA affirmed that a 1996 advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking “should be considered the primary corrective action implementation 
guidance.”  See id. at 54,607.  That 1996 document, in turn, affirms the “individual 
risk”-based policy for RCRA cleanups.  Corrective Action for Releases from Solid Waste 
Management Units at Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432, 
19,446, 19,449-50 (May 1, 1996). 
121 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1170-77. 
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10,000, and therefore that site-specific risk assessments were not pre-
sumptively required.122 
While RCRA is forward-looking, the Superfund statute, the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),123 is backward-looking.  CERCLA authorizes EPA to order 
clean-ups of inactive waste sites, with the expense of the clean-up 
borne by a range of private actors associated with the site.124  Site-
specific risk assessments are absolutely central to EPA’s remedial deci-
sions under CERCLA.  And the goal of these risk assessments, like 
those under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, RCRA, and (with 
some recent exceptions) the Safe Drinking Water Act, is not to gener-
ate information about “population risk.”  Instead, CERCLA site-
specific assessments focus on “individual risk” given a “reasonable 
maximum exposure.”  “Reasonable maximum exposure,” as that con-
struct is specified by EPA, is the “maximum exposure that is reasona-
bly expected to occur at a site.”125  More specifically, “reasonable 
maximum exposure” is calculated by using: 
[some] values for exposure factors . . . that are mean estimates (body 
weight) and some parameter values that are upper bounds (e.g., expo-
sure duration).  For the concentration of the chemical at the site, the 
EPA guidance directs that the 95th upper confidence limit on the esti-
mate of the mean concentration at the site or the maximum detected 
concentration be used, whichever is lower.
126
 
 
122 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:  Proposed Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 69 Fed. Reg. 
21,198, 21,325-31 (proposed Apr. 20, 2004); NESHAPS:  Final Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 52,839-43 (Sept. 
30, 1999), vacated by Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 871-72 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Revised Standards for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 61 
Fed. Reg. 17,358, 17,370-72 (proposed Apr. 19, 1996).  The most recent EPA draft 
guidance document for site-specific incinerator risk assessments does not specify “indi-
vidual risk” levels that licensed incinerators should meet.  See EPA, 1 HUMAN HEALTH 
RISK ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE COMBUSTION FACILITIES, Peer 
Review Draft at 7-9 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/combust/ 
risk.htm. 
123 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
124 For an overview of the CERCLA program, see 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION, supra note 104, at §§ 14:100-14:127. 
125 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL RESPONSE, EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT GUID-
ANCE FOR SUPERFUND, VOLUME 1:  HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL (PART A), 
Interim Final at 6-19 (1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/ 
ragsa. 
126 HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 13. 
  
2005] AGAINST “INDIVIDUAL RISK” 1157 
EPA policy (more formalized than in the RCRA context) is to or-
der clean-up at a CERCLA site where the individual cancer risk conse-
quent upon “reasonable maximum exposure” exceeds 1 in 10,000; to 
refrain from clean-up where this risk is less than 1 in 1 million; and to 
exercise discretion in the range between the two levels.  A clean-up, if 
ordered, must bring “individual risk” to the reasonably maximally ex-
posed individual to within this same range of “individual risk” levels (1 
in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million); once more, the agency has discretion, 
within this range, to consider factors other than “individual risk.”127 
In exercising its discretionary authority to order a clean-up and to 
set remedial goals under CERCLA, EPA considers factors such as cost 
and feasibility, but not “population risk”—at least not in any formal 
way, since the aggregate deaths caused by existing contamination and 
avoided by different remedial interventions are not quantified.128  
Some commentators have suggested that “EPA is most likely to [order 
a remedy within the 1 in 1 million to 1 in 10,000 range] . . . when 
population density suggests potentially high incidence of disease”129 
and that “EPA may be more inclined to select a more stringent rem-
edy if a large number of people may be exposed to risks from the 
site.”130  But it is clear that “population risk” has at most a subordinate 
role in EPA’s administration of the CERCLA program.  Hamilton and 
Viscusi studied a sample of 150 sites where EPA had ordered remedia-
tion and found that, although 731 cancer cases would be averted, 
most of these were clustered at a few sites.131 “[A]t the majority of sites 
 
127 On the role of “individual risk” considerations in EPA’s clean-up policy under 
CERCLA, see HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 25-29; Rhomberg, supra note 53,  
at 1178-86; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 317-20; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 
88, at 28-29.  The central features of the policy, including the “individual risk” targets, 
have been codified in a formal regulation.  See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) 
(2004). 
128 See, e.g., HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 14-15 (“[EPA does not] assess 
expected cancer cases averted through site cleanups.  The size of the exposed popula-
tion does not explicitly appear in EPA’s analysis of site remediation alternatives.”); 
Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1182 (“Under EPA Superfund policy, population risks are 
not formally considered, so quantitative estimates of population risk rarely appear in 
risk assessments.”). 
129 Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 320. 
130 Philip E. Karmel, Achieving Radical Reductions in Cleanup Costs, in NEW SOLU-
TIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS & REAL ESTATE DEALS 2003, at 371, 
398 (PLI Real Estate L. & Prac. Course, Handbook Series No. 499, 2003).  See also 
Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1182 (“[S]ome EPA Regional Project Managers (RPMs) 
have unofficially acknowledged that the magnitude of the potentially exposed popula-
tion sometimes informally affects remedial decisions.”). 
131 See HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 15, 104-07. 
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the expected number of cancer cases averted is less than 0.1 cases per 
site based on conservative risk parameter estimates.”132 
d.  Pesticides (FIFRA and FQPA) 
EPA administers two significant statutes covering pesticides.  The 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)133 is the 
more general statute and requires all pesticides to be “registered” (li-
censed) by EPA.  FIFRA gives lower priority to safety than many other 
EPA statutes. Its central criterion is, explicitly, a balancing criterion; 
pesticides and pesticide uses are to be permitted absent “unreasonable 
risks” to human life or the environment.134  Nonetheless, EPA in ad-
ministering FIFRA has given substantial weight to “individual risk,” 
and has employed the same range of “individual risk” levels (1 in 1 
million to 1 in 10,000) as are operative in its other regulatory pro-
grams.  Specifically, in evaluating pesticide licenses and license condi-
tions, EPA considers the risks posed by pesticides to food consumers, 
workers, and the general public (nonworkers exposed to pesticides 
through pathways other than food consumption, e.g., water contami-
nation or contact with pesticides used in the home).  And it typically 
seeks to reduce exposures to carcinogenic pesticides, in all three cate-
gories, below an “individual risk” level of 1 in 1 million, with some tol-
erance for higher levels.  Exposure modeling assumptions blend mid-
range and high-range parameter values, so the “individual risk” here is 
that of an individual receiving an above-average but nonmaximal ex-
posure.135 
 
132 Id. at 15.  It appears that at only a relatively small number of the 150 sites was 
“no action” selected as the remedy.  See id. at 248; see generally id. at app. A (describing 
the study methodology). 
133 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). 
134 For an overview of FIFRA, see 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra 
note 104, at §§ 18:1 to :68. 
135 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1111-23; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 304-
06.  This paragraph summarizes FIFRA practices as of the mid-1990s, when the Rhom-
berg report was written.  Since then, it appears, EPA has changed its risk assessment 
practices under FIFRA, as a result of the Food Quality Protection Act, by focusing on 
aggregate risks to consumers from the combination of food, water, and residential ex-
posures, and on cumulative risks resulting from multiple pesticides with a common 
mechanism of toxicity.  See OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, EPA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
FOR PERFORMING AGGREGATE EXPOSURE AND RISK ASSESSMENTS (2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/trac/science/aggregate.pdf; OFFICE OF PESTICIDE 
PROGRAMS, EPA, GUIDANCE ON CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF PESTICIDE CHEMI-
CALS THAT HAVE A COMMON MECHANISM OF TOXICITY (2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/trac/science/cumulative_guidance.pdf. 
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The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has a special section covering 
pesticides,136 and these provisions are administered by EPA rather than 
FDA.  EPA sets “tolerances,” that is, maximum permissible concentra-
tions, for pesticide residues on raw or processed food.  Foods exceed-
ing the tolerances are, legally, “adulterated” and subject to seizure.137  
Prior to 1996, EPA was required to set a zero tolerance for carcino-
genic pesticide residues in processed foods, under certain conditions 
(by virtue of the Delaney Clause); otherwise, the statute instructed 
EPA to employ a balancing test in setting tolerances.  In practice, for 
carcinogenic pesticides not covered by the zero-risk standard, EPA fol-
lowed its general approach under FIFRA, namely to aim at reducing 
the cancer risk to an above-average food consumer below 1 in 1 mil-
lion.138 
Congress overhauled this statutory regime for pesticide tolerances 
with the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,139 which repealed the 
applicability of the Delaney Clause to pesticides.  Tolerances for car-
cinogenic pesticide residues on both raw and processed foods are now 
to be set so that there is a “reasonable certainty that no harm will re-
sult from aggregate exposure to the pesticide.”140  Despite the switch 
from balancing language to language giving greater weight to safety, 
the House Committee report states explicitly that EPA should imple-
ment the new statutory provisions through the 1 in 1 million “individ-
ual risk” test that the agency had used (outside the Delaney context) 
prior to 1996.141 
 
136 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2000). 
137 For a summary of both the current and the pre-1996 systems of pesticide “tol-
erances,” see Dominic P. Madigan, Note, Setting an Anti-Cancer Policy:  Risk, Politics, and 
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 188-205 (1998). 
138 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1111-23; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 304-06. 
139 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 21 U.S.C.); see also Madigan, supra 
note 137, at 198-205. 
140 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
141 H.R. REP. NO. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996).  “Individual risk” also plays a role in 
EPA’s “Threshold of Regulation” policy for pesticide tolerances, which provides that 
tolerances will not be needed for pesticide uses where there are no detected residues 
and the incremental “individual risk” from any “theoretically possible” residues is be-
low 1 in 1 billion.  See THRESHOLD OF REGULATION POLICY:  DECIDING WHETHER A PES-
TICIDE WITH A FOOD USE PATTERN NEEDS A TOLERANCE 7 (1999) (referenced in Pesti-
cides, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,881, 57,881 (Oct. 27, 1999)), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-PEST/1999/October/Day-27/6042.pdf. 
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e.  Toxic Substances Control Act 
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)142 authorizes EPA to 
control, through rulemaking, any chemical that “present[s] an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”143  This sweeping 
authority is hedged by a provision that makes TSCA a back-up stat-
ute—toxics are to be regulated under TSCA only if other statutes are 
insufficient to meet the risk144—and in practice has been rarely used.145  
The office within EPA responsible for administering TSCA takes the 
position that carcinogens expected to cause fewer than one death per 
year, or less than a 1 in 1 million risk to a highly exposed individual, 
do not warrant regulatory intervention.  Conversely, in its stated justi-
fications for the rules that have been promulgated under TSCA, EPA 
has invoked both “individual risk” and “population risk.”146 
f.  Title VI 
A very different, but significant, context where “individual risk” 
will likely play a role in EPA practice concerns the racial impact of 
state and local environmental decisions.  Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 authorizes federal agencies to issue regulations prohibit-
ing recipients of federal funds, including state actors, from activities 
that have a disparate racial impact.147  EPA has promulgated Title VI 
regulations, and recently published an important guidance document 
explaining how Title VI challenges to licensing decisions by state or 
local environmental agencies (e.g., a decision to allow a waste dump 
in a minority neighborhood) will be evaluated.148  The guidance 
makes clear that a disparity between the minority population affected 
by the licensed facility and a comparison population, not merely in 
overall death rates, but in “individual risks” to representative or highly 
 
142 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000). 
143 Id. § 2605(a). 
144 Id. § 2608. 
145 See 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 104, at §§ 16.3-.4. 
146 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1123-30; Rosenthal et al., supra note 88, at 306-
09. 
147 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1(2000). 
148 Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environ-
mental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance 
for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Re-
vised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27, 2000); see also Adler, supra 
note 20, at 1426-28 (discussing Title VI and the “individual risk” approach of the EPA 
guidelines). 
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exposed individuals, could constitute an illegal “disparate impact” for 
Title VI purposes.149 
2.  Risk Assessment of Noncarcinogens 
Traditionally, noncancer and cancer risk assessment have been 
performed somewhat differently.  Toxic effects other than cancer 
have been seen to have a physiological threshold.  The difference, 
crudely, stems from the special causal mechanism for cancer—DNA 
damage to some cells, followed by proliferation of those cells—such 
that a dose so small as to be genotoxic to but a single cell might, in 
unfortunate circumstances, lead to fatal cancer for the organism.150 
Dose-response evaluation is therefore performed differently for 
noncancer toxicity than for cancers.151  Experiments and epidemiol-
ogical studies are still used to produce dose-response data points pair-
ing doses of the toxin with incremental risks (frequencies) of death or 
some other adverse effect, relative to background.  But instead of fit-
ting a linear function to these data points, or some other function 
without a threshold, the analyst instead identifies the so-called NO-
AEL (“no observed adverse effect level”):  the “highest tested dose at 
which no statistically significant elevation over background in the in-
cidence of the adverse effect was observed.”152  So-called safety factors 
are then applied to the NOAEL dose to produce a conservative esti-
mate of the physiologically safe level.  Typically, this means dividing 
 
149 Yet another area in which EPA has supported the use of “individual risk” tests is 
so-called comparative risk assessment—regulatory priority-setting at a high level.  
EPA’s guidebook, here, suggests that “individual risk” should play a role.  See Adler, 
supra note 20, at 1431-36. 
150 See HALLENBECK, supra note 28, at 21-25; JOSEPH V. RODRICKS, CALCULATED 
RISKS:  UNDERSTANDING THE TOXICITY AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS OF CHEMICALS IN 
OUR ENVIRONMENT 166-70 (1992); Graham, supra note 15, at 31-34. 
151 Good summaries of noncancer risk assessment include:  CRAWFORD-BROWN, 
supra note 28, at 123-56; HALLENBECK, supra note 28, at 29-42, 118-26; Felter et al., su-
pra note 28, at 9-16; Mark C. Gibson et al., Comparison of Noncancer Risk Assessment Ap-
proaches for Use in Deriving Drinking Water Criteria, 26 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOL-
OGY 243, 245-54 (1997); Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1105-08; Williams & Paustenbach, 
supra note 17, at 315-18, 331-35. 
152 Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1105.  Strictly speaking, agencies sometimes em-
ploy constructs other than a NOAEL to identify a safe level of a noncarcinogen, for 
example a “LOAEL” or “benchmark dose.”  See sources cited supra note 151.  The basic 
idea remains the same, though:  the NOAEL, LOAEL, or benchmark dose of the toxin, 
divided by appropriate safety factors, is supposed to be a dose that almost certainly cre-
ates zero “individual risk.” 
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the NOAEL dose by a factor of 10, 100, or 1000.153  The resultant dose, 
termed the “reference dose” (RfD)154 by EPA, is the physiologically 
safe dose, to a high degree of certainty:  that dose, and lower doses, do 
not (it can be said with great confidence) produce an incremental risk 
of death. 
This difference between the procedure for estimating noncancer 
and cancer risk leads to a difference in how “individual risks” for non-
carcinogens are expressed.  The “individual risk” incurred by a par-
ticular person, given her exposure to a noncarcinogen, is expressed as 
a ratio of the dose to the RfD—not as a probability number.  For ex-
ample, if the RfD for the toxin is a lifetime dose of 100 grams, and the 
exposure assessment predicts that the maximally exposed individual 
will receive a lifetime dose of twenty-five grams, she will be ascribed an 
“individual risk” index of 1/4.  If the exposure assessment instead 
predicts a maximal exposure of 200 grams, the “individual risk” index 
to the maximally exposed person is two.  These nonprobabilistic indi-
ces of “individual risk” are less meaningful than the probabilistic indi-
ces employed for carcinogens.  All that a nonprobabilistic index num-
ber less than one means is this:  to a high degree of certainty, the 
incremental fatality risk incurred by that person is zero.  All that a 
nonprobabilistic index number greater than one means is the nega-
tion, namely it cannot be stated with a high degree of confidence that 
the individual incurs a zero incremental fatality risk. 
EPA generally conducts risk assessments for noncarcinogens, and 
looks to “individual risk” in making regulatory decisions, in the same 
statutory contexts as for carcinogens.155  For example, under the Clean 
 
153 See Michael L. Dourson et al., Evolution of Science-Based Uncertainty Factors in Non-
cancer Risk Assessment, 24 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 108 (1996). 
154 For inhaled noncarcinogens, EPA uses “reference concentrations” (RfC) instead 
of “reference doses.”  See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1106-07. 
155 An important counterexample is air pollution.  Although section 112 of the 
Clean Air Act generally applies to “hazardous air pollutants,” including both carcino-
gens and noncarcinogens, the explicit statutory “individual risk” provision, see 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2) (2000), applies only to carcinogens.  This provision makes the 1 in 
1 million level an “individual risk” trigger, requiring EPA to consider lowering existing 
technology based standards.  See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.  EPA has an-
nounced its intention to use a parallel “individual risk” trigger for noncarcinogens.  See 
OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 102, at 116-18.  But the substantive criteria that 
EPA will rely upon, once deliberation is triggered, may differ as between carcinogens 
and noncarcinogens.  For carcinogens, EPA will rely upon the pre-1990 test, which is 
relatively clearly articulated and focuses on “individual risk.”  The substantive test it will 
use for noncarcinogens is less clear.  See id. at 122-25. 
 The so-called “criteria” air pollutants (currently sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, 
carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead), which EPA regulates under sec-
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Water Act, EPA encourages states to set water quality standards for 
noncarcinogenic toxins so that the index of “individual risk” to the 
above-average individual will be less than one.156  Under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, EPA sets MCLGs and (typically) federal standards 
so that the index of “individual risk” (again to the above-average indi-
vidual) is less than one.157  Under CERCLA, the agency looks to the 
“individual risk” from noncarcinogens to a person receiving a “rea-
sonable maximum exposure” from the waste site under review, once 
more seeking to keep that index number below unity.158  Under FI-
FRA, the agency takes into consideration the “individual risk” that 
those exposed to noncarcinogenic pesticides incur.159 
Despite this procedural parallel between EPA’s use of “individual 
risk” numbers in regulating both carcinogens and noncarcinogens, 
there is an important, substantive difference.  Because EPA’s cutoff 
for noncarcinogens is an “individual risk” index number equaling 
one, while its cutoff for carcinogens is an “individual risk” probability 
number ranging from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million, “individual risk”-
based assessment focusing on the maximally exposed individual tracks “popu-
lation risk”-based assessment for noncarcinogenic toxins but not carcinogens.  
Imagine that a population of 100 million is exposed to a toxin, with 
five million receiving maximal exposures.  If the toxin is carcinogenic 
and EPA uses the more conservative 1 in 1 million number in regulat-
ing the toxin, seeking to bring maximal exposures to that level, it can 
expect a “population risk” of at least five deaths caused by the toxin 
after regulation.  By contrast, if the toxin is noncarcinogenic and EPA 
uses the index number of one as its cutoff, it can expect a “population 
risk” of zero deaths caused by the toxin after regulation. 
 
tion 109 of the Clean Air Act, are noncarcinogens.  However, EPA has not employed 
the traditional NOAEL/safety factor methodology in setting standards under section 
109 since the criteria pollutants do not have clear thresholds for all their health effects.  
See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands:  The Limits of Science in Setting 
Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1283-90 (2004); Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 
1157-58. 
156 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1162-70. 
157 See id.  How this practice will be affected by the 1996 amendment to the Act 
remains to be seen.  See supra text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing the amend-
ment). 
158 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1178-86. 
159 See id. at 1111-23.  For other discussions of EPA’s risk assessment of noncar-
cinogens, see Donald G. Barnes & Michael Dourson, Reference Dose (RfD):  Description 
and Use in Health Risk Assessments, 8 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 471 (1988); 
Carole A. Kimmel, Quantitative Approaches to Human Risk Assessment for Noncancer Health 
Effects, 11 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 189 (1990). 
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In other words, in some contexts involving the regulation of non-
carcinogens, the advocate of risk assessment practices sensitive to 
“population risk” rather than “individual risk” need not be troubled 
by EPA’s focus on “individual risk.”  For in these contexts the two 
practices are convergent.  But the point should not be pressed too far.  
Crucially, the convergence depends on whose “individual risk” is be-
ing evaluated.  Regulatory techniques for noncarcinogens that focus 
on the “individual risk” borne by some individual other than the 
maximally exposed person—the average person, say, or the person in 
the 90th percentile of exposure—and that seek to ensure that this in-
dividual’s index number is below one do not correspond to the regula-
tory goal of zero “population risk.”  If 100 million are exposed to the 
toxin, five million receive maximal exposures, and EPA ensures that 
less exposed individuals are at zero incremental risk of fatality, then 
(obviously) it remains possible that maximal exposures result in a 
nonzero “individual risk” and hence a nonzero number of aggregate 
deaths. 
B.  “Individual Risk” and Agency Practice:  Other Agencies 
1.  The Food and Drug Administration 
FDA regulates the safety of foods, drugs, medical devices, and bio-
logics, and employs risk assessment in all these areas.160  “Individual 
risk” has long played a key role in FDA decision making, particularly 
with respect to food safety.161 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act162 requires “food additives” and 
“color additives” to be licensed by FDA, under a statutory standard 
 
160 Good reviews of FDA risk assessment practices include:  D.W. Gaylor et al., su-
pra note 91; Ronald W. Moch et al., Food and Drug Administration Risk Assessment—
Process and Toxicologic Pathology, 25 TOXICOLOGIC PATHOLOGY 61, 61-63 (1997); Rhom-
berg, supra note 53, at 1043-60.  An older review is Rodricks et al., supra note 47.  For 
state-of-the-art reviews of food risk assessment more generally, see E. Dybing et al., 
Hazard Characterisation of Chemicals in Food and Diet:  Dose Response, Mechanisms and Ex-
trapolation Issues, 40 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 237 (2002); L. Edler et al., Mathemati-
cal Modelling and Quantitative Methods, 40 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 283 (2002). 
161 As already mentioned, the now widespread view that a 1 in 1 million level of 
“individual risk” constitutes a de minimis risk level—such that toxins or other hazards 
creating a lower “individual risk” can be ignored by regulators—derives from an FDA 
decision in the 1970s.  See supra text accompanying note 47. 
162 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000). 
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that gives high priority to safety.163  For food additives and color addi-
tives that may be toxic but are not carcinogenic, FDA employs the 
standard NOAEL/safety factor method that (as we have seen) is used 
by EPA for noncarcinogens.  Experiments are undertaken or epide-
miological data is checked, and the dose of the noncarcinogen that 
produces zero incremental frequency of death in the group of sub-
jects receiving that dose, relative to background, is determined.  That 
dose is then divided by a “safety factor” (typically 100 at FDA) to de-
rive the “safe” level of the noncarcinogenic toxin.  This is, in effect, 
the dose that is highly likely to involve zero “individual risk.”  FDA 
then combines that number with information about food consump-
tion patterns to determine the maximum permissible concentration of 
the noncarcinogenic food or color additive in the foods to which it is 
added.  Specifically, FDA seeks to ensure that the 90th percentile food 
consumer will not ingest more than the “safe” dose of the noncar-
cinogenic additive.164  Because FDA focuses on the 90th percentile of 
the consumption distribution, not on the maximally exposed individ-
ual, this method cannot be justified as assuring zero “population risk.”  
At least in principle, depending on consumption patterns above the 
90th percentile and the size of the population, a concentration of 
some additive that very likely creates zero “individual risk” for the 90th 
percentile consumer might also be likely to cause more than zero 
deaths. 
FDA apparently employs an analogous method in setting permis-
sible levels of pathogenic microorganisms, including bacteria, molds, 
yeasts, and viruses, in foods.  The degree of microbial contamination 
that will not sicken a high-end consumer is determined, and then di-
vided by a safety factor.165 
Carcinogenic food and color additives are governed by the infa-
mous Delaney Clause:  a flat ban on any additive if it is “found to in-
duce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after 
tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of . . . addi-
tives, to induce cancer in man or animal.”166  This Clause bars FDA 
 
163 See id. §§ 348, 379e (2000); see also 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG AD-
MINISTRATION chs. 11-12 (2d ed. 1995) (describing FDA regulation of food and color 
additives). 
164 FDA’s risk assessment practices for noncarcinogenic food and color additives 
are discussed in Gaylor et al., supra note 91, at 307-09; Moch et al., supra note 160, at 
61-62; and Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1055-60. 
165 See Gaylor et al., supra note 91, at 308-09. 
166 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000) (food additives); see id. § 379e(b)(5)(B) (par-
allel provision for color additives). 
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from licensing the use of an additive, at any level, if the additive itself 
has been found to be carcinogenic.  But FDA has long interpreted the 
Clause, without judicial disagreement, to include an important excep-
tion:  an additive which has not itself been found to be carcinogenic, 
but has some nonfunctional chemical constituent that is carcinogenic, 
is not governed by the Delaney Clause.167  Instead, FDA’s view is that 
such carcinogen-containing additives are subject to the background 
“safety” requirement generally applicable to additives.  FDA licenses 
these additives by setting a maximum permissible concentration of the 
additive sufficiently low to ensure that the 90th-percentile food con-
sumer incurs an “individual risk” of cancer death no greater than 1 in 
1 million.168 
The Delaney Clause applies not merely to food and color addi-
tives, but also to animal drugs and feeds.169  The concern, of course, is 
that human carcinogens, if fed to animals, might accumulate in meats 
and other foods derived from animals.  But the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act includes an explicit exception to the proscription on car-
cinogenic animal drugs and feeds: 
[The Delaney Clause] shall not apply with respect to the use of a sub-
stance as an ingredient of feed for animals which are raised for food 
production, if [FDA] finds . . . that no residue of the additive will be 
found . . . in any edible portion of such animal after slaughter or in any 
food yielded by or derived from this living animal . . . .
170
 
FDA’s reading of this statutory “no residue” exception to the De-
laney Clause has been creative.  A literal reading of the exception 
would make it a virtual nullity, given the miniscule concentrations that 
are detectable with modern techniques used to analyze food contami-
nants.  Instead, FDA has (until recently) interpreted “no residue” as 
“safe”; safety, in turn, has been equated with the traditional 1 in 1 mil-
lion level of “individual risk.”  Carcinogenic residues of animal drugs 
 
167 See Gaylor et al., supra note 91, at 309-10; Moch et al., supra note 160, at 62; 
Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1051; Rodricks et al., supra note 47, at 535-36. 
168 See Gaylor et al., supra note 91, at 307-10; Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1052-60. 
169 Carcinogenic animal drugs are directly proscribed by a separate Delaney 
Clause.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(I) (2000).  Animal feeds that fall within the broad 
statutory definition of food additive, see id. § 321(s), are covered by the food additive 
Delaney Clause. 
170 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000) (food additives); see also id. § 360b(d)(1)(I) 
(parallel exception for animal drugs); id. § 379e(b)(5)(B) (parallel exception for color 
additives). 
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and feeds have been permitted at a concentration imposing a 1 in 1 
million risk on the 90th-percentile consumer.171 
This “individual risk”-based interpretation of the Delaney Clause 
with respect to animal drugs and feeds was revised by FDA in 2002, in 
response to a determination by the Department of Justice that the “no 
residue” provision could not be read to countenance carcinogens that 
actually produced detected residues.172  FDA’s new approach is there-
fore more roundabout, but still incorporates an “individual risk” test:  
the 1 in 1 million level is used to determine how sensitive analytical 
methods for detecting carcinogen residues must be, and the “no resi-
due” requirement is satisfied if none is detected above the “limit of 
detection” of an approved analytical method.173 
FDA has general jurisdiction over food safety, subsuming not 
merely food and color additives and animal drugs, but any toxin in 
food—for example, environmental contaminants such as PCBs and 
aflatoxins.  The burden of action rests on FDA—foods are not li-
censed by FDA, but rather are subject to seizure, regulation, and pen-
alties if dangerous—and the underlying statutory standard is more 
permissive than for additives.174  FDA decision making here is sensitive 
to the costs of eliminating food toxins (for example the hedonic and 
nutritional costs of banning food products containing the toxins, as 
reflected in the market price of the foods), in contrast to additive 
regulation, where safety is the sole acknowledged regulatory consid-
eration.175  Concentrations of food and color additives posing a non-de 
minimis risk of death or injury are flatly proscribed by the agency; that 
is not necessarily true for other food toxins.  Still, “individual risk” 
plays a role in FDA regulation of such toxins (carcinogens and non-
carcinogens alike) by serving to define the de minimis level.  Foods 
containing toxins below that level—a 1 in 1 million “individual risk” 
for carcinogens, a zero “individual risk” for noncarcinogens—are seen 
 
171 See Sponsored Compounds in Food-Producing Animals, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,572, 
49,572-74 (Dec. 31, 1987); Gaylor et al., supra note 91, at 311-12; Graham, supra note 
15, at 34-35; Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1048-60; Rodricks et al., supra note 47, at 533-
35; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 21-22. 
172 See Revision of the Definition of the Term “No Residue” in the New Animal 
Drug Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,172, 78,172-73 (Dec. 23, 2002). 
173 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 500.80-.92 (2004); 67 Fed. Reg. at 78,172-73. 
174 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332-34, 342(a) (2000).  On FDA regulation of food safety, 
see 1 O’REILLY, supra note 163, at ch. 9. 
175 See, e.g., Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in Fish and Shellfish, 49 Fed. Reg. 
21,514 (May 22, 1984); PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG 
LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 904-07 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing FDA regulation of afla-
toxins). 
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as safe by FDA and therefore permissible.  In effect, this de minimis, 
“individual risk” level serves as a trigger for regulatory analysis rather 
than (as with food additives) for an automatic proscription.176 
Finally, “individual risk” is the linchpin of FDA’s so-called “thresh-
old of regulation” policy, which has been in place for nearly a dec-
ade.177  Chemicals that are contained in food packaging materials or 
other food-contact articles and that migrate into food are technically 
“food additives,” subject to FDA licensure.  But the licensing process is 
expensive; the “threshold of regulation” policy therefore provides that 
chemicals in food-contact materials not currently known or suspected 
to be carcinogenic, which leave residues in food at a concentration be-
low 0.5 parts per billion (ppb), are exempt from licensure.  FDA ar-
rived at the 0.5 ppb level by looking at the universe of known toxins.  
Noncarcinogenic chemicals, it emerges, are very unlikely to produce 
toxicity at that level, while for carcinogens the 0.5 ppb level corre-
sponds to the tried-and-true “individual risk” level of 1 in 1 million.  As 
the agency explained:  
[We] used potency data on a large number of known carcinogens to es-
timate the likely risk that could be expected if an unstudied compound 
were later found to be a carcinogen. . . . 
 . . . FDA further restricted its analysis to the 477 animal carcinogens 
that were the subject of oral feeding studies. . . . 
 Based on the range of potencies exhibited by these 477 animal car-
cinogens, FDA has determined that most known carcinogens pose less 
 
176 See Gaylor et al., supra note 91, at 308 (noting that “FDA has used the no ob-
served adverse effect level . . . from bioassay data for noncancer effects as the starting 
point for safety assessment of chemicals,” both for food additives and contaminants); 
Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1054 (discussing the de minimis level for carcinogens). 
177 See Food Additives; Threshold of Regulation for Substances Used in Food-
Contact Articles, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,582 (July 17, 1995); 58 Fed. Reg. 52,719 (proposed 
Oct. 12, 1993).  For recent discussions, see Robert Kroes et al., Threshold of Toxicological 
Concern for Chemical Substances Present in the Diet:  A Practical Tool for Assessing the Need for 
Toxicity Testing, 38 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 255 (2000); Robert Kroes & Gunhild 
Kozianowski, Threshold of Toxicological Concern (TTC) in Food Safety Assessment, 127 TOXI-
COLOGY LETTERS 43 (2002).  In 1997, subsequent to the adoption of the Threshold of 
Regulation policy, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to permit 
food-contact materials that are food additives to be marketed without a license.  Manu-
facturers can instead submit a premarket notification to FDA.  However, the agency 
retains discretion to require the licensure process, and the Threshold of Regulation 
policy remains in place as an alternative to both premarket notification and licensure.  
See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 163, at § 11:9.50 (2004 Fall Cumulative Supp.); Food Addi-
tives:  Food Contact Substance Notification System, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,724 (May 21, 
2002). 
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than one in a million lifetime risk if present in the daily diet at 0.5 
ppb.
178
 
2.  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
OSHA regulates toxic workplace chemicals as well as other occu-
pational hazards. For toxins, the two crucial provisions are sections 
6(b)(5) and 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.179  Sec-
tion 6(b)(5) is specific to toxins and provides: 
 The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials 
or harmful physical agents . . . shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available 
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the 
hazard . . . for the period of his working life.
180
 
This language, taken alone, might be read as authorizing OSHA 
to regulate any chemical that is a toxin—that is toxic at some dose—
and to require reductions in workplace exposures to the toxin to the 
lowest feasible level.181  But section 3(8) of the Act, a generic provision 
describing the “standards” that OSHA is empowered to issue, defines  
an “occupational safety and health standard” as “a standard which re-
quires conditions . . . reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide 
safe or healthful employment and places of employment.”182  In Indus-
trial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,183 a plurality of the 
Supreme Court read section 3(8) as creating a “significant risk” 
threshold for OSHA regulation of toxins as well as other safety haz-
ards.  In effect, the Court determined that OSHA was statutorily re-
quired to recognize a de minimis level of risk; workplace toxins creat-
ing risks below that level could not be regulated. 
 By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are “rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employ-
ment and places of employment,” the Act implies that, before promul-
gating any standard, the Secretary must make a finding that the 
 
178 Food Additives; Threshold of Regulation for Substances Used in Food-Contact 
Articles, 58 Fed. Reg. at 52,722. 
179 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000). 
180 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), Pub. L. No. 91-596,  § 
6(b)(5), 84 Stat. 1590, 1594 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000)). 
181 Indeed, this was OSHA’s approach to regulating carcinogens prior to Industrial 
Union.  See Graham, supra note 15, at 36; Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1062. 
182 OSH Act, § 3(8), 84 Stat. at 1591 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2000)). 
183 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
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workplaces in question are not safe.  But “safe” is not the equivalent of 
“risk-free.”  There are many activities that we engage in every day—such 
as driving a car or even breathing city air—that entail some risk of acci-
dent or material health impairment; nevertheless, few people would 
consider these activities “unsafe.” . . . 
 Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or safety 
standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a 
place of employment is unsafe—in the sense that significant risks are 
present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices.
184
 
The Court then went on to suggest, famously, that the “significant 
risk” requirement might be understood in terms of “individual risk.”  
A 1 in 1000 “individual risk” was clearly significant, the Court said; a 1 
in 1 billion risk was not.185 
Industrial Union’s linkage between significant risk and “individual 
risk” might have been rejected as dictum.  An agency more self-
confident than OSHA might have read the case as mandating a de 
minimis threshold but permitting that to be specified in “population 
risk” terms—as some number of  premature deaths that would be 
caused by the workplace toxin absent OSHA intervention.186  Instead, 
OSHA’s practice in regulating workplace carcinogens has been to fol-
low the letter of Industrial Union:  the agency determines whether the 
existing concentration of a workplace carcinogen is a “significant 
risk,” warranting OSHA intervention, by determining whether a 
worker exposed to that concentration for his entire working lifetime 
(forty-five years of exposure, five days a week, eight hours a day) would 
incur an “individual risk” of premature death that exceeds, or at least 
is not too far below, 1 in 1000.187  Interestingly, OSHA’s approach is 
more eclectic once it has determined that the status quo level of a 
workplace carcinogen poses a “significant risk.”  Considerations of 
“population risk,” “individual risk,” and economic and technical “fea-
 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 655. 
186 See Cross et al., supra note 19, at 73-75 (explaining that “significant risk” might 
be specified in “population risk” or “individual risk” terms). 
187 See Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1494, 1560 
(Jan. 10, 1997) (“[A] risk of 1/1000 . . . is clearly significant.  It represents the upper-
most end of a million-fold range suggested by the Court, somewhere below which the 
boundary of acceptable versus unacceptable risk must fall.” (citing Industrial Union, 448 
U.S. at 655)); Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1060-70; Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, 
at 24-25. 
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sibility” all seem to bear on the agency’s decision as to what the per-
missible level of the carcinogen should be.188 
What about noncarcinogens?  There is an inherent tension be-
tween the standard NOAEL/safety factor method for regulating non-
carcinogens—a method that seeks to ensure an “individual risk” level 
of zero—and Industrial Union’s statement that a workplace toxin might 
pose an “individual risk” above zero but still be too insignificant to 
trigger OSHA’s regulatory authority.  This tension came to light in 
1992, when the Eleventh Circuit struck down a rulemaking in which 
OSHA had used the NOAEL/safety factor method to set permissible 
exposure limits for a variety of noncarcinogens.189  Since this decision, 
OSHA has issued only one new exposure limit for a noncarcinogen.190 
“Individual risk” has, historically, not played a role in OSHA’s 
regulation of workplace safety hazards as opposed to health hazards, 
such as falls from heights or dangerous machines.  To be sure, the 
“significant risk” threshold created by section 3(8) of the OSHA act 
applies to all OSHA regulations, whether targeted at illness or injury.  
But “significant risk” for safety hazards has in the past been under-
stood in “population risk” terms.  OSHA officials recently stated that:  
“Traditionally, OSHA has based its significant risk determination for 
 
188 See Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1563-69 
(Jan. 10, 1997); Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746, 56,794-
97 (Nov. 4, 1996).  For a compact statement of OSHA’s approach to setting permissible 
limits once a toxin has been determined to pose a “significant risk,” see 61 Fed. Reg. at 
56,791. 
189 AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 975-80 (11th Cir. 1992). 
190 The one new limit is the lead exposure limit for the construction industry, is-
sued under explicit statutory mandate.  See Lead Exposure in Construction, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 26,590, 26,590-91 (May 4, 1993).  Subsequent to the Eleventh Circuit decision, 
OSHA relied upon the NOAEL/safety factor method in proposing exposure limits for 
glycol ethers.  See Occupational Exposure to 2-Methoxyethanol, 2-Ethoxyethanol, and 
Their Acetates (Glycol Ethers), 58 Fed. Reg. 15,526, 15,576-79 (proposed Mar. 23, 
1993).  That proposal was eventually withdrawn.  See 68 Fed. Reg. 75,475 (Dec. 31, 
2003).  OSHA has also issued exposure limits for carcinogens with noncarcinogenic 
effects.  See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1494; 
Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,746; Occupational Expo-
sure to Asbestos, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,964 (Aug. 10, 1994); Occupational Exposure to Cad-
mium, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,102 (Sep. 14, 1992); Occupational Exposure to 4,4-
Methylenedianiline (MDA), 57 Fed. Reg. 35,630 (Aug. 10, 1992).  In all these cases, 
OSHA employed its standard approach for carcinogens, namely, satisfying the “signifi-
cant risk” test by establishing a quantitative “individual risk” of cancer in the vicinity of 
1 in 1000.  Interestingly, in some of these rulemakings OSHA also quantified the “indi-
vidual risk” of noncancer toxicity.  See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, 59 Fed. 
Reg. at 40,966 (asbestosis); Occupational Exposure to Cadmium, 57 Fed. Reg. at 
42,207-09 (kidney dysfunction). 
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safety standards on estimates of the annual numbers of injuries 
and/or fatalities associated with exposure to an occupational injury 
hazard and the number of injuries and fatalities likely to be prevented 
with a new standard in place.”191 
This may be changing.  As already explained, the “individual risk” 
of workplace injury is a perfectly coherent concept.192  Indeed, there is 
an emerging subliterature, within risk assessment, that seeks to define 
and measure the “individual risk” of occupational injury.193  The Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the fed-
eral government’s research institute on occupational health and 
safety, has encouraged this research.194  And OSHA, in the huge ergo-
nomics rulemaking a few years ago, relied in substantial part on the 
“individual risk” construct in arguing that ergonomics hazards were a 
“significant risk” and therefore fell within OSHA’s regulatory jurisdic-
tion.195  OSHA defined the worker’s risk of musculoskeletal disorder as 
“the probability that a worker will experience at least one work-related 
musculoskeletal disorder during his or her working lifetime (45 
years),”196 and used data on workplace injuries to determine this risk 
for different occupations.197 
OSHA practices in regulating pathogens, covered by the agency’s 
broad statutory authorization to issue workplace health and safety 
 
191 J.F. Martonik et al., Injury Risk Assessment for Occupational Safety Standards, 4 
HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1259, 1259 (1998). 
192 Just as one can construct a “dosing class” of persons exposed to a particular 
dose of some toxin, and define the “individual risk” of fatal cancer for that dose as the 
frequency with which persons in the dosing class develop fatal cancer as a result of the 
toxin, so too one can construct an “exposure class” of persons exposed in some sense 
to a workplace hazard—say, all persons who use ladders, or a type of machine—and 
define the “individual risk” of fatal injury as the frequency with which persons in the 
class experience a fatal injury as a result of the hazard.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 69-72. 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
194 See Linda Rosenstock & Nancy Stout, Occupational Injury Risk Assessment:  Perspec-
tive and Introduction, 4 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1255, 1256 (1998). 
195 See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262, 68,538-68, 68,754-55 (Nov. 14, 
2000); Ergonomics Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 65,768, 65,926-85 (proposed Nov. 23, 1999).  
The ergonomics rule was overturned pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.  See 
Ergonomics Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,403 (Apr. 23, 2001). 
196 65 Fed. Reg. at 68,556; 64 Fed. Reg. at 65,936. 
197 As OSHA explained in the proposed rulemaking:  “Among the 58 industry 
groups for which BLS provided estimates of the number of MSDs reported in 1996, the 
median lifetime risk of experiencing at least one LWD [lost workday] MSD is 255 per 
1,000 workers, and for only 8 of these industry groups is the estimated lifetime risk be-
low 100 cases per 1,000 workers.”  64 Fed. Reg. at 65,980.  There is a similar analysis in 
the final rulemaking.  See 65 Fed. Reg. at 68,755. 
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standards, should also be mentioned.  In 1991, OSHA promulgated a 
bloodborne pathogen standard; in 1997, it proposed a standard for 
tuberculosis, subsequently withdrawn.198  In both cases the agency 
quantified “individual risk” and sought to show that its traditional, 1 in 
1000 threshold for regulatory significance was satisfied.199 
3.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Reactor safety risk assessment has been central to NRC activities 
since the Three Mile Island accident.  The Commission has employed 
risk assessment to evaluate the safety of individual reactors, the ge-
neric safety of different plant designs, the advisability of new regula-
tions for existing plants, and in other contexts.200  The Commission 
formalized its commitment to risk assessment in a 1995 policy state-
ment.201 
Reactor safety risk assessment need not be keyed to the probability 
of death and illness.  Instead, a probabilistic assessment (be it of an 
individual plant, a class of plants, a regulation, an inspection protocol, 
or something else) might focus on the probability of an accident—
either the probability of damage to the reactor core, or the probability 
of what NRC calls a “large early release” of radioactivity into the envi-
ronment.  For example, a risk assessment of an individual reactor 
might conclude that the annual probability of that reactor experienc-
ing core damage is 2 in 1 million, without tracing or ascribing prob-
abilities to the causal paths leading from core damage to the irradia-
tion of persons near the plant and to their deaths.  Or, the annual 
probabilities that different amounts of radioactivity could be released 
as a result of core damage plus containment failure might be quanti-
fied, without deriving “population risks” or “individual risks” from 
 
198 See Occupational Exposure to Tuberculosis, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,768 (Dec. 31, 
2003). 
199 See Occupational Exposure to Tuberculosis, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,160, 54,211-14 
(proposed Oct. 17, 1997); Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 64,004, 64,034-38 (Dec. 6, 1991). 
200 See Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activi-
ties, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,622, 42,622-23 (Aug. 16, 1995); Wall et al., supra note 66, at 368-
72.  Earlier reviews of NRC risk assessment include:  Bernero, supra note 65; Miller B. 
Spangler, A Summary Perspective on NRC’s Implicit and Explicit Use of de Minimis Risk Con-
cepts in Regulating for Radiological Protection in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, in DE MINIMIS RISK 
111 (Chris Whipple ed., 1987).  An excellent technical overview of reactor risk assess-
ment methodology is Jon C. Helton & Roger J. Breeding, Calculation of Reactor Accident 
Safety Goals, 39 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 129 (1993). 
201 Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods, 60 Fed. Reg. at 42,628-29. 
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these release scenarios.202  However, the Commission in 1986 adopted 
a series of “safety goals” as the ultimate benchmarks for reactor risk 
assessment.  The goals are an interesting hybrid of “individual risk” 
and “population risk”: 
 The Commission has established two qualitative safety goals which 
are supported by two quantitative objectives.  These two supporting ob-
jectives are based on the principle that nuclear risks should not be a sig-
nificant addition to other societal risks. . . . 
• The qualitative safety goals are as follows: 
— Individual members of the public should be provided a level of pro-
tection from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation 
such that individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and 
health. 
— Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation 
should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electric-
ity by viable competing technologies and should not be a significant 
addition to other societal risks.  
• The following quantitative objectives are to be used in determining 
achievement of the above safety goals: 
— [Individual risk:]  The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a 
nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reac-
tor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 per-
cent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other acci-
dents to which members of the U.S. population are generally 
exposed. 
— [Population risk:]  The risk to the population in the area near a nu-
clear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear 
power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent 
 
202 As one commentator explains: 
[Reactor risk assessment] scopes are categorized as Levels 1, 2, and 3.  Level 1 
is the systems analysis with an end-state of Core Damage Frequency (CDF), 
Level 2 analyses the physical processes of the accident including the contain-
ment response with an end-state of Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 
and the quantities and compositions of the radioactive materials released to 
the atmosphere (source term), and Level 3 analyses the transport of radioac-
tive material through the environment and estimates the public health and 
economic consequences of the accident. 
Wall et al., supra note 66, at 369 n.d; cf. Bernero, supra note 65, at 287 (distinguishing 
between these three levels of reactor accident risk assessment). 
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(0.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all 
other causes.
203
 
The Commission’s position has been that the safety goals are to be 
used in evaluating NRC regulations, not in measuring the safety of 
particular plants.  Instead, risk assessments for particular plants are to 
focus on the probability of core damage and “large early release” of 
radiation; and the general probability benchmarks regarding core 
damage and “large early release” are, in turn, to be shaped by the 
safety goals.204  But there have been recent suggestions by the Commis-
sion and staff that the safety goals might be used on a plant specific 
basis.205  In any event, the goals make “individual risk” one of several 
foundational, regulatory criteria for nuclear plants in the United 
States.  Plant designs and procedures are ultimately to be evaluated by 
considering, inter alia, the “individual risk” of immediate death fol-
lowing a reactor accident incurred by the average individual living “in 
the vicinity” of a plant.206  The Commission has clarified that this 
means “the average individual biologically (in terms of age and other 
risk factors) and locationally who resides within a mile from the plant 
 
203 Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,028, 
30,028-29 (Aug. 21, 1986). 
204 See id. at 30,031-32; Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods, 60 Fed. Reg. 
at 42,627-28. 
205 NRC staff recommended various changes to the safety goal policy statement, 
including a change to the effect that “[t]he Commission approves use of the . . . safety 
goals . . . in the regulatory decisionmaking process on both plant-specific and generic 
bases.”  It appears that the Commission tentatively approved this particular change.  See 
NRC, SECY-01-0009, Modified Reactor Safety Goal Policy Statement, at pt. V. (Jan. 22, 
2001) (emphasis added), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/secys/2001/secy2001-0009/2001-0009scy.html; see also Mark 
A. Caruso et al., An Approach for Using Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-
Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, 63 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 231, 233 
(1999) (suggesting, in a staff-authored article, that safety goals may be used on a plant-
specific basis).  However, the Commission eventually decided not to amend the safety 
goal policy statement.  See NRC, Commission Voting Record, Modified Reactor Safety 
Goal Policy Statement (Apr. 16, 2001), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2001/2001-0009vtr.html. 
206 Indeed, the putative “societal risk” goal, namely that “[t]he risk to the popula-
tion in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from 
nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 per-
cent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes,” is itself a hy-
brid of “individual risk” and “population risk,” see Safety Goals for the Operation of 
Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,028-29, since it divides the number of cancer 
deaths in the nearby population resulting from an accident by the total number of 
cancer deaths in that population, rather than using the numerator alone as the rele-
vant measure.  See Vicki M. Bier, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safety Goal Policy:  
A Critical Review, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 563, 564-65 (1988). 
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site boundary.”207  The quantitative “individual risk” goal articulated by 
NRC—0.1 percent of the average “individual risk” of prompt fatality 
from other causes—translates into an annual risk of 1 in 2 million.208  
In short, reactors are (inter alia) “safe” when average individuals living 
very near them incur no more than a 1 in 2 million annual chance of 
dying immediately as a result of a reactor accident.  This has been 
NRC’s stated safety policy since a few years after Three Mile Island. 
Reactor safety risk assessments focus on the probability of a reac-
tor accident.  Considerations of “individual risk” also influence federal 
regulation of other aspects of the safety of nuclear power generation, 
for example by shaping NRC criteria for maximum permissible doses 
of radiation received by the population or plant workers as a result of 
ordinary plant operation,209 or by structuring the regulation of nuclear 
wastes.210  A salient recent example involves the proposed Yucca 
Mountain repository for high-level nuclear waste, which is to be built 
and operated by the Department of Energy, and licensed by NRC, 
pursuant to safety standards issued by EPA.211  Congress has enacted a 
number of relevant statutes, including the Energy Policy Act of 
1992,212 which suggested, without mandating, that the design of the 
Yucca Mountain site be focused on “individual risk” rather than 
“population risk.”  The Act stated that EPA shall promulgate “stan-
dards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive ma-
terials stored or disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain 
site,”213 but instructed EPA to consult first with the National Academy 
of Sciences on various questions, including:  “[W]hether a health-
based standard based upon doses to individual members of the public 
 
207 Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,030. 
208 See Helton & Breeding, supra note 200, at 129; cf. Spangler, supra note 200, at 
139 (determining that prompt fatality safety goal translates into an annual “individual 
risk” of 4 × 10-7, i.e., 1 in 2.5 million). 
209 See Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 88, at 18-20; see also COMM. ON TECH. BASES 
FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, supra note 63, at 41-50 (summarizing different 
regulatory limitations on radiation exposure and resultant “individual risk”). 
210 See B. John Garrick, The Use of Risk Assessment to Evaluate Waste Disposal Facilities 
in the United States of America, 40 SAFETY SCI. 135, 135-46 (2002). 
211 The Yucca Mountain program is discussed in id. at 139; General Guidelines for 
the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,298, 
57,299-57,311 (Nov. 14, 2001); David P. Ross, Note, Yucca Mountain and Reversing the 
Irreversible:  The Need for Monitored Retrievable Storage in a Permanent Repository, 25 VT. L. 
REV. 815 (2001). 
212 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2776, 2921-23 
(1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 40, and 42 U.S.C). 
213 Id. § 801(a)(1). 
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[i.e., an individual-risk based standard] . . . will provide a reasonable 
standard for protection of the health and safety of the general pub-
lic.”214  The National Academy of Sciences thereupon produced a re-
port, which concluded that the safety of Yucca Mountain should in-
deed be judged in terms of “individual risk” rather than the total 
deaths caused by releases from facility—specifically, “individual risk” 
to maximally exposed persons—and suggested that the safe level of 
“individual risk” might be set at 1 in 2000 or lower.215 
EPA responded by promulgating a standard for Yucca Mountain 
that is framed in terms of radiation dose, not risk:  persons maximally 
exposed to releases from the waste site must not receive more than fif-
teen millirem of radiation per year.216  But EPA justified this dose-
based standard by adverting to the de minimis “individual risk” im-
posed on the maximally exposed individual by a radiation dose at or 
below the level of fifteen millirem.  As the agency explained: 
[W]e have based the proposed dose-based standard upon the risk of de-
veloping a fatal cancer as a result of that level of exposure based upon a 
linear, non-threshold, dose-response relationship. . . . Dose and [indi-
vidual] risk are closely related; one can be converted to the other simply 
by using the appropriate factor.
217
 
A fifteen millirem annual dose, assuming a seventy-year lifetime 
for the maximally exposed person and the dose-response curve that 
EPA invoked in the Yucca Mountain rulemaking, translates into an 
“individual risk” of 6 in 10,000.218  Both NRC and the Department of 
 
214 Id. § 801(a)(2)(A). 
215 See COMM. ON TECH. BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, supra note 63, at 
1-14, 33-65.  Strictly speaking, the report recommended that the “individual risk” stan-
dard focus on risk to members of the small “critical group” of persons at highest risk 
from the repository, not the single maximally exposed individual.  See id. at 51-54. 
216 See Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca 
Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,074, 32,085-95 (June 13, 2001); Ross, supra note 211, at 
830-36.  The relevant exposure is that of the “reasonably maximally exposed” individ-
ual. 
217 Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada,  
64 Fed. Reg. 46,976, 46,984 (proposed Aug. 27, 1999).  For similar statements in the 
final rulemaking, see 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,086. 
218 This 6 in 10,000 lifetime “individual risk” is calculated by multiplying the fif-
teen millirem dose times seventy years times the slope of EPA’s linear dose-response 
model (5.75/10000 cancers per rem).  See Public Health and Environmental Radiation 
Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,086; Environmental 
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,979. 
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Energy have amended their own Yucca Mountain regulations to con-
form to EPA’s 15 millirem/year dose limit.219 
In the summer of 2004, the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s Yucca 
Mountain regulation insofar as it mandated compliance with the fif-
teen millirem limit and other requirements for only 10,000 years—a 
compliance period that the court found to be inconsistent with the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992.220  How EPA will respond to this ruling re-
mains to be seen. 
4.  The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) administers 
various statutes, including the Federal Hazardous Substances Act,221 
which requires that “hazardous substances” intended for household 
use bear a specified label.222  A “hazardous substance” is defined as 
“[a]ny substance or mixture of substances which (i) is toxic . . . if such 
substances or mixture of substances may cause substantial personal in-
jury or substantial illness during or as a proximate result of any cus-
tomary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use.”223  A “hazardous 
substance” that lacks the required label is “misbranded” and cannot 
be introduced into interstate commerce.224 
In 1992, CPSC issued lengthy guidelines that explain when a sub-
stance is “toxic” and that employ an “individual risk” test in defining 
the subset of “toxic” substances that are “hazardous” for statutory pur-
poses.225  Specifically, a product containing a carcinogen is “hazard-
ous” if a consumer using the product incurs an “individual risk” ex-
 
219 See Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Reposi-
tory at Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732, 55,733 (NRC Nov. 2, 2001); General 
Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57,298, 57,310-11 (Dep’t of Energy Nov. 14, 2001) . 
220 See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266-73 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
reh’g en banc denied, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18782, at *1 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
221 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (2000).  The Act is summarized in 2 DONALD W. STE-
VER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE §§ 4:1 to :18 (2003). 
222 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261(p), 1263 (2000). 
223 Id. § 1261(f)(1)(A). 
224 Id. § 1263(a). 
225 Labeling Requirements for Art Materials Presenting Chronic Hazards, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,626 (Oct. 9, 1992).  On toxic risk assessment at CPSC, see Michael A. Babich, 
Risk Assessment of Low-Level Chemical Exposures from Consumer Products Under the U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission Chronic Hazard Guidelines, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
(SUPP. 1) 387 (1998); Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1070-80. 
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ceeding 1 in 1 million.226  The portion of the guidelines covering ex-
posure assessment stipulates that exposure means “anticipated expo-
sure from normal lifetime use,” and that “[i]n most cases the best es-
timate of exposure (average exposure) is acceptable.”227  In short, the 
relevant “individual risk” level is that of the average, rather than 
maximal consumer.  The “hazardous” cutoff for noncarcinogenic tox-
ins is defined using the standard NOAEL/safety factor method.  It is 
that product concentration resulting in a lifetime exposure to the av-
erage consumer which equals the “no observed effect level,” divided 
by a safety factor of 10 or 100.228 
CPSC has rulemaking authority under the Act.  The agency can 
supplement or vary the statutorily required labeling and, under cer-
tain conditions, ban a “hazardous substance.”229  “Population risk” 
considerations clearly play a role in these rulemakings.230  For exam-
ple, in justifying a rule that required retail containers of charcoal to 
bear a label warning of the carbon monoxide risk from burning char-
coal in confined spaces, CPSC explained that “there are approxi-
mately 28 deaths and 300 CO-related . . . injuries associated with the use 
of charcoal each year.”231  From these numbers CPSC inferred both an 
“individual risk” of dying from charcoal-related CO poisoning232 and 
an aggregate monetized cost of death and injury.233 
C.  Beyond “Individual Risk”:  “Population Risk” in Agency Practice 
The prior two Sections described a wide range of administrative 
practices whereby agency choice depends, wholly or partly, on the 
level of frequentist “individual risk” incurred by some person exposed 
to a hazard, identified by her place in the exposure distribution—for 
example, the person with an average exposure, or the person with a 
 
226 Labeling Requirements for Art Materials Presenting Chronic Hazards, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,656. 
227 Id. at 46,647, 46,656. 
228 Id. at 46,656. 
229 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261(q), 1262(b)-(c) (2000). 
230 See Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 1080. 
231 Requirements for Labeling of Retail Containers of Charcoal, 61 Fed. Reg. 
19,818, 19,827 (May 3, 1996) (internal citation omitted). 
232 See id. at 19,827 (“[T]he estimated 160 million bags of charcoal briquets sold in 
1995 were associated with approximately one death for every 5.7 million charcoal bri-
quet bags . . . .”). 
233 See id. (“Assuming a statistical value of life of $5 million [and a cost of injury of 
$10,000], these [300] injuries and [28] deaths cost society about $143 million annu-
ally.”). 
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high-end (90th percentile, say) exposure, or the maximally exposed 
person.  I shall argue below that these practices are normatively mis-
guided and should be changed.  This normative analysis presupposes 
that the practices could be different—“ought implies can”—and the 
best way to demonstrate this is by showing that health and safety agen-
cies sometimes employ metrics other than “individual risk” to a par-
ticular person in evaluating hazards.  In particular, federal health and 
safety agencies sometimes evaluate hazards by quantifying “population 
risk”:  the total deaths, illnesses, or injuries caused by the hazards and 
abated by intervention.  What follows is not comprehensive, or even a 
collection of the major examples, but is rather meant to underscore 
that the “individual risk”-based methodologies now dominant at EPA 
and also employed at FDA, OSHA, NRC, and CPSC are by no means 
inevitable. 
Even where carcinogens and other toxins are concerned, regula-
tory analysis sometimes focuses (at least in part) on “population risk.”  
Various examples were interspersed in my discussion above.  Since the 
1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA has relied 
both on “individual risk” to the above-average individual, and on cost-
benefit analyses incorporating information about aggregate deaths, in 
setting enforceable drinking water standards.234  In regulating food 
contaminants that impose an “individual risk” exceeding what FDA 
regards as the de minimis level, the agency has taken into considera-
tion “population risk.”235  Similarly for OSHA:  once that agency has 
determined that a carcinogen currently found in the workplace 
crosses the threshold of regulability because it imposes a sufficiently 
high (roughly 1 in 1000) “individual risk” on the maximally exposed 
worker, the agency sets the permissible level of the carcinogen by at-
tending to “population risk” as well as “individual risk” and economic 
and technical feasibility.236  CPSC has pointed to the aggregate deaths 
and injuries caused by toxins in justifying rulemaking under the Fed-
 
234 See supra text accompanying note 115.  Another area where EPA has given some 
weight to “population risk” considerations is the regulation of criteria pollutants.  See, 
e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,863-68 
(EPA July 18, 1997); see also Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 155, at 1290-1323 (ar-
guing that EPA lacks a coherent approach to regulating the criteria pollutants). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 174-76; Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in 
Fish and Shellfish; Reduction of Tolerances, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,514, 21,519 (May 22, 
1984). 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 187-88. 
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eral Hazardous Substances Act,237 as has EPA in its rulemakings under 
the Toxic Substances Control Act.238 
A yet more compelling example, perhaps:  a recent international 
survey of carcinogen risk assessment practice found that “European 
[agencies] have established the estimation of the likely incidence of 
cancer in the human population as the goal for risk assessment.”239  
This is a “population risk” measure—or at least one much closer to 
“population risk” than the sorts of “individual risk” measures generally 
employed at EPA.240 
My survey of agency practice, in Sections A and B above, suggests 
that “individual risk”-based tests are widely used to evaluate health 
hazards, such as toxic chemicals, radiation, and pathogens, but are 
much less often used for safety hazards, where the threat is injury 
rather than illness.  One counterexample is OSHA’s recent reliance 
on “individual risk” levels to assess workplace safety hazards, as in the 
ergonomics rulemaking.241  But this is a special case.  Agencies admin-
istering federal safety programs usually rely on “population risk,” not 
“individual risk,” as a measure of regulatory need and success.  For ex-
ample, CPSC has jurisdiction under the Consumer Products Safety 
Act242 and other statutes243 to regulate dangerous consumer products.  
In recent rulemakings for safety hazards (such as bath seats, which risk 
infant drownings; bunk beds, which risk entrapment of small children; 
“dive sticks,” which risk impalement; and multi-purpose lighters, 
which risk fires), the agency has provided historical data about total 
annual or periodic deaths and injuries, and has used this information, 
 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 229-32. 
238 See supra text accompanying note 146. 
239 Robert J. Moolenaar, Carcinogen Risk Assessment:  International Comparison, 20 
REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 302, 308 (1994). 
240 It is not clear from the survey whether the Europeans’ focus on the “incidence 
of cancer in the human population” means a focus on the total number of cancer 
deaths caused by a hazard, or instead on a fraction equaling the total number of can-
cer deaths from a hazard divided by some measure of the size of the whole population 
in the country (total population, total cancer deaths from any source).  Still, this kind 
of fraction is more directly related to “population risk” (total cancer deaths caused by a 
hazard) than the “individual risk” numbers relied upon by EPA, since the fraction 
equals “population risk” divided by a number that is roughly constant (a measure of 
the size of the whole population). 
241 See supra text accompanying notes 195-97. 
242 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2085 (2001). 
243 See id. §§ 1261-78 (Federal Hazardous Substances Act); id. §§ 1471-76 (Poison 
Prevention Packaging Act). 
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together with a monetary value of lifesaving and injury-reduction, to 
estimate the monetized benefits of regulation.244 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
regulates motor vehicle safety.  Unlike CPSC, NHTSA has until very 
recently declined to monetize lifesaving and injury-avoidance.245  But 
like CPSC (and OSHA), NHTSA regularly quantifies aggregate lifesav-
ing and injury-avoidance.  In numerous rulemakings conducted over 
the last decade—concerning power windows; lap/shoulder belts in 
rear seats; tire performance; tire pressure monitoring systems; airbags; 
child restraint anchorage systems; reflectors for truck tractors; rear 
impact guards for trailers; door locks; and head impact protection—
the agency has predicted both the total lives and injuries avoided by 
the rule, and the monetary costs.246  “Population risk,” for NHTSA, has 
traditionally served as the input to a fuzzy cost-benefit analysis where 
 
244 See Bath Seats, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,878, 74,885-86 (Dec. 29, 2003); Dive Sticks, 66 
Fed. Reg. 13,645, 13,646-49 (Mar. 7, 2001); Safety Standard for Bunk Beds, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 71,888, 71,888-90, 71,897-98 (Dec. 22, 1999); Safety Standard for Multi-Purpose 
Lighters, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,854, 71,855, 71,864-67 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
245 Email from Ro Malik, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, to author (Nov. 18, 2003).  
NHTSA practice, here, may be changing.  In a number of rulemaking analyses pub-
lished in 2004, the agency did monetize life-saving or injury-avoidance.  See Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Head Restraints, 69 Fed. Reg. 74,848, 74,878-79 (Dec. 
14, 2004); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 69 
Fed. Reg. 70,904, 70,911-12 & n.10 (Dec. 8, 2004); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dards; Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,896, 55,916-18 (proposed 
Sept. 16, 2004); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection, 69 
Fed. Reg. 27,990, 28,013-14 (proposed May 17, 2004). 
246 See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Power-Operated Window, Parti-
tion, and Roof-Panel Systems, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,517, 55,528-29 (Sept. 15, 2004); Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,546, 
46,550 (proposed Aug. 6, 2003) (lap/shoulder belts); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards; Tires, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,116, 38,118 (June 26, 2003) (tire performance); Fed-
eral Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 67 Fed. Reg. 
38,704, 38,739 (June 5, 2002); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant 
Crash Protection, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,958, 49,983 (proposed Sept. 18, 1998) (air bags); 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Anchorage Systems, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 10,786, 10,796-97 (Mar. 5, 1999); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, 
Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,355, 41,359 (Aug. 8, 
1996) (reflectors); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Impact Guards, 61 
Fed. Reg. 2004, 2029 (Jan. 24, 1996); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Door 
Locks and Door Retention Components, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,020, 75,028 (proposed Dec. 
15, 2004); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Door Locks and Door Retention 
Components, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,124, 50,132-33 (Sep. 28, 1995); Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards; Head Impact Protection, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,031, 43,047-48 (Aug. 18, 
1995).  The very recent rulemakings in which NHTSA conducts a straightforward 
monetized cost-benefit analysis also calculate “population risk.”  See sources cited supra 
note 245. 
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cost per life saved is calculated but no explicit cut-off monetary value 
for a human life is stated—by contrast with CPSC’s more straightfor-
ward balancing.  But in both cases “population risk” statistics figure 
centrally in the agencies’ analyses. 
III.  FREQUENTIST RISK AND WELFARIST 
CONSEQUENTIALISM 
“Individual risk” in the frequentist sense should be irrelevant to 
regulatory practice.  The frequentist conceptualizes the “individual 
risk” of death as the incremental frequency of death, above back-
ground frequency, in a “dosing class” (for toxins) or an analogous 
reference class (for nontoxins).  The practices described in Part II, 
where agencies give weight in some way to frequentist “individual 
risk,” are normatively misguided.  This is true across a wide range of 
moral theories.  In this Part, I seek to demonstrate the normative ir-
relevance of frequentist “individual risk” within welfarist consequen-
tialism—the normative framework now standardly adopted by econo-
mists, policy analysts, and many others.  Part V examines competing 
normative frameworks. 
So as to avoid extra complexity, and because most of the current 
examples of regulatory attention to “individual risk” involve toxic 
chemicals, my normative analysis here and below will focus specifically 
on toxins.247  But the results of that analysis are, I believe, fully gener-
alizable to nontoxic hazards.  Governmental regulation of workplace 
accidents, motor vehicle crashes, radiation leaks, mechanically flawed 
consumer products, and other such targets of regulatory concern—
like governmental regulation of toxins—should not be keyed to fre-
quentist “individual risk.” 
A.  Welfarist Consequentialism:  Some Clarifications 
Welfarist consequentialism is the moral view underlying welfare 
economics248 and, derivatively, law and economics.249  It is the view that 
 
247 Similarly, the analysis will focus on the “individual risk” of death but general-
izes, quite naturally, to the “individual risk” of nonfatal illness or injury. 
248 More precisely, welfare economics standardly presupposes welfare consequen-
tialism plus a preference-satisfaction view of welfare.  See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL 
BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 1-3 (1984). 
249 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 15-81 (2002). 
Admittedly, Kaplow and Shavell’s claim that normative evaluation of legal rules re-
duces to a welfare-consequentialist evaluation has proven controversial, even among 
law-and-economists.  See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being, and Morality in 
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drives cost-benefit analysis,250 which over the last two decades has be-
come the dominant methodology for normative evaluation employed 
in the federal government.251  Welfarist consequentialism, more gen-
erally, undergirds much normative talk in our polity, by legislators, 
presidents, bureaucrats, and citizens—witness the pervasive assump-
tion that policy choices are properly tied to public “goals,” “aims,” or 
“purposes” (all consequentialist constructs), and that these goals are 
ultimately related to human welfare in some way.252 
The concept of an “outcome” or, more precisely, a “possible 
world”—a maximally specified outcome253—is central to consequen-
tialist thinking.  Any consequentialist moral view has two parts:  (1) an 
“ex post” part, namely a criterion for ranking outcomes, a criterion 
that determines whether an outcome is “better” or “worse” than an-
other; and (2) an “ex ante” part, namely a rule for determining what 
choice an actor should make in any choice situation, given the range 
of choices available to him and the possible outcomes of each choice.  
Further, for a theory to count as consequentialist, both the “ex post” 
and “ex ante” parts of the theory must satisfy certain formal con-
straints.  For example, the “ex post” criterion for ranking outcomes 
must be “evaluator neutral.”  In other words, the ranking must not 
vary depending on the evaluator’s perspective:  O1 will be better or 
worse than O2 from each of our viewpoints, not better from your view-
point but worse from mine.254 
 
Social Decisions, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2003) (criticizing Kaplow and Shavell’s claim 
that fairness considerations properly influence social choice via preferences for fair-
ness). 
250 More precisely, cost-benefit analysis tracks overall well-being:  a welfare-based 
and consequentialist construct that might be incorporated in a variety of moral views. 
See Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when Preferences Are Distorted, supra 
note 36, at 1108-16; Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 
194-225. 
251 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1389-92. 
252 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988) (holding 
that the equal protection principle requires that statutory classification be “rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose”); ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION:  LEGAL 
FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 29-54 (1994) (surveying a range of standard justifica-
tions for regulation, all connected to well-being). 
253 See JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002); MICHAEL J. LOUX, METAPHYSICS:  A 
CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 176-214 (2d ed. 2002). 
254 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1316-21.  It might be objected that consequentialism 
permits evaluator-relative outcome rankings, or moral rules that are coextensive with 
evaluator-relative rankings.  But I would not define “consequentialism” so inclusively.  
See infra note 370. 
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Welfarist consequentialism is a particular kind of consequentialist 
view.  It offers a particular answer to the ex post question:  what de-
termines the moral goodness of outcomes?  The welfarist answers:  
“Welfare, and only welfare.”255  “Welfare” here means the well-being of 
humans or any other creatures that are welfare subjects, most plausi-
bly certain nonhuman mammals.  The moral goodness of outcomes 
hinges on their welfare goodness, their goodness for welfare subjects.  
This defining aspect of welfarist consequentialism is often framed as 
a so-called “supervenience”256 requirement:  one outcome cannot be 
ranked as better or worse than another outcome, by the ex post crite-
rion, unless the two outcomes differ with respect to at least one per-
son’s welfare.257  Welfare-identical outcomes are seen, by the welfarist 
consequentialist, to be morally identical. 
Just like the Russian dolls that open to reveal smaller ones, the 
categories here divide into subcategories that themselves divide.  
Moral views include both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 
views; consequentialist views, both welfarist and nonwelfarist variants; 
welfarist consequentialist views, both utilitarian and nonutilitarian ver-
sions.258  Many assume that welfarist consequentialism just equates with 
utilitarianism.  But this is untrue.  Given any set of outcomes, there 
will typically be different (indeed a multitude of) ranking schemes, all 
of which satisfy the “evaluator neutrality” requirement definitive of 
consequentialism and the welfare-supervenience requirement defini-
tive of welfarism.259  Outcomes can be ranked in light of overall well-
being:  that is utilitarianism.260  Or, they can be ranked in a strictly 
 
255 See Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp, Welfarism in Moral Theory, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. 
PHIL. 598 (1996); cf. Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice, 30 CA-
NADIAN J. PHIL. 497, 497-98 (2000) (presenting a welfarist account that incorporates 
considerations of individual responsibility).     
256 On the general notion of “supervenience,” see JAEGWON KIM, SUPERVENIENCE 
AND MIND 53-78 (1993). 
257 See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 248, at 143-44; Walter Bossert & John A. 
Weymark, Utility in Social Choice, in 2 Handbook of Utility Theory (Salvador Barberà et 
al. eds. 2004), available at http://www.econ.ubc.ca/dp9623.pdf; AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, 
WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 18-19 (1982). 
258 For an excellent overview of these distinctions, albeit with somewhat different 
terminology, see SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 25-105 (1998). 
259 This point is reflected, within welfare economics, in the recognition that there 
are multiple “social welfare orderings” consistent with welfarism.  See BOADWAY & 
BRUCE, supra note 248, at 137-69.  It is reflected, within moral philosophy, in the rec-
ognition that welfare consequentialism encompasses both utilitarianism and also views 
more sensitive to the distribution of welfare.  See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 29-54. 
260 See generally GEOFFREY SCARRE, UTILITARIANISM (1996); UTILITARIANISM AND 
BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
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egalitarian way, such that an outcome with a more equal distribution 
is better than an outcome with a less equal distribution, even if the 
first outcome is Pareto-inferior to the second.  Or they can be ranked 
in a “prioritarian” way, such that (1) Pareto-superior outcomes are al-
ways ranked better than their inferiors; but (2) in the ranking of Pa-
reto-noncomparable outcomes, special weight is given to those whose 
welfare levels are lower.261  Or, they can be ranked in a way that bal-
ances utilitarian and egalitarian considerations:  this balancing might 
admit some Pareto-inferior moves, but would also (unlike strict egali-
tarianism) admit some Pareto-superior moves that purchase large im-
provements in overall welfare with small decrements in equality.262  
Further possibilities—many of them!—exist.  The analysis that follows 
will be agnostic as between the different versions of welfarist conse-
quentialism.  It will not be necessary to take a position in the ongoing, 
philosophical debates between utilitarians, egalitarians, and prioritari-
ans. 
My analysis will, however, take sides in a different debate.  It will 
rely upon a substantive rather than preferentialist account of well-
being.263  Preferentialists say that P is better off in some outcome O1, as 
compared to some other outcome O2, if and only if P prefers O1 to O2 
(in some sense).  Substantivists offer a list of welfare “values” or 
“goods.”  For example, John Finnis claims that these goods are:  life 
itself, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical rea-
sonableness, and religion.264  Martha Nussbaum’s list includes:  life, 
bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of the “senses, imagination and 
thought,” emotions, practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other 
species, play, and control over one’s environment.265  Derek Parfit, de-
scribing (without endorsing) the substantive view of welfare, writes 
that “[t]he good things might include moral goodness, rational activ-
ity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and being a 
 
261 The choice between egalitarianism and prioritarianism is currently a “hot 
topic” in moral philosophy.  See 19 ECON. & PHIL. 1-134 (2003). 
262 See Adler, supra note 35, at 310. 
263 Several of my works provide critical surveys of theories of welfare, most recently 
Adler, supra note 20, at 1303-16.  See also Adler, supra note 35, at 262-67; Adler & Pos-
ner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 197-204.  Hedonism, often con-
trasted with both substantive (or “objective”) and preferentialist views of welfare, might 
alternatively be seen as a narrow kind of substantive view—one with only two goods, 
namely pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 
264 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980). 
265 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:  THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 78-80 (2000). 
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good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty.”266  James 
Griffin lists accomplishment, autonomy, understanding, enjoyment, 
and deep personal relations.267  The substantivist claims that P is better 
off in some outcome O1, as compared to some other outcome O2, only 
if O1 is better for P than O2 with respect to one or more genuine wel-
fare values. 
I have elsewhere described at length the grounds in favor of a sub-
stantive view of human well-being.  To summarize quickly:  preferen-
tialists typically end up invoking fully informed and otherwise ideal-
ized preferences, rather than actual preferences, as the basis for 
welfare.  Consider the taste for sadism:  satisfying this actual prefer-
ence, intuitively, does not benefit its holder.  The construct of ideal-
ized preferences licenses that sort of intuition, by providing critical 
purchase on the welfare subject’s actual preferences, and yet still links 
up with the subject’s wants and desires.  If someone wouldn’t prefer 
something, even with full information and after full deliberation, then 
it doesn’t improve her welfare.268  Substantive views go yet further in 
the direction of idealization.  Roughly, substantive goods are those 
features of lives that all idealized agents would prefer.  Something is 
substantively good for a subject if it would be ideally preferred, not 
merely by the subject herself, but by all persons with sufficient infor-
mation, deliberation, etc., considering a life with that feature and one 
without it.269  In other words, substantive views define welfare in terms 
of convergent idealized preferences.  An important argument in favor 
of this convergence requirement involves interpersonal compari-
sons.270  Any welfare-consequentialist moral view (be it a utilitarian 
view, an egalitarian view, or some other) will need to compare the wel-
fare levels or changes in the welfare levels of different persons.271  For 
example, if one person actually or ideally prefers outcome O1, and an-
other person actually or ideally prefers O2, what would license the 
conclusion that O1 or O2 is better for their aggregate welfare?  Substan-
tive welfare goods can license that sort of conclusion; idealized pref-
erences, alone, cannot. 
 
266 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 499 (reprinted with corrections 1987). 
267 JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUE JUDGEMENT:  IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 29-30 
(1996). 
268 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1304-06. 
269 See id. at 1353-54. 
270 See Adler, supra note 35, at 289-302. 
271 See id. at 296-97; Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, 
at 204-09. 
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B.  The Ex Post Question:  Does “Individual Risk”  
Degrade Outcomes? 
One welfare-consequentialist defense of “individual risk” takes the 
ex post perspective.272  The claim, here, is that an outcome or possible 
world in which some person P is subjected to a high frequentist risk of 
death is worse for him, ceteris paribus, than an outcome or possible 
world in which he is not subjected to that risk.  This is not a prepos-
terous idea.  Imagine that, while P is sleeping, an intruder steps to his 
bedside, pulls out a revolver with a bullet in one of the six chambers, 
spins the chambers, pulls the trigger—with no resultant firing—and 
leaves.  At least some people respond to this sort of hypothetical case 
with the intuition that P is made worse off by the game of Russian rou-
lette, even though he is unaware of the game at the time it is played 
and even if he never learns of it.273  By analogy, perhaps, the “maxi-
mally exposed” or “highly exposed” or representative individual who 
incurs a 1 in 10,000 or 1 in 1 million risk of death by virtue of his toxic 
exposure (as calculated relative to the canonical dosing class or some 
other reference class) suffers a welfare reduction just by virtue of this 
frequentist risk, even if the toxin does not cause his death or other-
wise affect him. 
Intuitions are important, but may mislead:  for example, in the 
Russian roulette case, we may have a strong intuition that P has been 
harmed, but this intuition may be grounded in the violation of P ’s 
property rights, or in the intruder’s contempt for P,274 not the risk im-
 
272 I argue for the “ex post” irrelevance of “individual risk” at length in Adler, su-
pra note 20, at 1340-69.  The analysis here reaches the same conclusion, albeit in a dif-
ferent way. 
273 See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 970-71 (2003); 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1651 
(2002); cf. Peter Railton, Locke, Stock, and Peril:  Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and 
Risk, in TO BREATHE FREELY:  RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 89, 101-07 (Mary Gibson ed., 
1985) (suggesting that risk imposition, as in Russian roulette cases, is wrongful); Ste-
phen A. Fogdall, Risks as Harms 1 (unpublished paper, on file with author) (arguing 
that “it is plausible” that risks are harms).  But see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT 
LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 101-15 (2001) (arguing that risk is not harm); Heidi M. 
Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 263-64 (1996) (same); Perry, su-
pra note 84, at 330-39 (same); John Oberdiek, The Morality of Risking:  On the Nor-
mative Foundations of Risk Regulation 30-50 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Library) 
(same). 
274 Cf. Railton, supra note 273, at 101-04 (suggesting that wrongfulness of risk im-
position involves a lack of respect for person risked). 
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position itself.275  Let’s change the hypothetical so that P ’s neighbor 
inadvertently fails to service his heating system, increasing the risk of 
an explosion, which fortunately fails to occur.  Assume that P never 
learns of the risk.  Now, the response (I submit) is either an intuition 
that P has not been harmed, or at most a weak intuition (weaker than 
in the Russian roulette case) that he has been.  Systematic theories of 
welfare are crucial in deflating misleading intuitions, and in regiment-
ing our welfare judgments where the intuitions are relatively weak. 
Let us turn, then, to the systematic theory of welfare that, I have 
argued, is correct—namely, the substantive view.276  Substantivists dis-
agree about the correct list of welfare goods and the correct ground-
ing for this list.277  I will focus on the list provided by Martha Nuss-
baum, since it is quite extensive and subsumes most other lists 
currently in play in the philosophical literature.278  If frequentist risk is 
not a welfare setback given Nussbaum’s list, then a fortiori it is not a 
welfare setback given other plausible substantive accounts of welfare. 
Nussbaum’s list of “the central human functional capabilities” 
runs as follows.  I have included part of her gloss on each item, where 
that gloss is helpful in determining whether the item should be un-
derstood to subsume freedom from fatality risks. 
1.  Life.  Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; 
not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not 
worth living. 
2.  Bodily Health.  Being able to have good health, including reproductive 
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3.  Bodily Integrity.  Being able to move freely from place to place . . . to 
be secure against assault, including sexual assault . . . and domestic vio-
lence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in mat-
ters of reproduction. 
4.  Senses, Imagination, and Thought. . . . Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain. 
5.  Emotions. . . . Not having one’s emotional development blighted by 
overwhelming fear and anxiety . . . . 
 
275 See PORAT & STEIN, supra note 273, at 113-15 (identifying real harms, such as 
emotional or property damage, with which risk is often associated). 
276 See supra text accompanying notes 263-71. 
277 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1306-07. 
278 See id. at 1306 & n.49, 1307. 
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6.  Practical Reason. . . . 
7.  Affiliation. . . . Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; 
being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of 
others. . . . 
8.  Other Species. . . . 
9.  Play. . . . 
10.  Control over One’s Environment. . . .
279
 
A close analysis of this comprehensive and appealing list suggests 
that frequentist risk relative to canonical dosing classes, or for that 
matter relative to noncanonical reference classes, is not a welfare set-
back in the substantive sense. 
Consider two outcomes, O1 and O2, differing only in the fact that P 
suffers a toxic exposure in O1, which imposes a nontrivial frequentist 
risk on him but does not actually cause his death. 280  Is P worse off, in 
O1, with respect to one or more of Nussbaum’s welfare values?  Be-
cause the toxin does not cause P ’s death in O1, and thus he does not 
die prematurely in that outcome relative to O2, the first outcome is not 
worse with respect to the value of life itself—the first value on Nuss-
baum’s list. 
This is pretty obvious:  of the multitudes exposed to the risks suffi-
cient to concern EPA, OSHA, etc. (risks as low as perhaps 1 in 1 mil-
lion, and in any event 1 in 1000), the vast majority will not live shorter 
lives, or have impaired health (Nussbaum’s second value), as a result 
of those risks.281  But perhaps we might say that everyone exposed to a 
 
279 NUSSBAUM, supra note 265, at 78-80 (footnotes omitted). 
280 It might be objected that there are other pairings of outcomes that might be 
used to test whether frequentist risk is a welfare setback in the ex post sense.  Although 
this is true, using a different pairing wouldn’t change my analysis, with respect to “life” 
or any other of Nussbaum’s values.  For example, consider the pair O1* and O2*:  P suf-
fers a larger toxic exposure and thus a larger frequentist risk relative to the canonical 
dosing class in the first outcome, and P dies as a result of the toxin in both worlds.  
These two outcomes, like the outcomes compared in the text (O1 and O2), are just the 
same with respect to Nussbaum’s “life” value.  Longevity, not the risk of truncated lon-
gevity, is what is at stake under this rubric. 
281 This is true analytically:  if a randomly selected group of individuals is exposed 
to a toxin that has a 1 in X fatality risk relative to the canonical dosing class, then (if 
the group is large) the frequency of death within the group should approximately 
equal 1 in X.  See HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 75, at 321-22 (stating Mises’s “axiom 
of the existence of limits,” a precondition for frequentist risk in the standard, Misean 
sense).  For a dramatic illustration of the divergence between “individual risk” and ac-
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frequentist risk of death suffers an infringement of bodily integrity 
(Nussbaum’s third value).  After all, a toxic exposure amounts to a 
kind of physical invasion, at least where the exposure is involuntary:  
an unconsented-to breach of the body’s curtilage by a chemical 
agent.282  The mistake, here, is in equating physical invasion with fre-
quentist risk.  Everyone who unknowingly eats, breathes, or dermally 
uptakes a toxic (or for that matter nontoxic) chemical suffers a bodily 
“invasion” of the kind just described.  That is true of the person whose 
exposure produces a nonzero frequentist risk; it is also true of the 
person whose exposure produces a zero frequentist risk (for example, 
a person exposed to an amount of a noncarcinogenic toxin falling be-
low the toxicity threshold and therefore resulting in a risk number less 
than one).  One might object that only “small” doses produce sub-
threshold risks, but this is not true as a matter of toxicology.  Physi-
cally large doses (doses containing many large molecules) can pro-
duce a subthreshold dose, and vice versa—it just depends on the 
toxin.283  To be sure, doses below the threshold are necessarily “small” 
in a nonphysical sense—they don’t produce a nonzero frequentist 
risk—but the notion of physical invasion does not explain why we care 
about the risk dimension, as opposed to some measure of sheer physi-
cal size (such as volume or mass).  Note also that, where safety hazards 
rather than toxins are at issue (for example, unsafe cars, workplaces, 
or consumer products), a nonzero frequentist risk will typically occur 
without any physical invasion of the subject’s body at all.284 
Nussbaum’s fifth value is “emotion.”  Fear and related emotional 
states, such as anxiety, clearly are objective welfare setbacks, for Nuss-
baum.285  And there is a connection between risk and fear.  P genu-
inely fears death only if P is, in some sense, at risk of death.  But it is 
 
tual death, see HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 15.  Hamilton and Viscusi exam-
ined 150 Superfund sites where EPA—using the test of “individual risk” to the rea-
sonably maximally exposed individual—required remedies and found that “at the ma-
jority of sites the expected number of cancer cases averted is less than 0.1” and that 
“[o]nly ten sites had one or more expected cancer cases.” 
282 Cf. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 205-26 (1990) (arguing for 
a moral right against bodily intrusion). 
283 See RODRICKS, supra note 150, at 45 (“The conditions of exposure under which 
toxic effects are produced—the size of the dose and the duration of dosing needed—
vary greatly among chemicals.”). 
284 See Railton, supra note 273, at 94-95 (distinguishing between risks imposed via 
an intrusion into the victim’s person or property, and pure risk imposition). 
285 NUSSBAUM, supra note 265, at 79; see also Adler, supra note 20, at 1375-85 (argu-
ing that fear is harm); Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment:  Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 988-89 (2004) (same). 
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important to be careful in analyzing the fear-risk linkage.  The kind of 
risk conceptually linked to genuine fear is first-party Bayesian risk.286  P 
genuinely fears death only if P believes to a sufficient degree (has a 
sufficiently high Bayesian probability) that he will die and this belief 
produces physical arousal and feelings of distress.  Frequentist risk, as 
opposed to Bayesian risk, has no a priori connection to fear.  Any link 
would be contingent and empirical.  P can be at high frequentist risk 
of death, but not believe he will die, and not experience attendant 
arousal and distress.287  He can be at low frequentist risk from a toxin, 
yet still fear it—indeed, fear it quite rationally, if the belief-states ani-
mating his fear are epistemically rational. 
Finally, Nussbaum counts “affiliation” as an objective welfare 
good.  Other substantive welfare theorists propose similar goods:  Fin-
nis, “sociability”; Griffin, “deep personal relations.”288  It is here, sur-
prisingly perhaps, that the ex post welfare relevance of frequentist risk 
becomes most plausible.  Return to the Russian roulette game.  Imag-
ine that your neighbor intentionally fails to service his boiler, hoping 
to kill you—or, to wash out the suicide element and make the case 
purely homicidal, imagine that he builds a bomb in a shed on his lot 
and sets a timer that will explode the bomb while he’s away and kill 
you.  The bomb misfires, and you never learn of the neighbor’s plot.  
So you haven’t been physically harmed, nor scared, by his risky activ-
ity.  Nonetheless, there seems to be a sense in which, qua the objective 
welfare good of “affiliation,” your life history is worse than a life in 
which he didn’t build the bomb.  By deliberately imposing a fatality 
risk on you, without your consent, he failed (to quote Nussbaum) to 
“treat[] [you] as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of oth-
ers.”289 
Here, there is an overlap between welfarist moral theories and 
nonconsequentialist moral theories, which are considered below.  
Does the deliberate imposition of a high frequentist fatality risk on P, 
as such, really deny his full human worth and dignity?  If so, the non-
 
286 See Wayne A. Davis, The Varieties of Fear, 51 PHIL. STUD. 287, 289-302 (1987) 
(analyzing fear as an involuntary state of arousal and distress produced by the occur-
rent belief that some harm might occur); see also Adler, supra note 20, at 1375-76, 1377 
& n.229 (presenting Davis’s account and citing similar accounts). 
287 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 20, at 1350-51, 1358-59, 1363 (arguing that frequen-
tist risks need not be experienced); PORAT & STEIN, supra note 273, at 113 (same); 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 273, at 1650-51 (distinguishing between the “inter-
mediate harm” of risk and the “ultimate harm” of emotional distress). 
288 See FINNIS, supra note 264, at 88; GRIFFIN, supra note 267, at 30. 
289 NUSSBAUM, supra note 265, at 79. 
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consequentialist may well say that risk imposition is wrong :  it violates a 
“deontological” norm.  And the welfare consequentialist who incorpo-
rates the substantive welfare good that Nussbaum terms “affiliation,” 
or some similar good, will see risk imposition as a full-blown, ex post, 
welfare setback.  My response, to be fleshed out below, is that the so-
cial character of meaning and communication undermines any claim 
that the imposition of frequentist rather than Bayesian risk is a digni-
tary harm and thereby a welfare setback or deontological violation.290 
To sum up:  Frequentist fatality risk is not an ex post welfare set-
back.  P ’s life history is not worse in virtue of the various frequentist 
risks (relative to canonical dosing classes or any other classes) to 
which he may be subjected.  No pair of possible worlds differing 
merely in P ’s level of frequentist risk are different for P ’s welfare (and 
obviously, then, they are not for anyone else’s either).  Therefore, any 
pair of possible worlds differing merely in someone’s level of frequen-
tist risk must be given the same ranking by the welfarist consequential-
ist.  No member of any such pair can be ranked as better or worse 
without violating the “supervenience” requirement that is fundamen-
tal to welfare consequentialism.  And so the justification for regulatory 
attention to individual, frequentist risk cannot be the “ex post” justifi-
cation.  It cannot be that worlds with these features are just worse, ce-
teris paribus, than other worlds—as are, for example, worlds where 
pain, fear, injury, or premature death occurs. 
C.  The Ex Ante Question:  Should Frequentist Risk Play a Role in the  
Choices of the Welfare-Consequentialist Regulator? 
A different welfare-consequentialist defense of “individual risk” 
invokes the ex ante perspective.  Frequentist risk might have a role in 
determining morally appropriate choices even though it doesn’t 
change the goodness of outcomes.  Consider an actor—for our pur-
poses, a governmental regulator—faced with a choice among various 
options.  Welfare-consequentialist theories are moral theories, and 
therefore should provide criteria for evaluating these options.  But the 
ex post component of a consequentialist theory does not do that.  A 
ranking scheme for the different possible outcomes of an actor’s op-
tions is not, yet, a ranking scheme for his options.  Should the actor 
choose the action with the best outcome?  The action with the greatest 
expected value?  The action whose worst possible outcome is best? 
The “ex ante” component of a consequentialist theory provides a 
 
290 See infra text accompanying notes 389-92. 
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“bridging” rule that derives a ranking of the choices available to any 
actor, in any choice situation, from the ranking of the possible out-
comes of these choices.291  Perhaps frequentist risk becomes relevant 
at this stage of welfare consequentialism, rather than at the ex post 
stage. 
Some bridging rules do not invoke probabilities.  For example, 
the maximin rule says to determine the “worst case” outcome associ-
ated with each choice (the worst of all of the possible outcomes that 
might result from the choice) and to rank the choices accordingly.292  
But there is a plausible, indeed quite famous, bridging rule that does 
incorporate probability information:  the rule of “expected utility” 
maximization.  This rule says:  assign to each outcome (using a tech-
nique too complicated to summarize) a “utility” number, which repre-
sents the goodness of that outcome; for each action and each of its 
possible outcomes, determine the probability that the action will result 
in that outcome; using these probability numbers, plus the “utility” 
numbers attached to outcomes, determine an “expected utility” num-
ber for each action equaling the probabilistically weighted average of 
all its possible outcomes; and then rank the actions available for 
choice in the order of their “expected utility” numbers.293 
 Perhaps a little formalism will help:  Given a choice between 
{A1 . . . AN}, where each choice has possible outcomes {Oi, 1 . . . Oi, M}, 
there exists a utility function U(Oi, j) and a probability function p(Ai , 
Oi,j)—the latter representing the probability that Ai results in Oi,j .  
Then the “expected utility” number assigned to each action Ai is:   
Σj p(Ai  , Oi, j) × U(Oi, j).  And the appropriate choice, ex ante, is the 
choice with the highest expected utility. 
 
291 See RICHARD A. FUMERTON, REASON AND MORALITY:  A DEFENSE OF THE EGO-
CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 92-113 (1990); KAGAN, supra note 258, at 64-69; Adler, supra 
note 20, at 1318-19. 
292 See SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY 36 (1988). 
293 The “expected utility” rule has been hugely important within decision theory 
and economics.  For good overviews, see ELLERY EELLS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAU-
SALITY 65-86 (1982); FRENCH, supra note 292, at 149-209; DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 71-131 (1990); DAVID M. KREPS, NOTES ON THE THEORY OF 
CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES:  AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THE-
ORY 81-120 (1987).  The seminal works in this area are:  FRANK PLUMPTON RAMSEY, 
Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL ES-
SAYS 156, 156-98 (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1950), reprinted in STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROB-
ABILITY 61 (Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. & Howard E. Smokler eds., Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., 
trans., 1964); LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954); and JOHN 
VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
15-31, 617-32 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (3d ed. 1953). 
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How is this relevant to risk regulation?  The thought is that a regu-
lator’s attention to frequentist risk, in making her choices, is just the 
sort of responsiveness to probability information required by certain 
ex ante bridging rules, paradigmatically expected utility maximiza-
tion.  But this thought is misguided.  Rules for regulatory choice that 
look to frequentist “individual risk”—be it risk to a particular person 
or some amalgam of risk to different persons, such as the average “in-
dividual risk”—will not track the expected utility rule.  Conceptually, 
the two sorts of rules are quite different.  The probabilities relevant 
for expected utility maximization take possible worlds as their argu-
ments.  Each p(Ai , Oi, j) is a probability of a particular action leading to 
a given total outcome.  By contrast, a frequentist “individual risk,” in 
the regulatory context, is the risk of a particular regulatory action 
leading to some type of adverse effect suffered by a particular person.  
These risks take persons and effects, not possible worlds, as their ar-
guments.  Their form is p(Ai , E, Pk), where E is the type of effect (here, 
death) and Pk is the particular person.  Probability here is being at-
tributed to a small fragment of a possible world:  the little bit of reality 
that would be changed if some person were to die. 
To put the point another way, the probabilities relevant to ex-
pected utility maximization are the probabilities of extremely detailed 
and thorough descriptions of reality:  the probabilities of the different 
possible total consequences of each action.294  The “individual risk” 
numbers produced by risk assessment are the probabilities of very 
sketchy and incomplete descriptions of reality:  descriptions that at-
tend only to whether some person dies as a consequence of a toxic 
exposure or some other hazard.  Furthermore, the probabilities rele-
vant to expected utility maximization are Bayesian, not frequentist 
 
294 The expected utility rule tells the decision maker to assign values to acts based 
upon the possible outcomes of each act and the probability of the outcomes.  If the 
decision maker is unboundedly rational (as she is traditionally assumed to be by 
economists and decision theorists), then the “outcomes” which are valued using the 
expected utility rule should be complete possible worlds rather than consequences in a 
more generic sense (technically, sets of possible worlds).  Why?  The value that an un-
boundedly rational decision maker should assign to a generic consequence—a set of 
possible worlds—is the weighted average of the values assigned to its component pos-
sible worlds, as weighted by their probabilities.  So the unboundedly rational decision 
maker either starts with maximally specified outcomes, or starts with less specified out-
comes but, in turn, values those by using an expected utility procedure incorporating 
maximally specified outcomes.  See RICHARD C. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION 210 
(2d ed. 1983) (“[I]t is only the complete consistent novels [i.e., complete possible 
worlds] that can be said to have nonprobabilistic values:  the desirability of a proposi-
tion [a set of possible worlds] will be a probability-weighted average of the values of the 
possible worlds in which it would be true.”). 
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probabilities.295  The expected utility model builds upon a belief-desire 
account of rational action.  “Utilities” are numbers representing the 
desirability of different outcomes (how much welfare they contain, 
how it is spread), while “probabilities” are numbers representing the 
decisionmaker’s degree of belief that different outcomes will occur if 
different actions are chosen.  Imagine, for example, that the regulator 
is certain that a particular outcome will not occur.  Her Bayesian 
probability of its occurrence is zero.  Then, regardless of the frequen-
tist probability of that outcome, she should ignore the outcome in de-
ciding which action to undertake. 
It might be objected that the ex ante rule of expected utility 
maximization presupposes an unrealistically idealized regulator.  The 
regulator is not omniscient, but her logical and conceptual abilities 
are unbounded.  She is able to imagine the totality of possible worlds, 
each described in complete detail, and to ascribe probabilities to 
each.  Real world regulators, by contrast, are boundedly rational—
 
295 Admittedly, the expected utility rule might be understood as using objective 
(frequentist) rather than Bayesian (subjective) probabilities.  The frequentist version 
of the rule originates with von Neumann and Morgenstern; the Bayesian version, with 
Ramsey and Savage.  See KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 293, 
at 112 (“The von Neumann-Morgenstern model, where probabilities are objective, and 
the Savage . . . model, where probabilities are subjective, are the chief models of con-
sumer choice under uncertainty in microeconomics.”); see also sources cited supra note 
293.  But frequentist expected utility maximization has serious flaws.  First, the very 
point of ex ante rules within welfare consequentialism is to reflect the epistemic posi-
tion of the decision maker.  Omniscient decision makers should choose the action with 
the best outcome; but a nonomniscient decisionmaker might properly follow a differ-
ent ex ante rule, given her uncertainty about what the outcomes of her choices will be.  
See, e.g., EELLS, supra note 293, at 5 (arguing that Bayesian decision theory seeks to cap-
ture the idea that the rationality of a course of action is relative to the decision maker’s 
beliefs and desires); cf. ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS:  A THEORY OF 
NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 42-43 (1990) (arguing that moral rightness should be under-
stood subjectively, not objectively).  If this epistemic view of ex ante rules is rejected, 
then the rule for an omniscient decision maker might be something other than 
“choose the action with the best outcome”–-which is absurd, since surely the conse-
quentialist would want the omniscient decision maker to choose the action with the 
best outcome.  Second, assigning frequentist probabilities to complete possible worlds 
is problematic.  A complete possible world is a complete description of everything that 
might occur, and some (all?) of the occurrences therein described are nonrepeat-
able—paradigmatically, an occurrence that takes place at a particular time.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 322-24 (discussing difficulty in assigning frequentist prob-
abilities to nonrepeatable events).  For rejections of the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
approach to expected utility theory, see EELLS, supra note 293, at 31-33; HIRSHLEIFER & 
RILEY, supra note 74, at 10; Philippe Mongin & Claude d’Aspremont, Utility Theory and 
Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 371, 404 (Salvador Barberà et al. eds., 
1998). 
  
2005] AGAINST “INDIVIDUAL RISK” 1197 
they are humans.296  Expected utility maximization is an idealization:  a 
plausible ex ante rule for demigods, perhaps, but not for us.  Showing 
that the probabilities relevant to the rule of expected utility maximiza-
tion are not “individual risks” hardly demonstrates that the ex ante 
rule appropriate for human regulators dispenses with “individual 
risk.” 
What is the ex ante rule appropriate for human regulators?  What 
decision-procedure does welfare consequentialism instruct boundedly 
rational regulators to employ?  I have answered this question in other 
work:  cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a rough-and-ready, humanly acces-
sible version of expected utility maximization, in which the salient wel-
fare effects of regulatory choices are priced in dollars and a total dol-
lar cost or benefit is determined for each choice, is generally the 
appropriate decision-procedure for regulators concerned to maximize 
overall welfare.297  To be sure, welfare consequentialism is a broad 
family of moral views.  Utilitarianism, which focuses on overall welfare, 
is only one member of the family.298  But it seems plausible that CBA 
can be adapted to nonutilitarian variants of welfare consequentialism 
demanding sensitivity to the distribution of welfare (at least to priori-
tarianism and others that respect the Pareto principle), through the 
use of  appropriate weighting factors—factors that give greater weight 
to the welfare of those who are worse off.299 
Let us consider, then, whether “individual risk” in the frequentist 
sense has a role to play in CBA.  Certainly there are forms of CBA that 
do not directly incorporate “individual risk” information.  For exam-
ple, current CBA practice at federal regulatory agencies is to calculate 
the monetary benefit of regulatory interventions that prevent deaths 
by predicting the total number of deaths prevented and then multiply-
ing that number by the “value of statistical life,” a dollar amount in 
 
296 See Matthew D. Adler, Rational Choice, Rational Agenda-Setting, and Constitutional 
Law:  Does the Constitution Require Basic or Strengthened Public Rationality?, in LINKING 
POLITICS AND LAW 109, 131-32 (Christoph Engel & Adrienne Héritier eds., 2003).  The 
locus classicus for discussions of bounded rationality is, of course, Herbert Simon’s 
work.  See generally 1 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY:  ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982); 2 id.; 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY:  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997). 
297 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 194-225 
(conceptualizing cost-benefit analysis as a decision-procedure); Adler & Posner, Imple-
menting Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 272-80 (same). 
298 See supra text accompanying notes 258-62. 
299 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 224 (dis-
cussing possibility of distributively-weighted cost-benefit analysis); Adler & Posner, Im-
plementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 300-05 (same). 
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the range of one to six million dollars.300  CBA, thus structured, evalu-
ates policy choices by characterizing the impact of those choices on 
“population risk,” not “individual risk.”  The risk assessor predicts the 
aggregate deaths that would result from a hazard and be avoided by 
regulatory intervention; these mortality effects are then monetized at 
a price of one to six million dollars per death, and added to the non-
mortality costs and benefits of the different regulatory options, such as 
compliance and enforcement costs. 
To be sure, the “value of statistical life” number is itself derived 
from information about willingness to pay to avoid small risks of 
death, rather than willingness to pay to avoid certain death or willing-
ness to accept in exchange for certain death (the first number will be 
dramatically skewed by individual wealth, while the second may well 
be infinite).  But “individual risk” has no direct role in the kind of 
CBA just described.  Particular regulatory interventions are evaluated 
by quantifying and then monetizing their effect in reducing the total 
number of deaths, not by quantifying and monetizing their effect on 
the distribution of “individual risk.” 
Still, it is possible to construct a different variant of CBA—one 
that does characterize and price the “individual risks” created by par-
ticular hazards.301  For most hazards, even those where the regulator is 
very confident (ex ante) that one or more deaths will result from the 
hazard if left unregulated, the regulator will not know (ex ante) the 
identities of the persons who will die.  Imagine, for example, a toxic 
 
300 For general discussions of the “value of statistical life” method, see A. MYRICK 
FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES:  THEORY 
AND METHODS 298-321 (2d ed. 2003); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:  PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 34-74 (1992); W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POL-
ICY 45-68 (1998); M.W. Jones-Lee, Safety and the Saving of Life:  The Economics of Safety 
and Physical Risk, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 290, 290-318 (Richard Layard & Stephen 
Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994); David Pearce, Valuing Risks, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 345, 345-75.  Govern-
mental use of the “value of statistical life” construct is surveyed in Don Kenkel, Using 
Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life in Evaluating Consumer Policy Regulations, 26 J. 
CONSUMER POL’Y 1, 4-7 (2003), and W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of Statis-
tical Life:  A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 5, 53-56 (2003). 
301 NRC’s approach to CBA, it appears, is to price risks rather than deaths.  The 
agency currently monetizes the health costs of radiation exposure at a price of $2000 
per person-rem.  But because the $2000 figure is used across the board to price expo-
sures, this technique is not sensitive to variation in individual willingness-to-pay to 
avoid risk.  See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, REGULATORY ANALYSIS GUIDE-
LINES, NUREG/BR-0058, at 31-32 (Rev. 4, Sept. 2004) (presenting NRC’s approach to 
monetizing radiation exposure), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/brochures/br0058/br0058r4.pdf. 
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food that produces a 1 in 10,000 fatality risk for those who consume 
it—or so the regulator believes—and that is consumed by a popula-
tion of one million.  It is therefore overwhelmingly likely, the regula-
tor believes, that the food will cause at least one premature death.  
Yet, for any given food consumer, the regulator assigns a probability of 
1 in 10,000 that that particular individual will die if the food is left on 
the market.  The regulator might monetize the benefits of regulation 
by pricing the mean number of possible deaths—in this example, one 
hundred deaths.  That is the current practice, as just explained.  Al-
ternatively, the regulator might monetize the benefits of regulation by 
pricing each “individual risk” of death that regulation avoids, and ag-
gregating across the population.  In the food example, that would 
mean:  determining how much different categories of food consum-
ers, described in greater or lesser detail, are willing to pay to avoid a 1 
in 10,000 fatality risk (for example, willingness to pay to avoid that risk 
might vary with wealth or age); determining how many individuals in 
the total population of consumers of the toxic food (one million) fall 
into the various categories; and then multiplying the numbers in each 
category by the category-specific willingness to pay to avoid a 1 in 
10,000 risk.  For example, if willingness to pay is individuated by age, 
wealth, and gender, the regulator would calculate the total risk-
reduction benefit of banning the toxic food as illustrated in the table 
below: 
 
Gender Age Wealth 
Mean 
WTP 
Total 
Number 
Total WTP    
in Category 
      
      
M < 21 Poor $150 25,000 $3,750,000 
M 21 - 40 Poor $100 30,000 $3,000,000 
M 41 - 70 Poor $175 40,000 $7,000,000 
M > 70 Poor $250 10,000 $2,500,000 
F < 21 Poor $150 25,000 $3,750,000 
F 21 - 40 Poor $100 35,000 $3,500,000 
F 41 - 70 Poor $250 45,000 $11,250,000 
F > 70 Poor $300 15,000 $4,500,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
In short, CBA’s methodology for monetizing the benefits of 
avoided fatalities might take two different forms:  the “population 
risk” form, where mean total fatalities avoided are predicted and 
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priced;302 or the “individual risk” form, where the “individual risks” of 
fatality imposed on various groups of individuals by hazards are char-
acterized, priced, and aggregated.  Choosing between these variants of 
CBA is a complicated matter, which I cannot pursue here.  The choice 
depends on the degree of variability of willingness-to-pay to avoid risk 
across the population,303 and the deliberation costs of disaggregating 
the population at risk from a hazard into different willingness-to-pay 
categories.304  But both represent plausible procedures. 
It should be stressed that the “individual risk” version of CBA does 
not presuppose the mistaken view, criticized above, that risk is itself an 
ex post harm.  Like the “population risk” version, it assumes that death 
is the welfare setback targeted by risk regulation:  it is death, not risk, 
that makes a human life worse and that legitimately influences the 
welfare-consequentialist ranking of possible worlds.  “Individual risk” 
becomes relevant at the ex ante stage by virtue of the regulator’s un-
certainty about who will die.305  Consider this analogy:  where the regu-
lator knows that one person in a population of one million will ex-
perience great pain as a result of a hazard, but doesn’t know who the 
sufferer will be, that “pain cost” might be priced either as the amount 
a single person would pay to avoid certain pain, or as the aggregate 
amount that one million persons would pay to avoid a 1 in 1 million 
risk of pain.  Neither approach to valuing pain presupposes that the 
risk of pain, as opposed to pain, is an ex post welfare setback.  Ditto for 
the “individual risk” approach to valuing death:  it denies, rather than 
presupposes, that the unwitting victim of a game of Russian roulette 
has been harmed as such. 
Have we finally, then, identified a legitimate role for “individual 
risk” within regulatory choice governed by welfare consequentialism?  
 
302 More precisely, pricing the mean number of deaths is the simplest, and cur-
rently practiced, variant of the “population risk” approach to CBA, but not the only 
possibility.  The well-informed analyst will have a Bayesian probability distribution over 
the possible number of deaths avoided by regulatory intervention.  That Bayesian dis-
tribution can then be used, in a variety of different ways, to monetize the benefit of 
intervention. 
303 On heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay to avoid fatality risks, see FREEMAN, supra 
note 300, at 318; VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 300, at 42-47. 
304 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 216-43 (ar-
guing that the design of CBA should be sensitive to deliberation costs); Adler, supra 
note 285, at 998-1001 (same). 
305 See FREEMAN, supra note 300, at 301 (“[One] way of characterizing the eco-
nomic approach [to the valuation of life] is by saying that the economic value is de-
rived by focusing on choices ex ante, that is, before the uncertainty about the individ-
ual’s death during a specified period is resolved.”). 
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No, because the “individual risks” relevant within CBA, if at all, are 
Bayesian not frequentist.306  CBA, again, is a rough and ready version 
of expected utility maximization—one that does not require the regu-
lator to imagine possible outcomes in complete detail, but instead asks 
her to focus on the welfare-relevant features of outcomes likely to be 
substantially affected by the choices before her, and to price those.  
Still, just as the probabilities that would properly drive the regulatory 
choices of an unboundedly rational regulator maximizing expected 
social utility are Bayesian probabilities—numbers measuring her own 
beliefs about the likelihood of different possible worlds—so the prob-
ability numbers figuring in CBA and driving regulatory choice under 
bounded rationality are also, appropriately, Bayesian.  Consider once 
more the toxic food case.  The food has a frequentist risk, relative to 
the canonical dosing class, of 1 in 10,000.  One of every 10,000 per-
sons who eat a standard serving of the food dies as a result.  But (let us 
imagine) there is a subpopulation that (the regulator believes) is resis-
tant to the toxin.  Ethnic Albanians have a gene that, current scientific 
theory predicts, should almost always render the toxin harmless.  
Then the “individual risk” number that the regulator should use in 
determining the benefit that individual Albanians would gain from a 
food ban should be less than 1 in 10,000.  If, for example, the regula-
tor believes to degree 1 in 1 million (not 1 in 10,000) that the food 
will cause the death of a given Albanian consumer, then the 
monetized benefit for that consumer of a food ban should equal his 
willingness-to-pay to avoid a 1 in 1 million risk of death. 
 
306 See id. at 210 (suggesting that the relevant probabilities for purposes of CBA 
under uncertainty are Bayesian); Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 300, at 10 (same).  
Whether the Bayesian probabilities relevant to CBA should be first-party probabilities 
(Bayesian probabilities measuring the beliefs of the persons affected by the govern-
mental choice being evaluated) or third-party probabilities (Bayesian probabilities 
measuring the beliefs of the CBA analyst or governmental official) is a further ques-
tion.  Given the status of CBA as a rough-and-ready approximation to expected utility 
maximization, and the fact that the relevant Bayesian probabilities for expected utility 
maximization are third party, not first party, it follows (I believe) that the probabilities 
relevant for CBA are also third party.  See Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of “Ex Ante Effi-
ciency”:  Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1276-79 
(2003) (arguing that government decision makers who are maximizing expected utility 
should not attend to first-party Bayesian probabilities); Mongin & d’Aspremont, supra 
note 295, at 437-44 (developing social choice theory using Bayesian probabilities, and 
discussing relevance of first-party probabilities).  This is not a point I will argue at 
length here, since it is tangential to my main claim in this Article:  namely that the 
probabilities that properly figure in CBA, and more generally in plausible governmen-
tal decision procedures for risk regulation, are Bayesian measures of someone’s beliefs, 
not frequencies. 
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The claim I am making here—that the probabilities relevant to 
CBA are Bayesian, not frequentist—rests on a view about bounded ra-
tionality.  For actors with unbounded cognitive resources, the best de-
veloped and most plausible model of rationality meshes beliefs and 
desires, and is formalized through the expected utility model.  It is 
conceivable, I suppose, that the shift from unbounded to bounded 
cognitive resources radically changes the role of beliefs in rational 
choice.307  Beliefs, and the numbers measuring them, might drop out 
of the picture.  Where the boundedly rational regulator strongly be-
lieves that an outcome will (or will not) occur, but the frequency of 
the outcome relative to some reference class is low (or high), it might 
be rational for the regulator to scrap her beliefs and rely instead on 
frequencies as the ultimate determinants of her choice.308 
But why think that?  The topic of bounded rationality is under-
theorized,309 and I certainly don’t have a full-blown account to offer 
here.  If regulators were so epistemically flawed that frequentist prob-
abilities, relative to certain stipulated classes, were generally closer to 
the “idealized” Bayesian probabilities (i.e., the Bayesian probabilities 
that the regulators would have, if unboundedly rational) than the 
regulators’ actual Bayesian probabilities, then perhaps it might be ra-
tional for the regulators to ignore their actual Bayesian probabilities 
and substitute frequentist probabilities calculated using the stipulated 
classes.  But there are many serious problems with this frequentist pic-
ture of rational choice under conditions of bounded rationality.  First, 
 
307 It has been argued that the shift from unbounded to bounded rationality pro-
duces other large changes in the structure of rational choice—most famously, that 
boundedly rational decision makers should “satisfice” rather than maximizing ex-
pected value.  See Michael Byron, Satisficing and Optimality, 109 ETHICS 67, 70-75 
(1998). 
308 Even on this view, beliefs would play a role.  It is difficult to imagine an account 
of rational choice where they wouldn’t.  (For any proposed rule of rationality, the 
chooser would have to be guided by her beliefs about how the rule applied to a given 
choice situation.)  But on the view now under consideration, beliefs about the fre-
quencies of outcomes relative to stipulated reference classes, rather than probabilistic 
beliefs about the outcomes themselves, would determine rational choice. 
309 To be sure, a vast empirical literature now exists documenting the extent to 
which individuals deviate from expected utility maximization.  See generally REID HASTIE 
& ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (2001) (surveying this literature). But bounded ra-
tionality as a topic in normative decision theory remains relatively neglected, cf. ARIEL 
RUBINSTEIN, MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY 3 (1998) (“[A]ttempts to model 
bounded rationality have yet to find the right track.”), despite Simon’s early efforts, see 
SIMON, supra note 296.  For some recent attempts to develop norms for bounded deci-
sion makers, see GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 
(1999). 
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there are actual humans who are pretty good at reasoning probabilis-
tically along Bayesian lines–-for example, risk assessors or other statis-
ticians trained in Bayesian techniques310-–and regulators can defer to 
them, just as they now defer to traditional, frequentist risk assessors.311  
Second, frequencies relative to reference classes which are finely 
specified to take account of the individual characteristics that would 
influence the degrees of belief of an idealized regulator cannot be ob-
served; they must be inferred, and making that inference in a reliable 
way assumes a high degree of epistemic competence on the part of the 
regulator or those experts to whom she defers.312  In our food exam-
ple, the regulator will not have the option of determining the fre-
quency of premature death relative to a reference class of “Albanian 
humans who eat a standard dose of the food” by actually feeding the 
food to Albanians and a control group, given the ethical limits on 
human experimentation.313  Instead, she will have to infer that fre-
quency from scientific theory, animal tests, and epidemiological data.  
If the regulator, or the expert risk assessor to whom she defers, has 
enough epistemic competence to do that, why not just use the ex-
pert’s Bayesian probabilities?  Conversely, if the frequentist probabili-
ties putatively determinative of rational choice by boundedly rational 
regulators are stipulated to be directly observable—in the case of toxic 
risks, the frequencies directly observed in animal tests—then those 
frequencies will have to be defined relative to fairly crude reference 
classes, given the costs of experiments and other constraints such as 
the limited number of direct analogues for human characteristics in 
the animals that are the subject of toxicity experiments.314  The fre-
 
310 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 330 (presenting Bayesian approaches to risk 
assessment). 
311 See generally ROGER M. COOKE, EXPERTS IN UNCERTAINTY:  OPINION AND SUBJEC-
TIVE PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE (1991) (discussing use of expert subjective probabilities 
in governmental decision making as well as other contexts); M. GRANGER MORGAN & 
MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY:  A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITA-
TIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1990) (same); M. Granger Morgan, Uncertainty Analysis 
in Risk Assessment,  4 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 25, 30-34 (1998) (discuss-
ing applicability of this approach to risk assessment). 
312 Cf. Finkel, supra note 86, at 305-08 (discussing different ways to infer the varia-
tion in individual cancer risk that results from variation in individual “susceptibility” to 
cancer). 
313 See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 149 (“Due to ethical and practical 
problems associated with experimenting with human subjects, controlled human ex-
posure studies typically have been limited to the study of mild and reversible health 
effects (e.g., allergic skin reactions).”). 
314 Indeed, even where frequencies are defined relative to canonical dosing classes 
rather than more finely specified classes, and estimated using dose-response experi-
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quency of toxicity in a class of rats fed a ten-gram dose of the danger-
ous food might be directly extrapolated to predict the frequency of 
toxicity in a class of humans fed a ten-gram dose; but what rat experi-
ment could be undertaken to directly predict the frequency of death 
in a group of Albanian humans fed a ten-gram dose? 
*          *          * 
To summarize the analysis to this point:  Consequentialism is the 
class of moral views that specify the actions that regulators should 
choose with reference to the outcomes that those actions might lead 
to.  Consequentialist theories have both an “ex post” part, describing 
the features of outcomes that make them better or worse, and an “ex 
ante” part, providing rules (perhaps probabilistic in form) for deriv-
ing a ranking of the choices available to the regulator from the “ex 
post” ranking of outcomes.  Welfare consequentialism says that the only 
morally relevant feature of outcomes is human welfare.  “Individual 
risk” in the frequentist sense has no place within welfare consequen-
tialism.  First, “individual risk” lacks ex post significance.  A life where 
the subject at some point consumes a toxin that imposes a high fre-
quentist fatality risk on her—relative to the canonical dosing class or 
any other reference class—is not worse, ceteris paribus, than a life where 
she is not thus put at risk.  In other words, the frequentist risk of 
death, unlike death itself, or the pain or bodily harms that accompany 
disease and injury, or the fear of death, is not a “cost” for purposes of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Second, “individual risk” in the frequentist sense lacks ex ante sig-
nificance.  If regulators are as traditional economic theory assumes 
them to be—if they have unbounded cognitive resources-–then ex 
ante they should maximize expected social utility.  The probabilities 
relevant to regulatory expected utility maximization are Bayesian 
probabilities over complete possible worlds, not frequentist probabili-
ties that particular persons will die prematurely.  To be sure, regula-
tors with bounded cognitive resources should follow some procedure 
more tractable than expected utility maximization.  Specifically, at 
least where implementing a variant of welfare consequentialism that is 
not radically egalitarian, regulators should engage in cost-benefit 
analysis.  One plausible version of CBA uses “population risk” as an 
input, pricing aggregate predicted deaths; another plausible version 
 
ments in rats, those frequencies are not literally directly observed.  Rather, inference 
procedures must be used to control for experimental error and to extrapolate from 
high to low dose and from animals to humans.  See id. at 137-43. 
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seeks instead to describe the distribution of “individual risk” across the 
population and prices these risks individually.  But the kind of risk 
relevant to this latter sort of CBA is Bayesian rather than frequentist.  
Some subject’s “individual risk” of dying prematurely as a result of a 
toxin is (in this context) the regulator’s degree of belief that the sub-
ject will die prematurely, not the frequency of death relative to the 
canonical dosing class or any other reference class. 
One possible objection to my analysis is that I haven’t adequately 
considered egalitarian variants of welfare consequentialism.  I have 
suggested that some of these variants might be implemented through 
CBA, by using “distributive weights” to adjust costs and benefits; but 
other variants would warrant non-CBA procedures.  As a clear exam-
ple, consider strict welfare egalitarianism, which rejects the Pareto 
principle,315 enjoins regulators to aim at equalizing welfare levels, and 
therefore considers an outcome in which everyone’s welfare level is 
the same to be better than an outcome in which some persons have 
that level and others have a higher level.  This radical view would not 
justify CBA, but neither would it justify regulatory attention to fre-
quentist risk—certainly not if regulators have unbounded cognitive 
resources,316 and plausibly not if their rationality is bounded.317 
A different general objection to my welfare-consequentialist analy-
sis is that my persistent distinction between frequentist and Bayesian 
probabilities is illusory.  This objection merits a longer response, 
which I shall now attempt to provide. 
 
315 See supra text accompanying note 261. 
316 Strictly egalitarian regulators with unbounded cognitive resources would 
maximize expected utility, with the crucial twist that the “utility” numbers ranking 
worlds would track the degree to which welfare is equally distributed in the worlds, not 
the total amount of welfare.  Probabilities would be relevant ex ante, not ex post, but-–
as with utilitarianism, prioritarianism, or other welfare-consequentialist views—these 
would be the regulator’s Bayesian probabilities over total outcomes. 
317 Plausibly, the boundedly rational egalitarian regulator would compare, in a 
rough way, the expected welfare of those at risk from hazards with the expected wel-
fare of the general population or some other control population.  If those at risk have 
lower expected welfare, shutting down the hazard increases equality.  If those at risk 
have higher expected welfare, then the hazard should not be shut down.  And, plausi-
bly, the boundedly rational regulator’s assessment of the expected welfare of the ex-
posed population versus controls would hinge on his own Bayesian probabilities—
since (as before) it is hard to see why bounding rationality would change the kind of 
probabilities relevant to regulatory choice. 
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IV.  FREQUENTIST RISK AND BAYESIAN RISK:   
ARE THEY REALLY DIFFERENT? 
I have tried to demonstrate that “individual risk” in the frequentist 
sense would have no role in the decision procedures of regulators 
choosing in accordance with welfare consequentialism.  Probabilities 
may play a role, at various points, but these are Bayesian rather than 
frequentist probabilities, or so I have argued.  The reader is surely en-
titled to wonder whether these two kinds of probabilities are genu-
inely distinct.  Don’t Bayesian probabilities reduce, ultimately, to rela-
tive frequencies?  Doesn’t the rational regulator’s degree of belief that 
some person will die prematurely as a result of a toxin equal the fre-
quency with which persons exposed to the toxin die prematurely-–if 
not the frequency relative to the canonical dosing class, then surely 
the frequency relative to some other reference class?  How, concretely, 
would Bayesian risk assessment of toxins differ from the frequentist 
risk assessment that is now the norm?318 
The Bayesian account of probability, generically, sees probabilities 
as numbers that measure a person’s beliefs in various propositions 
and that satisfy the probability calculus. The numbers must not be 
greater than 1 or less than 0; if the probability of some proposition is 
p, then the probability of its negation must be 1-p; if two propositions 
are mutually exclusive, then the probability of their disjunction must 
equal the sum of their probabilities; and so on.319  Various Bayesian 
accounts for attaching numbers to beliefs have been offered by phi-
losophers and mathematicians.  To give one example:  if an individual 
has comparative beliefs, beliefs in the relative likelihood of different 
propositions, that are well-behaved, then (it turns out) those beliefs 
can be represented by a scheme of numbers conforming to the prob-
ability calculus.  Well-behaved, in this context, means something like 
this:  (1) completeness (for given propositions X and Y, either our be-
liever B believes X to be more likely than Y, or she believes Y to be 
more likely than X, or she believes them to be equally likely); (2) tran-
sitivity (if B believes X to be more likely than Y and Y to be more likely 
 
318 For an excellent discussion of the difference between Bayesian and frequentist 
approaches to environmental policy, published after this Article was drafted, see David 
E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint:  The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Pro-
cedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497 (2004). 
319 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1312 n.73 (citing overviews of Bayesian theories of 
probability).  On Bayesian statistical techniques, see BAYESIAN BIOSTATISTICS (Donald 
A. Berry & Dalene K. Stangl eds., 1996); PETER M. LEE, BAYESIAN STATISTICS:  AN IN-
TRODUCTION (2d ed. 1997). 
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than Z, then she believes X to be more likely than Z); and (3) additiv-
ity (if B believes X to be more likely than Y and both X and Y to be 
mutually exclusive of W, then she believes the disjunction X-or-W to be 
more likely than Y-or-W).  If B’s beliefs satisfy these axioms and sev-
eral other technical ones, then there exists a unique probability func-
tion mapping each belief onto a number between 0 and 1.320  These 
numbers represent the beliefs of B in the sense that p(X) is greater than 
p(Y) if and only if B is more certain in X than in Y. 
The specific Bayesian approach just described, and Bayesian ac-
counts more generally,321 do not draw a foundational link between 
probabilities and relative frequencies.  The fact that B is comparatively 
more certain in X than in Y might be taken as a primitive, or analyzed 
in behavioral terms:  if B is comparatively more certain in X, then if 
given the choice between a lottery which makes some attractive payoff 
contingent on X and one that makes the very same payoff contingent 
on Y, she will choose the first.  In any event, there is no insistence that 
X and Y must be disaggregated into their component, repeatable 
events and that B’s comparative belief in X and Y must be reduced to 
the comparative frequency of these events relative to stipulated, ca-
nonical reference classes.  Indeed, one virtue of Bayesian approaches, 
both this approach and others, is that they permit the attachment of 
probability numbers to propositions where ascribing frequentist prob-
abilities is unthinkable or at least extremely silly.322  Consider, for ex-
ample, a proposition that makes some temporal assertion, claiming an 
event to have occurred at a particular time:  “Nixon resigned in 1974.”  
We might imagine an infinite series of political experiments where 
Presidents “like Nixon” are placed in similar political contexts and ei-
ther resign or not; but this would be the frequency with which Presi-
dents like Nixon resign at some time, not the frequency with which 
they resign at a particular time (1974).  Particular times are necessar-
 
320 See Patrick Suppes, Qualitative Theory of Subjective Probability, in SUBJECTIVE 
PROBABILITY 17, 27 (George Wright & Peter Ayton eds., 1994). 
321 Another approach sees Bayesian probabilities as primitives.  See FRENCH, supra 
note 292, at 224-32.  Yet another, pioneered by de Finetti, reduces them to odds for 
small money bets.  See Bruno de Finetti, Foresight:  Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources 
(1937), reprinted in STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY, supra note 293, at 93.  And 
some (most famously Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey) have proposed techniques for using 
a rational agent’s choices to derive both a “utility” measure of her preference for out-
comes and a “probability” measure of her beliefs.  See JEFFREY, supra note 294, at 59-
163; RAMSEY, supra note 293; SAVAGE, supra note 293, at 6-104. 
322 See, e.g., COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 210 (“Bayes’s theory is more 
general than [frequentist] probability in that probabilities may be assigned to any 
meaningful hypothesis or proposition . . . .”). 
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ily unrepeatable.323  Or, more relevant to risk regulation, imagine a 
proposition that asserts some scientific model of toxicity to be true.  
What could the frequentist probability of a given scientific model pos-
sibly consist in?324  Could it consist in the frequency with which a very 
large or infinite class of “similar” models—models that fall in a refer-
ence class characterized by some attribute that this particular model 
has—turn out to be true?  How could we possibly have grounds for be-
lieving what that frequency is, and why on earth would we care? 
Thus far I have discussed Bayesian approaches at a high level of 
abstraction:  as theories stipulating some criterion for mapping indi-
vidual beliefs onto numbers satisfying the probability calculus.  More 
concretely, how would Bayesian approaches be employed to guide 
regulatory choice?  These approaches have been widely used in cer-
tain areas of regulation, such as predicting the probability of a nuclear 
reactor accident.325  The risk assessor consults with experts in nuclear 
engineering to identify the different series of occurrences within the 
reactor that might lead to core damage.  Then, various techniques are 
used to ensure that each expert has a coherent set of beliefs with re-
spect to the possible occurrences, sufficient to allow the ascription of 
Bayesian probabilities and to elicit those probabilities. (For example, 
the expert might be asked the odds at which he’d be willing to make a 
small monetary bet on each occurrence or its subevents; if those odds 
are incoherent, in the sense that they fail to satisfy the probability cal-
culus, then the expert might be encouraged to revise his assess-
ment.)326 Finally, the different experts’ probabilities are averaged or 
otherwise amalgamated by the risk assessor, so as to arrive at a single, 
 
323 See id. at 209-10 (discussing difficulty in assigning frequentist probabilities to 
nonrepeatable events); Adler, supra note 20, at 1345 n.158 (citing sources that describe 
this difficulty). 
324 Cf. HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 75, at 203 (noting that classical statistics re-
fuses to assign probabilities to scientific theories). 
325 For a general discussion of how to integrate Bayesian probabilities into policy-
making, see FUMIKA OUCHI, A LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE USE OF EXPERT OPINION IN 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS (Feb. 2004) (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 
3201), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/32873_wps3201.pdf; Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, 
Risk and Uncertainty Analysis in Government Safety Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 633 (2002); 
sources cited supra note 311.  On the use of expert subjective probabilities in nuclear 
reactor risk assessment, see COOKE, supra note 311, at 27-41.  For a recent example, see 
Truong V. Vo et al., Estimates of Rupture Probabilities for Nuclear Power Plant Components:  
Expert Judgment Elicitation, 96 NUCLEAR TECH. 259 (1991). 
326 See generally COOKE, supra note 311, at 121-57 (discussing elicitation of expert 
probabilities); MORGAN & HENRION, supra note 311, at 102-71 (same); DETLOF VON 
WINTERFELDT & WARD EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 112-
33 (1986) (same). 
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pooled set of Bayesian probabilities of the various possible occur-
rences leading to reactor failure.327 
In the area of toxic risk assessment, and more generally in ascrib-
ing probabilities of death, illness, and injury, Bayesian techniques 
have not been much used to date by U.S. regulators.328  Nuclear regu-
lators, for example, have been Bayesians in predicting the probability 
of reactor failure, but not in predicting the deaths that would result 
from a failure.  And frequentism has dominated toxics regulation, as 
discussed.329  Still, there is a growing scholarly literature that explores 
and defends the Bayesian variant of toxic risk assessment.330  The basic 
 
327 See COOKE, supra note 311, at 171-220 (discussing combination of expert prob-
abilities); WINTERFELDT & EDWARDS, supra note 326, at 133-36 (same). 
328 One important exception is EPA’s use of expert subjective probabilities in 
regulating “criteria” air pollutants.  See MORGAN & HENRION, supra note 311, at 9-11, 
154-57. 
329 See supra Parts II.A-II.B.  The problem of “uncertainty” is now reasonably high 
on the agenda of governmental risk assessors.  See, e.g., Fred Hansen (Deputy Adminis-
trator), EPA, Policy for Use of Probabilistic Analysis in Risk Assessment (May 15, 1997), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/osa/spc/htm/probpol.htm.  The focus here, however, 
is exposure assessment rather than dose-response assessment.  See CULLEN & FREY, su-
pra note 58, at 2.  And, in any event (oddly enough), it seems to be a widespread view 
among risk assessors that the probabilities quantifying uncertainty need not be Bayes-
ian.  See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at  207-24; CULLEN & FREY, supra note 
58, at 15-21. 
330 See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 213-16; CULLEN & FREY, supra 
note 58, at 18-21; Catherine Petito Boyce, Comparison of Approaches for Developing Distri-
butions for Carcinogenic Slope Factors, 4 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 527, 535-
41 (1998); James D. Englehardt, Predictive Bayesian Dose-Response Assessment for Apprais-
ing Absolute Health Risk from Available Information, 10 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESS-
MENT 69 (2004); John S. Evans et al., A Distributional Approach to Characterizing Low-Dose 
Cancer Risk, in LOW-DOSE EXTRAPOLATION OF CANCER RISKS, supra note 86, at 253; 
John S. Evans et al., Use of Probabilistic Expert Judgment in Uncertainty Analysis of Carcino-
genic Potency, 20 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 15 (1994); William E. Fayer-
weather et al., Quantifying Uncertainty in a Risk Assessment Using Human Data, 19 RISK 
ANALYSIS 1077 (1999); Vic Hasselblad & Annie M. Jarabek, Dose-Response Analysis of 
Toxic Chemicals, in BAYESIAN BIOSTATISTICS, supra note 319, at 235; Ryan A. Hill, From 
Science to Decision-Making:  The Applicability of Bayesian Methods to Risk Assessment, 2 HUM. 
& ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 636 (1996); Gary Koop & Lise Tole, Measuring the 
Health Effects of Air Pollution:  To What Extent Can We Really Say That People Are Dying from 
Bad Air, 47 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 30 (2004); Jane C. Lindsey & Louise M. Ryan, 
Analyzing Rodent Tumorigenicity Experiments Using Expert Knowledge, in BAYESIAN BIOSTA-
TISTICS, supra note 319, at 503; Morgan, supra note 311; Tapan K. Nayak & Subrata 
Kundu, Calculating and Describing Uncertainty in Risk Assessment:  The Bayesian Approach, 7 
HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 307 (2001); D. Warner North, Use of Expert 
Judgment on Cancer Dose-Response: Probabilistic Assessment and Plans for Application to Diel-
drin, in LOW-DOSE EXTRAPOLATION OF CANCER RISKS, supra note 86, at 275; Anthony 
O’Hagan, Uncertainty in Toxicological Predictions:  The Bayesian Approach to Statistics, in 
FORECASTING THE ENVIRONMENTAL FATE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICALS 25 (Philip S. 
Rainbow et al. eds., 2001). 
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idea, I propose, is this.  Different models of toxicity exist.  Some are 
deterministic, positing that under certain conditions an exposed per-
son will definitely suffer the toxic effect, and that under other condi-
tions she definitely will not.  The “conditions” might include the size 
of the dose, the genetic makeup of the person, her health history, and 
so on.  Other models are stochastic:  they attach an irreducible risk of 
toxicity, greater than zero and less than one, to different kinds of ex-
posures.  For a given toxic exposure of a person, characterized in 
terms of the dose she received and perhaps other characteristics, the 
risk assessor’s and therewith the regulator’s Bayesian probability that 
the individual will die prematurely as a result of that exposure can be 
determined by:  (1) consulting with toxicologists, biologists, and other 
experts to determine the different plausible models of toxicity, be 
they deterministic or stochastic; (2) for each expert, eliciting her Bay-
esian probabilities that the different possible models are true; (3) for 
each expert and each deterministic model, determining her Bayesian 
probability that the exposure being analyzed satisfies the conditions 
requisite for toxicity (here, death); (4) for each expert and each sto-
chastic model, determining her Bayesian probability that the condi-
tions requisite for an irreducible risk of toxicity are satisfied, and dis-
counting that risk by that Bayesian probability; (5) for each expert, 
determining an all-in Bayesian probability that the exposure will result 
in death by discounting the probability conditional on each model by 
the probability that the model is true, and then summing these 
amounts across all the models; and (6) averaging or otherwise pooling 
the experts’ all-in Bayesian probabilities.331 
“Individual risks” that are ascribed using this Bayesian approach 
need not correspond to frequencies relative to reference classes, be 
they canonical dosing classes or other classes.  Assume, first, that the 
relevant models are all deterministic.  This assumption is not that 
 
331 Admittedly, much of the Bayesian risk assessment literature cited supra note 
330 employs the sort of Bayesian “probability tree” sketched above, where experts as-
sign subjective probabilities to nested sets of mutually exclusive alternatives, to deter-
mine a pooled expert estimate of frequentist risk relative to a canonical dosing class—
more precisely, a pooled second-order Bayesian probability distribution over possible 
first-order frequentist probabilities—and not a Bayesian probability that some person 
will die.  In this sense, the existing literature is incompletely Bayesian.  See T. Aven & 
J.T. Kvaloy, Implementing the Bayesian Paradigm in Risk Analysis, 78 RELIABILITY ENG’G & 
SYS. SAFETY 195, 197 (2002).  Still, it seems that a “probability tree” approach allowing 
for model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and other kinds of uncertainty would be 
the natural way to arrive at first-order Bayesian probabilities of some person’s death.  
See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 220 (discussing Bayesian probability 
trees); LEE, supra note 319, at 35-36 (discussing Bayesian prediction). 
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strange:  toxicologists have traditionally relied upon deterministic 
models for noncarcinogenic toxins, positing that each person has an 
individual threshold such that doses above the threshold definitely re-
sult in the toxic effect and doses below it do not.332  Imagine, now, that 
the risk assessor, relying upon experts, is ascribing a Bayesian risk of 
death to a person (the Subject) individuated in terms of his dose (one 
gram), rough age (adult), and ethnicity (Danish).333  Danes typically 
have some gene which may confer resistance to the toxin.  The expert 
believes to degree 0.4 that the gene confers resistance, and to degree 
0.6 that it does not.  She believes to degree 0.9, based on published 
genetic studies of Danes, that this individual has the gene.  Other 
work suggests very strongly that the frequency with which adults gen-
erally die as a result of the one-gram dose is 1 in 20,000.  (This work 
consists, say, in dose-response studies on adult rats plus epidemiologi-
cal evidence.)  For simplicity, assume that the expert is virtually cer-
tain that the frequency of mortality from one gram dosings in the 
general adult population is 1 in 20,000.  Based on this frequency, the 
expert determines that 1 in 20,000 adults who lack the (possibly) resis-
tant gene have a threshold below one gram, and 19,999 have a 
threshold exceeding or equaling one gram.334 
With all this information, the expert’s Bayesian probability that 
the adult, Danish Subject will die prematurely as result of the one-
gram dose is: 
 
[.9 × .4 × 0] + 
[.9 × .6 × (1/20,000) × 1] +  
[.9 × .6 × (19,999/20,000) × 0] + 
[.1 × (1/20,000) × 1] +    
[.1 × (19,999/20,000) × 0]    = .64 × (1/20,000). 
 
332 See CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra note 28, at 128; RODRICKS, supra note 150, at 166-70. 
333 Individual susceptibility to deterministic or “threshold” toxins, as to carcino-
gens, can certainly vary.  See Dale Hattis et al., Human Interindividual Variability in Pa-
rameters Related to Health Risks, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 711, 716-22 (1999) (non-cancer ef-
fects); sources cited supra note 86 (cancer).  Indeed interindividual variability in 
susceptibility to noncarcinogens is part of the rationale for using “safety factors” to de-
rive a reference dose from a NOAEL.  See Dourson et al., supra note 153, at 110-11.  For 
a discussion of quantitative models that presuppose interindividual variability in toxic-
ity thresholds, see CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra note 28, at 105-6. 
334 I am additionally assuming, here, that the expert is quite sure that only a small 
proportion of the general population has the gene.  She is therefore able to infer from 
a 1 in 20,000 frequency of mortality in the general population that there is approxi-
mately a 1 in 20,000 frequency of mortality in the population lacking the gene. 
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The different terms in this equation represent the different, mutually 
exclusive possibilities as the expert sees them.  First, the Subject might 
have the gene and the gene might confer resistance, in which case the 
Subject determinately will not die.  Second, the Subject might have 
the gene, the gene might fail to confer resistance, and the Subject 
might have a toxicity threshold below one gram, in which case he de-
terminately will die.  Third, the Subject might have the gene and the 
gene might fail to confer resistance, yet the Subject might (by virtue of 
the rest of his genetic makeup, his health history, etc.) have a toxicity 
threshold greater than or equal to one gram, in which case he deter-
minately will not die.  Fourth, the Subject might lack the gene and 
have a toxicity threshold below one gram, in which case he determi-
nately will die.  Finally, the Subject might lack the gene and have a 
toxicity threshold greater than or equal to one gram, in which case he 
determinately will not die. 
The expert’s Bayesian probability that the Subject will die (in this 
example .64 × (1/20,000)) clearly does not equal the Subject’s fre-
quentist risk of death relative to the canonical dosing class.  The pro-
portion of all individuals (children as well as adults) who die prema-
turely as a result of a one-gram dose might be 1 in 10,000, not 1 in 
20,000 or 1/20,000 discounted by a factor of 0.64.  Nor does the ex-
pert’s Bayesian probability of the Subject’s death equal the Subject’s 
frequentist risk of death relative to a maximally specified reference 
class—a reference class specifying all of his characteristics, including 
the dose amount, his genetic code, and the current physiological con-
dition of his body.335  The frequency relative to this class will either be 
zero (if in fact individuals with that genetic code and physiological 
condition have a threshold equal to or exceeding one gram) or one 
(if in fact someone with that genetic code, etc., has a threshold below 
it).336  Nor, finally, does the expert’s Bayesian probability equal the 
Subject’s frequentist risk relative to the reference class of “adult Danes 
consuming a one gram dose”:  a reference class defined by the charac-
teristics known to the regulator. 
This last point is subtle, and to see it we should distinguish be-
tween (1) the actual frequentist risk, (2) the frequentist risk directly 
observed in an experiment, and (3) the frequentist risk that the ex-
 
335 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1352, 1357-62 (discussing maximally specified refer-
ence classes). 
336 See id. at 1360; Perry, supra note 84, at 336. 
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pert believes to obtain.  In the example at hand, the actual frequentist 
risk relative to the reference class of “one gram dosings by adult 
Danes” might well be 1 in 20,000.  But the expert doesn’t know that; 
instead, she believes to degree 0.4 that Danes often possess a gene that 
confers genetic resistance, and therefore ascribes a lower Bayesian 
probability to the Subject’s death.  Nor would it be ethical to actually 
give a group of Danish adults a one-gram dose and observe how many 
die.337  Even if such a grisly experiment had been performed with a re-
sult of one in X deaths, the expert might not believe to degree one in 
X that the Subject will die. To give a stark example along these hor-
rific lines:  if twenty adult Danes in an experimental group of 1000 die 
prematurely as a result of a one-gram dose of the toxin, the expert 
would not necessarily ascribe a Bayesian probability of 1 in 50 to the 
Subject’s death.  Instead, assuming that the expert remains confident 
that ninety percent of Danes have the particular gene posited by one 
possible genomic model of toxicity to confer resistance, this experi-
mental result would simply induce the expert to revise downwards her 
“prior” probability that the model is true, and perhaps to change her 
estimate of the frequency of a one-gram threshold in the general 
population.338  What the revised numbers would be is a complicated 
question in Bayesian statistics, but it should be clear that the expert’s 
revised (or “posterior”) Bayesian probability of the Subject’s death 
need not equal 1 in 50.  Assume, at the extreme, that the grisly ex-
perimental results lead the expert to reject the gene-resistance model 
entirely.  She now assigns that model a probability of zero and believes 
that adult Danes have the same distribution of thresholds as the gen-
eral adult population.339  But many prior studies have suggested that 
 
337 See, e.g., COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 149-50 (discussing the ethi-
cal limitations on the use of human experiments in risk assessment). 
338 It is a mainstay of Bayesian statistics that an experimental observation should 
not directly determine an observer’s degree of belief in a model, a model parameter, 
or some other object of belief, but instead should be integrated with the observer’s 
“prior” (pre-experimental) beliefs about the model, parameter, or other object.  For a 
general discussion, see LEE, supra note 319, at 33-73.  For good discussions with refer-
ence to risk assessment, see O’Hagan, supra note 330; Nathan O. Siu & Dana L. Kelly, 
Bayesian Parameter Estimation in Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 62 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING 
& SYS. SAFETY 89 (1998). 
339 Another possibility, suggested by these results, is that Danes are particularly 
vulnerable—in other words, that (1) the gene-resistance model is untrue and (2) 
something in the genetic makeup or health history of Danes produces lower thresholds 
than the general population.  Even taking this possibility into account, the expert’s 
posterior probability of the Subject’s death, given the grisly experimental data, need 
not equal 1 in 50—because the expert will have prior beliefs about how likely it is that 
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only 1 in 20,000 adults have a threshold lower than one gram.  The 
current study suggests that the number is 1 in 50.  Integrating all this 
information, the expert will ascribe a nonzero probability to the pos-
sibility that the fraction of adults with a threshold lower than one 
gram is 1 in 50.  Yet she need not be certain of that possibility, for 
again there is considerable, conflicting, prior data; she need not as-
sign it a Bayesian probability of one.  Therefore, despite the grisly ex-
perimental result, she need not ascribe a 1 in 50 Bayesian probability 
to the Subject’s premature death. 
So the expert’s Bayesian probability that the Subject, character-
ized as an adult Dane consuming a one-gram dose, will die as a result 
of that exposure need not equal (1) the actual frequency with which 
adult Danes die as a result of a one-gram dose nor (2) the observed 
frequency in an experiment on adult Danes.  Finally, it need not equal 
(3) the frequency with which adult Danes die as a result of a one-gram 
dose that the expert believes to obtain.  Return to the original exam-
ple sans grisly experiment.  The expert believes to degree 0.4 that a 
gene (which she believes ninety percent of Danes possess) confers re-
sistance; to degree 0.6 that it does not; and that 1 in 20,000 adults 
lacking the gene have a toxicity threshold below one gram.  She there-
fore believes to degree 0.4 that the frequency of death among adult 
Danes consuming one-gram doses is 1 in 200,000 (1 in 20,000 times 
0.1, the proportion of Danes lacking the gene) and to degree 0.6 that 
it is 1 in 20,000.  There is no single frequency that the expert whole-
heartedly believes to be the true frequency; rather, she believes to 
some degree (less than one) that one frequency is the true one, and 
to some degree (also less than one) that a different, incompatible fre-
quency is the true one.  We might stipulate that the expert “believes” 
in a frequency if she thinks it more likely than not—if she ascribes it a 
Bayesian probability greater than 0.5.  In this example, that would be 
1 in 20,000:  more likely than not, thinks the expert, the model con-
ferring resistance on the gene is untrue.  But the expert’s Bayesian 
probability that the Subject will die prematurely is less than 1 in 
20,000, since it also incorporates the expert’s probabilistic belief 
(here, 0.4) that the less likely model is correct. 
This example, I hope, dispels the thought that the difference be-
tween Bayesian and frequentist risk assessment is insubstantial.  A 
regulator’s degree of belief that some individual will die prematurely 
 
Danes have lower thresholds and, if so, what proportion of the Danish population has 
a threshold below one gram. 
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as a result of a toxic exposure, formulated in consultation with risk as-
sessors and the experts that the assessors in turn consult, certainly 
need not equal the actual, experimental, or believed frequency of 
death relative to the canonical dosing class.  After all, regulators and 
assessors will sometimes have more information about the individual 
than her dose, and this information may influence their Bayesian 
probability ascriptions.  Nor (more subtly) need the regulator’s de-
gree of belief equal the actual, experimental, or believed frequency of 
death relative to some reference class more finely specified than the 
canonical dosing class, be it a maximally or non-maximally specified 
class.  Regulators are not omniscient and may well not know what the 
actual frequency is; on a Bayesian view, frequencies observed in any 
given experiment need not determine the expert’s degree of belief, 
but must be integrated with prior experiments and scientific theory; 
and, whatever the reference class, there is no single frequency relative 
to that class which the expert need believe wholeheartedly to obtain.340 
To be sure, information about frequencies and proportions, so 
central to traditional risk assessment, will continue to have an impor-
tant role in Bayesian practices.  Animal dose-response experiments 
(demonstrating that various fractions of rat populations die after con-
suming various toxins at various doses) and epidemiological data 
(showing the proportions of groups of humans at various exposure 
levels that have died in the past) will shape the Bayesian probabilities 
of experts, assessors, and regulators.341  They will do so by influencing 
the experts’, assessors’, and regulators’ degrees of belief in different 
models of toxicity and, for a given model, in different model parame-
ters and in the distribution of causal features relevant to the model 
 
340 In the example at hand, it is true that the expert’s Bayesian probability of the 
Subject’s death (.64 × (1/20,000)) equals the weighted average of the possible fre-
quencies relative to the Subject’s characteristics that the expert knows about (here 
his dose, age, and ethnicity), summed across possible models and discounted 
by the expert’s belief in the different models—in this instance 
.4 × (1/200,000) + .6 × (1/20,000).  But even this sort of connection between Bay-
esian and frequentist probabilities need not hold true—for it presupposes that the ex-
pert knows for sure that the Subject has some characteristics (which are used to define 
the reference class) and otherwise believes him to have causally relevant characteristics 
just to the degree that those exist in the reference class.  In any event, I am not deny-
ing that there is some connection between Bayesian and frequentist probabilities.  The 
point, rather, is that Bayesian probabilities cannot be reduced to frequencies—they are 
a different kind of entity—and thus none of the straightforward connections, mooted 
in the text, obtain.  See infra note 346 (acknowledging one connection between fre-
quentist and Bayesian probability in the case of stochastic models). 
341 See, e.g., O’Hagan, supra note 330, at 30-32 (describing the Bayesian approach 
to dose-response data). 
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across the population.  I say “influencing” rather than “determining” 
because the experts’, assessors’, and regulators’ Bayesian probabilities 
will also be influenced by general scientific theory and by experiments 
that do not produce frequency data (for example, molecular structure 
or mutagenicity tests).342  Rational belief-formation, even by bound-
edly rational toxicologists, assessors, and regulators, is holistic; it is the 
amalgamation of frequency data with the other (theoretical or obser-
vational) grounds of belief that produces the experts’, assessors’, and 
regulators’ Bayesian probabilities. 
The example I have been relying upon to illustrate the divergence 
of “individual risk” in the Bayesian sense (the regulator’s Bayesian 
probability that some person will die) from “individual risk” in the 
frequentist sense assumed that the causal models to which the regula-
tor ascribed a nonzero probability were all deterministic.  This as-
sumption eased exposition, but was not essential.  The divergence still 
obtains even if some or all of the models are stochastic-–as are, for ex-
ample, some prominent models of carcinogenesis.343 
A stochastic model posits some irreducible, causal randomness.  It 
posits some exhaustive set of causal features such that individual expo-
sures identical with respect to these features need not all result in, or 
fail to result in, the toxic effect.344  Instead, the long-run frequency 
with which identical exposures result in the effect is greater than 0 
and less than 1.  This frequency is the stochastic “risk” that the model 
attaches to various, maximally-specified toxic exposures.  Frequencies 
are therefore integral to stochastic models in a way that is not true of 
deterministic models.  The deterministic threshold model used in the 
example above says that each individual’s genetic makeup and current 
physiology produces a threshold for her such that exposures above 
the threshold definitely kill her and exposures at or below the thresh-
old do not.  A different, stochastic model might say that each individ-
ual’s genetic makeup M and current physiology H determine a unique 
probability function p(D, M, H), such that for any dose D the fre-
quency of fatalities in a large group of individuals consuming just that 
 
342 See COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 17, at 134-37 (describing these tests). 
343 See CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra note 28, at 128; RODRICKS, supra note 150, at 156, 
168. 
344 See CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra note 28, at 106 (contrasting deterministic and sto-
chastic models of toxicity); HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 75, at 7 (“[M]any scientific 
theories are explicitly probabilistic [such as] Mendel’s theory of inheritance.  This 
states the probabilities with which certain combinations of genes occur during repro-
duction; but, strictly speaking, the theory does not categorically rule out, nor predict, 
any particular genetic configuration.”). 
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dose and possessing just that genetic makeup and physiology is p(D, 
M, H).   
But even with stochastic models in the picture, the expert’s Bayes-
ian probability that some individual will die prematurely as a result of 
an exposure need not equal the actual, observed, or most likely345 fre-
quentist risk relative to the canonical dosing class, the maximally 
specified class, or the class specified with reference to the features of 
the Subject that the expert knows about.  If the expert knows that the 
Subject is an adult Dane, and believes that adult Danes have a differ-
ent distribution of genetic makeups and physiologies than the general 
population, then (clearly) her Bayesian probability of the Subject’s 
death can differ from the actual, observed, or most likely canonical, 
frequentist risk.  Further, the expert might have nonzero degrees of 
belief in two or more incompatible stochastic models, and within each 
model in different possible characteristics that the Subject might have.  
p1(D, M, H) might be the correct model, and the Subject might actu-
ally be characterized by genetic makeup M* and physiology H*, but 
the expert might be unsure whether the function is p1(D, M, H) or 
p2(D, M, H), and what precisely the Subject’s genetic makeup and 
physiology is.  Given these uncertainties, the expert’s Bayesian prob-
ability of the Subject’s death certainly need not track the actual fre-
quency relative to the maximally specified class (given by p1, by the 
Subject’s actual dose, and by M* and H*),346 nor the most likely fre-
quency347 relative to the maximally specified class.348  Finally, the actual 
 
345 By “most likely,” I mean that frequency to which the expert ascribes the highest 
Bayesian probability.  In the earlier example, see supra text accompanying notes 333-40, 
the expert believed to degree 0.4 in a frequency of 1 in 200,000 and to degree 0.6 in a 
frequency of 1 in 20,000; thus the “most likely” frequency was 1 in 20,000. 
346 Note that my analysis does acknowledge that the expert’s beliefs about the sto-
chastic fatality risks to which a Subject may be vulnerable shape the expert’s Bayesian 
probability assessment that the Subject will die.  If a given model/parameter combina-
tion ascribes a given stochastic risk to the Subject, then that stochastic risk, discounted by 
the expert’s Bayesian probability that the model/parameter combination truly characterizes the Sub-
ject, is added to other such discounted risks or deterministic outcomes (if deterministic 
models are also in the picture) to produce the expert’s all-things-considered assess-
ment.  But, except in the limiting case where the expert is certain of a particular model 
parameter combination, her Bayesian assessment that the Subject will die doesn’t re-
duce to any particular stochastic probability.  On the linkages between frequentist and 
Bayesian risk, see HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 75, at 344-47. 
347 Think of the point this way:  concatenating possible models (here, p1 and p2) 
and model parameters (here, different values of M and H) produces a set of possible 
frequencies relative to maximally specified classes.  The most likely frequency is that 
single frequency, in this set, to which the expert ascribes the highest Bayesian probabil-
ity.  But the expert’s Bayesian probability that the Subject will die is a weighted average 
of all the frequencies in the set, as weighted by her Bayesian probability for each. 
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frequency of premature death among adult Danes is determined by 
the true model (p1), while the expert’s Bayesian probability of the Sub-
ject’s death is a function both of that model and of others to which 
she ascribes a nonzero probability.  The observed frequency in a grisly 
experiment with adult Danes must be integrated with the expert’s 
prior beliefs about models and about the distributions of gene types 
and physiologies across the adult Danish population.  And the fre-
quency relative to the class of adult Danes that the expert believes to 
be most likely is not necessarily the same as her Bayesian probability in 
the Subject’s death, since that latter probability is a weighted average 
of all possible models, gene types, and physiologies that might charac-
terize an adult Dane (as weighted by the expert’s beliefs in these vari-
ous model/parameter combinations), while the former is not a 
weighted average but is instead the single most likely frequency that 
emerges from combining the different possible models with different 
possible distributions of genes and physiologies across the population 
of adult Danes. 
Part of my argument for the divergence between the regulator’s 
Bayesian probability that some person will die prematurely as a result 
of a toxic exposure, and that person’s “individual risk” in the frequen-
tist sense, has been that regulators may know more about the indi-
viduals exposed to toxins than their dosing amounts.  This, among 
other things, drives a wedge between Bayesian risk and the kind of 
frequentist risk standardly used in current risk assessment practices—
namely frequencies relative to canonical dosing classes.  The regula-
tor, in my example, knows that the person receiving a one-gram dose 
is an adult Dane—not merely that he is a person receiving a one-gram 
dose.  It might be objected that regulators lack this information.  But 
certainly some characterizing information, beyond dose amount, is ac-
cessible to regulators.  The age, gender, and ethnic makeup of a com-
munity exposed to a toxic waste dump, a group of workers at risk from 
some occupational toxin, or the consumers currently enjoying some 
risky food, could be established (to some degree of certainty) by risk 
assessors evaluating these hazards.349  Indeed, the influential 1993 Na-
 
348 What about observed frequencies relative to maximally specified classes?  Where 
the models invoke characteristics such as genetic makeup or health history, experi-
ments holding constant these characteristics will be extremely difficult to perform, and 
thus observations of frequencies relative to different maximal classes will likely be un-
available.  In any event the general Bayesian point about the need to incorporate ob-
servations produced by any experiments with prior beliefs will still hold. 
349 Those who argue that risk regulation should be sensitive to considerations of 
“environmental justice”—specifically, to skews in death or risk across gender, racial, or 
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tional Academy of Sciences report on risk assessment encourages 
agencies to characterize individuals in greater detail than is currently 
the norm:  
 EPA, NIH, and other federal agencies should sponsor molecular epi-
demiologic and other research on the extent of interindividual variabil-
ity in various factors that affect susceptibility and cancer, on the relation-
ships between variability in each factor and in the health end point, and 
on the possible correlations between susceptibility and such covariates as 
age, race, ethnicity, and sex.  Results of the research should be used to 
adjust and refine estimates of risks to individuals (identified, identifiable, 
or unidentifiable) and estimates of expected incidence in the general 
population.
350
 
A different objection, from within welfare consequentialism and 
CBA, is that characterizing individuals and individual exposures is 
costly.  Perhaps, given the deliberation costs of fuller characterization, 
the practice of describing only the distribution of doses that toxic haz-
ards deliver to the population, not the age, gender, ethnic, or other 
casually relevant features of that population, is optimal.351  But it is 
very hard to see why a blanket rule against fuller characterization 
 
socioeconomic lines—often suggest, not surprisingly, that risk assessors should charac-
terize exposed populations in gender, racial, or socioeconomic terms.  See, e.g., John D. 
Graham, Making Sense of Risk:  An Agenda for Congress, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED:  
GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 183, 190-91 (Robert W. Hahn, ed., 1996) 
(“Since low-income and minority citizens often incur a disproportionate share of pub-
lic health and environmental risks, agencies should make a special effort to investigate 
those citizens’ degree of exposure and susceptibility to hazards.” (citation omitted)); 
Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 151 (“Risk assessors should be required to include informa-
tion on the exposures and risks experienced by relevant subpopulations disaggregated 
by race, ethnicity, income, age, and other important variables.”).  Indeed, Executive 
Order 12,898 states:  “To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, . . . each 
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identi-
fying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human 
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations . . . .”).  Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101, 3 
C.F.R. 859, 859 (1995).  See generally Adler, supra note 20, at 1423-31 (discussing envi-
ronmental justice). 
350 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 219.  For scholarly work advocat-
ing greater regulatory attention to individual variability in nondose characteristics 
relevant to toxicity, see Finkel, supra note 86, at 313-20; Jean A. Grassman et al., Ac-
counting for Variability in Responsiveness in Human Health Risk Assessment, in HUMAN 
VARIABILITY IN RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL EXPOSURES, supra note 86, at 1-26; Hattis, supra 
note 87, at 7-11.  Governmental guidelines or proposed guidelines encouraging atten-
tion to individual variability are cited in Grassman, supra, at 15-16. 
351 See supra text accompanying note 304 (discussing deliberation costs). 
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would indeed be optimal.  What of cases where non-dose information 
is cheaply obtainable or already known by the assessor? 
V.  BEYOND WELFARISM:  FREQUENTIST RISK AND  
NONWELFARIST VIEWS 
Regulatory attention to frequentist risk is problematic not merely 
for welfarist consequentialism but for other moral views too.  In this 
Part, I consider the leading competitors:  nonwelfarist consequential-
ism, deontological or rights-based views, contractualism, and democ-
ratic views. 
A.  Safety-Focused Consequentialism 
Welfarist consequentialism, whether in the form of utilitarianism 
or in a more egalitarian form, presumes that welfare is the “currency” 
of morality.352  What makes one outcome better or worse than another 
is the welfare that different persons enjoy—nothing else.  Various 
moral theorists have objected to this focus on welfare, arguing that 
moral requirements may depend (at least in part) on something other 
than human well-being353—for example, on the distribution of “pri-
mary goods” (Rawls’s idea),354 “resources” (Dworkin’s),355 or the satis-
faction of needs.356 
Skepticism about the moral primacy of welfare might impel the 
skeptic to abandon consequentialism entirely—for example, to adopt 
deontology357 or contractualism.358  But it need not do so.  Skepticism 
about the moral primacy of welfare can also be accommodated within 
consequentialism.  How?  By making the ex post ranking of outcomes 
depend upon something other than welfare.  For example, one can 
imagine a kind of “safety-focused consequentialism” that makes the ex 
post ranking hinge on human health and longevity, either exclusively 
 
352 See Arneson, supra note 255. 
353 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 211-16 (sur-
veying and criticizing “resourcist” views). 
354 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90-95 (1971). 
355 See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?  Part 2:  Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 283, 283 (1981). 
356 See Thomas Nagel, Autonomy and Deontology, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 142, 145-50 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). 
357 See infra Part V.B. 
358 See infra Part V.C. 
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or predominantly.359  For simplicity, I’ll confine my discussion to the 
first kind of safety-focused consequentialism:  where the world-ranking 
depends solely on human health and longevity.  On this view, the 
“primary good” or “resource” of bodily integrity becomes the sole, 
bedrock moral factor for adjudicating between outcomes.  This view, 
because simplified, is implausible:  presumably any plausible non-
welfarist consequentialism will incorporate a range of “primary goods” 
or “resources,”360 and not merely health and longevity.  But my analysis 
of the simplified view carries over, I believe, to more complicated non-
welfarist accounts. 
Note that safety-focused consequentialism (the simple kind) maps 
nicely onto certain decision procedures that, it is sometimes pro-
posed, regulators should employ instead of CBA:  namely, “risk-risk” 
analysis361 and “QALY-based” analysis.362  Risk-risk analysis aims to 
maximize longevity, that is, the cumulative life-span of the entire 
population; QALY-based analysis takes account of health as well as 
longevity, by giving greater weight to years that persons live in good 
health, and less weight to years that they live in poor health.  Safety-
focused consequentialism, in effect, is the moral view that directly 
 
359 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97 J. PHIL. 
477, 487-92  (2000) (emphasizing that consequentialism does not entail welfarism). 
360 See RAWLS, supra note 354, at 92 (listing “rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, income and wealth” as well as self-respect—“a sense of one’s own worth”—as 
primary goods). 
361 For general discussions of risk-risk analysis, see LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY 
OF SOCIAL REGULATION:  DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 15-17 (1981); Frank B. 
Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill:  The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 729 (1995); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk 
Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 
1995); Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis:  To-
wards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1538-52 
(1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-7 (1994). 
362 For overviews of the QALY (quality-adjusted life years) method for measuring 
health states, see DOUGLAS MCCULLOCH, VALUING HEALTH IN PRACTICE:  PRIORITIES, 
QALYS, AND CHOICE (2003); ERIK NORD, COST-VALUE ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE:  MAK-
ING SENSE OUT OF QALYS (1999); Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health-Related Quality 
of Life for Use in Resource Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 1723 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Robert Fa-
bian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY:  AN ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH 118 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994); Robert M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for 
Estimating Quality-Adjusted Life Years, in VALUING HEALTH CARE:  COSTS, BENEFITS, AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 31 (Frank 
A. Sloan ed., 1995).  For a proposal that regulators employ QALYs, see Richard H. 
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 83-85 
(1995). 
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maps onto these regulatory techniques.363  Relatedly, safety-focused 
consequentialism is one way to justify statutory provisions that pre-
clude cost-benefit analysis and give greater weight to health and lon-
gevity than welfarist views would countenance.364 
Safety-focused consequentialism has the same outcome-oriented 
structure as welfare consequentialism.  It contains:  (1) an “ex post” 
part, that is, a criterion for ranking possible worlds; and (2) an “ex 
ante” part, that is, a bridging rule for deriving “oughts” over choices 
from the ranking of outcomes.  It also includes a “supervenience” 
principle analogous to the welfarist’s—namely, two outcomes identical 
with respect to human longevity and health must be ranked the 
same.365  Think of the scheme this way:  for each outcome, each per-
son is assigned a QALY number that measures her total lifespan, as ad-
justed for her health at different points.366  Then the supervenience 
principle demands that any two outcomes identical with respect to the 
QALY numbers for all persons must be accorded the same ex post 
ranking. 
Would “individual risk” in the frequentist sense play a role in 
regulatory practice grounded on safety-focused consequentialism?  I 
suggest not.  First, “individual risk” lacks ex post relevance.  Interest-
ingly, it is much easier to show this than to demonstrate ex post irrele-
vance within welfare consequentialism.  P ’s risk of death, in the fre-
quentist or for that matter the Bayesian sense, doesn’t change her 
longevity or health.  As between two outcomes, differing only in that a 
toxic exposure (or something else) occurs and subjects P to a frequen-
tist or Bayesian fatality risk, her QALY number in both outcomes will 
be the same.  Welfarists can’t stop here, but must consider (as we did 
above) whether the risk of death is an ex post setback on non-safety 
grounds:  because it is dispreferred; because it gives rise to fear; be-
cause it disrupts affiliational goods.367  Safety consequentialists need 
 
363 Safety-focused consequentialism has distributively insensitive and distributively 
sensitive variants, just as welfare consequentialism does.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 258-62.  The distributively sensitive variants of safety consequentialism would re-
quire a kind of risk-risk analysis or QALY-based analysis which attends to the distribu-
tion of longevity or health-adjusted longevity, rather than simply maximizing longevity 
or health-adjusted longevity. 
364 See Adler, supra note 20, at 1391-92, 1414-15 (describing statutes that clearly or 
arguably give priority to safety and preclude CBA). 
365 See supra text accompanying notes 255-57. 
366 For example, if she lives 60 years, 40 of those in excellent health, and 20 during 
which her health is midway between excellent health and a health state no better than 
death, her QALY measure is (40 × 1)  + (20 × (1/2)) = 50. 
367 See supra text accompanying notes 280-90. 
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not consider these more difficult questions; the obvious point that the 
risk to some person of a serious or fatal accident or illness doesn’t en-
tail her actual illness, injury, or premature death suffices for the ex 
post analysis. 
Second, “individual risk” lacks ex ante relevance within safety con-
sequentialism.  Here, the analysis is quite parallel to the welfarist 
analysis.368  Various bridging rules are possible:  some will be probabil-
istic, others will eschew reference to probabilities.  Expected utility 
maximization is the most plausible example of a probabilistic bridging 
rule for cognitively unbounded regulators.  The probabilities, here, 
are Bayesian probabilities over complete outcomes, not frequentist 
probabilities of individuals dying.  Boundedly rational regulators 
would employ a more tractable decision procedure:  for example, 
minimizing the number of premature deaths, maximizing the popula-
tion’s longevity, or maximizing the population’s health-adjusted lon-
gevity.  The “individual risk” of death incurred by different persons is 
not directly relevant to the decision procedures just described, but it is 
possible (I suppose) to imagine a safety-consequentialist decision pro-
cedure where it would be.369  One such possible procedure instructs 
the regulator to determine the “individual risk” of death, illness, or 
injury that members of different groups face as a result of hazards, 
and therewith their expected loss of longevity or health-adjusted lon-
gevity.  Note, however, that the risks here would be third-party Bayes-
ian risks:  the regulator’s degrees of belief that the various individuals 
will die prematurely or suffer bad health or bodily harm. 
B.  Deontological Views 
Deontological views deny that the moral ordering of a set of pos-
sible actions necessarily derives from the outcomes those actions 
might produce, as ranked in some impartial (evaluator-neutral) way.  
Deontologists propose that morality includes certain “agent-relative 
constraints”—prohibitory rules that, in identifying the actions that are 
impermissible for a given actor, point to some nexus between those 
 
368 See supra Part III.C. 
369 Cf. Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK:  HEALTH, SAFETY & 
ENVIRONMENT 325, 342-44 (1996) (enumerating possible dimensions for evaluating 
hazards, including “population-based measures” and “individual risk measures”); Gra-
ham & Wiener, supra note 361, at 30-31 (arguing that risk-risk analysis should be sensi-
tive to both “population risk” and “individual risk”). 
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actions and that particular person.370  A classic example is the rule “do 
not kill.”  This rule, which purports to apply even to perfectly in-
formed actors, does not instruct the actor to choose the action leading 
to the outcome in which the fewest killings occur, in which the fewest 
deaths occur, or in which aggregate longevity or health-adjusted lon-
gevity is greatest.  Rather, he is instructed not to perform an action 
that would constitute a killing by him, even if his not killing has as its 
consequence more total killings.371  Because deontological rules are 
“agent relative” in this sense, they do not correspond to any impartial, 
consequentialist ranking of outcomes.  The deontological injunction 
“do not kill” is structurally distinct, in a deep way, from the conse-
quentialist injunction “minimize the number of killings.” 
What would a deontological practice of risk assessment look like?  
At the threshold, one needs to confront a generic problem for the 
view that government should enforce some deontological constraints.  
Agent A is about to breach some constraint, harming or otherwise af-
fecting the victim P.  Why should government intervene to prevent the 
breach, absent some consequential justification for doing so?  And 
why should it punish A after the fact (as proposed by deontological 
theorists of criminal law),372 or coerce him to compensate P (as pro-
posed by deontological theorists of tort law),373 if prevention fails?  Af-
ter all, the constraint is agent relative:  it is worse from A’s perspective 
that he act in a certain way, not worse from ours.  Does the deontolo-
gist want to say that it is deontologically worse from our perspective—
 
370 On the distinction between deontological and consequentialist moral views, 
with particular reference to deontological “constraints” (my focus here), see KAGAN, 
supra note 258, at 70-78; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974); 
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQENTIALISM 80-114 (rev. ed. 1994); Na-
gel, supra note 356, at 156-72.  My understanding of consequentialism as a family of 
moral views that necessarily eschew agent-relative moral rules is quite standard.  See, 
e.g., Douglas W. Portmore, Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative?, 38 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 363, 363-64 (2001) (“A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the exact 
same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. . . . [M]any philosophers would deny 
that a consequentialist theory can be agent relative.” (footnotes and paragraph struc-
ture omitted)).  Consequentialism might be defined more inclusively, see id. at 364, but 
it strikes me that this is less useful than the more traditional and narrower definition 
keyed to the salient distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative rules. 
371 See, e.g., Portmore, supra note 370, at 364 (“[A] theory would have to be agent 
relative in order to accommodate a constraint against intentionally killing the inno-
cent . . . since such a constraint prohibits the commission of murder even for the sake 
of preventing numerous others from committing comparable murders.”). 
372 See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHAR-
ACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS:  NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987). 
373 See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-60 (1992). 
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as fellow citizens of A and P—not to prevent A’s breach of the con-
straint or, failing that, to punish A or coerce compensation from him 
after the breach occurs?  If so, how does this square with the general 
deontological aversion to affirmative duties, duties of intervention?374  
Again, this is a very general problem for deontological accounts of law 
and governmental practice, and so I will place it to one side.  I will as-
sume that if there are deontological prohibitions against killing or risk 
imposition, then these constraints are properly enforced by regulators 
in some way and therefore influence their evaluation of regulatory op-
tions.  But it bears remembering that the assumption is questionable. 
Assuming this very general problem for a deontological account 
of governmental practice can be overcome, what are the implications 
of deontology for risk assessment?  There are subtle issues here, which 
need to be carefully unpacked.  One needs to distinguish between:  
(1) a deontological constraint against killing, which governmental of-
ficials operating under uncertainty attempt to enforce; and (2) a de-
ontological constraint against risk imposition (even risk impositions that 
do not cause deaths), which governmental officials attempt to en-
force. 
As for the first possibility, the set of deontological constraints, if 
non-empty, surely includes a prohibition against killing.375  No deon-
tologist suggests otherwise.  Providing a precise characterization of 
this constraint is tricky.  “Killing” is not the same as “causing death.”  
One needs to distinguish, perhaps, between active and passive causa-
tion (since merely failing to prevent death may not breach the con-
straint); between direct and indirect causation (since actions that 
cause death only when conjoined with certain “intervening” causes, 
such as the victim’s own voluntary action, may not breach the con-
straint); between death-causing actions motivated by a sufficiently 
wrongful mental state (perhaps purpose or knowledge) and death-
causing actions motivated by an innocent mental state; and so on.376  
But all of this could, in principle, be incorporated within risk assess-
 
374 See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 94-100. 
375 See, e.g., id. at 71 (“Intuitively, at least, most of us have little doubt that it is mor-
ally forbidden to chop up an innocent person, even if this is the only way to save five 
other innocent people from death.”); Nagel, supra note 356, at 157 (listing deontologi-
cal constraints supported by “[c]ommon moral intuition,” including “rights not to be 
killed, injured, imprisoned, threatened, tortured, coerced, robbed”). 
376 See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 258, at 84-105 (discussing content of constraint 
against harming); 2 F.M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY 17-120 (1996) (discussing dis-
tinction between killing and letting die); THOMSON, supra note 282, at 205-48 (discuss-
ing content of moral rights not to suffer bodily intrusion or be harmed). 
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ment.  One might ask, for example, whether a “killing” is likely to re-
sult if a given toxic source is left unregulated—where that determina-
tion will be sensitive, if necessary, to the directness of the causal route 
between the toxin and the victims, the mens rea of the persons who 
control the source, the responsibility of the victims for their own 
deaths (did they “come to the hazard” despite warnings?), and other 
such considerations that may distinguish killings from those deaths 
that, albeit unfortunate, wouldn’t breach deontological rules. 
Risk assessment practices grounded on the no-killing constraint 
would need to take into account the limited information of regula-
tors.377  Regulators aren’t omniscient; they can’t simply be instructed 
to “prevent killings,” since they may well be unsure whether some 
toxin or other hazard, if unregulated, would indeed produce a killing.  
Instead, I suggest, the generic decision rule for nonomniscient deon-
tological regulators would be something like the following:  “ceteris 
paribus, intervene to prevent any hazardous activity that you believe, to 
degree p or higher, would constitute a killing.”  In other words, deon-
tologically grounded risk regulation would incorporate a probability 
threshold p (perhaps zero) for one or more killings; once a hazard 
reached that threshold, the regulator would intervene, absent suffi-
cient conflicting considerations, to enforce the no-killing rule.  Con-
flicting considerations could be the cost of enforcement or a liberty 
interest on the part of the actor.378  Any full-blown deontological ac-
count of risk regulation would need to specify these considerations, 
since the notion of an absolute governmental obligation to prevent 
killings, even where prevention has huge costs, is implausible.  More 
plausible is that the risk regulator has a prima facie obligation to in-
tervene when she believes, to some degree p or higher, that a killing 
would otherwise occur. 
The crucial point to see here is that the probability threshold p in-
vokes a Bayesian, not frequentist, probability.  The decision procedure 
for enforcing deontological rules, such as the no-killing rule, will ap-
peal—I am suggesting—to the regulator’s knowledge.  Intuitively, if 
 
377 Moral theorists haven’t focused much on the problem of choice under uncer-
tainty.  See TED LOCKHART, MORAL UNCERTAINTY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 16-21 (2000).  
But moral theories, including deontological theories, are normative (act-guiding) and 
therefore should contain instructions for actors as they (virtually always) find them-
selves, namely in an epistemically limited state. Whether “wrongness” and “rightness” 
itself is subjective or objective is a different issue.  Cf. GIBBARD, supra note 295, at 42-43 
(arguing that moral wrongness is subjective). 
378 See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 78-82 (explaining that deontological constraints 
might be defeasible by countervailing considerations). 
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the regulator is certain that a hazardous activity would constitute a 
killing, then (ceteris paribus) she should intervene to stop the activity.  
Given the divergence between frequentist and Bayesian probabili-
ties,379 there can be cases in which the regulator, even an omniscient 
regulator, is certain that a killing will result, yet the frequentist prob-
ability of the hazardous activity constituting a killing is low.  Intuitively, 
the regulator in such cases has a prima facie obligation to intervene 
(assuming the more basic premise that deontological rules are en-
forceable by government).  Relatedly, where the regulator is nonom-
nisicent and uncertain, the relevant kind of probability for a deonto-
logical decision procedure enforcing the no-killing constraint is a 
Bayesian measure of her belief that killings may ensue, not a relative 
frequency. 
What about the deontological rule against risk imposition?  Some 
deontologists, most visibly the philosopher David McCarthy, argue 
that A infringes P ’s moral rights by imposing a risk of death (or other 
bodily harm) on P, even if A’s action doesn’t actually cause P ’s death 
or bodily harm.380  Assuming that deontological rules exist and are 
properly enforced by regulators, might a no-risking rule account for 
regulatory attention to frequentist risk, even if the no-killing rule 
doesn’t? 
McCarthy’s view is highly controversial, even among deontologists.  
While no deontologist worth her salt would deny that a killing (suita-
bly characterized) violates the victim’s rights, many would deny that a 
risking (without more) does.381  Consider, specifically, the imposition 
of a frequentist death risk, the central concern of risk assessors.  
Where A acts and thereby imposes a high frequentist death risk on P, 
relative to some reference class, it does not follow that P suffers death, 
injury, fear,382 or an invasion of her property383 or body,384 as a result of 
 
379 See supra Part IV. 
380 David McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 ETHICS 205, 205-06 (1997). 
381 See id. at 205-06 (stating that “many writers have been pessimistic about whether 
the morality of risk imposition can be accommodated in a plausible theory of rights” 
and citing Robert Nozick, Peter Railton, and Dennis McKerlie); id. at 208 (citing Ju-
dith Thomson, Dennis McKerlie, and Samuel Scheffler as denying the “Risk Thesis,” 
i.e., that “we have the right that other people not impose risks of harm upon us”). 
382 On rights not to be frightened, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT 
LIABILITY 29-32 (1980).  But see THOMSON, supra note 282, at 250-59 (arguing for moral 
right against non-belief-mediated distress, not fear or other kinds of belief-mediated 
distress). 
383 See, e.g., Railton, supra note 273, at 90-92 (summarizing Lockean view of moral 
rights to property). 
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this action.  For example, if A builds a bomb on his own property, 
which fails to explode and which P fails to learn about, then P may 
well have suffered a very high frequentist risk (relative to the class of 
all persons who are as proximate as P, for a similar duration, to simi-
lar explosives), but there has been no physical or emotional harm to 
P ; setback to her property interests in land, goods, or person; or ma-
nipulation385 of her—the typical disjunctive preconditions for rights 
violations.  And in the case of toxic exposures, which admittedly are 
physically invasive, the rights-theorist could not justify her attention to 
frequentist risk by adducing a concern with physical invasion—since 
every exposure, risky or not, intrudes on the subject’s body. 
One line of argument in defense of a no-risking constraint (al-
though McCarthy doesn’t pursue this) is that risk imposition amounts 
to a dignitary harm.  Risking is not (as such) tangibly or emotionally 
harmful, invasive, manipulative, or a breach of property rights, but it 
does amount to a kind of insult to the victim.  The homicidal neighbor 
who builds a bomb so as to kill P, thereby risking P ’s death, has 
wronged P in virtue of the contemptuousness of this action—or so the 
intuition goes.  Certainly there are plausible moral theories in the 
neighborhood (as it were) of this intuition.  Jean Hampton has pro-
posed a general “expressive” theory of deontological constraints;386 
Martha Nussbaum, as noted above, includes affiliational goods (sub-
suming the good of respectful treatment) on her list of welfare 
goods;387 and Peter Railton has, specifically, sketched a dignitary de-
fense of a no-risking constraint: 
Would it make any difference to the wrongness of my playing Russian 
roulette on my sleeping roommate that he is someone who constitution-
ally feels no fear? . . . Kantians, at least, would presumably deny this.  
They have held that the wrong done to an individual by (for example) 
fraud or coercion is not just a matter of the discomfort such an act, if 
known, would cause him . . . . Rather, Kantians have argued that such 
acts fail to show adequate respect for the individual as an autonomous 
being, discomfort apart.  Therefore, [those] who would employ a Kant-
ian interpretation of the notion of respect for persons and rights must 
 
384 See, e.g., THOMSON, supra note 282, at 205-26 (arguing for moral right against 
bodily intrusion). 
385 See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 356, at 157 (stating that deontological constraints 
include “the special obligations created by promises and agreements [and] the restric-
tions against lying and betrayal”). 
386 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs:  The Goal of Retribu-
tion, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1671-85 (1992) (developing an expressive account of the 
distinction between wrongdoing and mere harm-doing). 
387 See supra text accompanying notes 288-90. 
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affirm that what makes endangering [risk-imposing] acts wrong is not 
merely the uncomfortable psychological states they may cause in oth-
ers.
388
 
For the sake of argument, I will accept the premise that A harms 
and wrongs P by “expressing,” in some sense, the proposition that P is 
a lesser being, not worthy of full respect, not a full person, and so 
on—even if P is unaware of A’s communication (and therefore suffers 
no emotional harm).389  But how does this premise explain a con-
straint against risking?  Doesn’t it explain a constraint against insults:  
namely, those actions with a particular linguistic content, either in vir-
tue of the actor’s subjective intentions, or in virtue of the linguistic 
conventions existing in his society?390  One answer, perhaps, is that risk 
imposition that is not linguistically insulting can still be “insulting”-—
can still constitute a wrongful “expression”—in a broader sense.  For 
this explanation to work, we need a broad view of meaning that as-
cribes propositional content to actions independent of actors’ inten-
tions or linguistic rules.391  Such a view is problematic on its own terms.  
And even bracketing that point, what specifically about A’s imposition 
of a risk on P “expresses” P ’s inferiority where A neither means to say 
that P is inferior, nor conventionally says that P is inferior in the way 
that an inscription or verbal performance would?  The meaning of A’s 
imposition, if not a matter of his intentions or of linguistic conven-
tions, would have to arise from the responses of suitably characterized 
onlookers.392  Anyone characterized in the right way would see A’s ac-
tion as contemptuous of P.  But wouldn’t that, in turn, depend on 
whether this onlooker sees the action as a risky one?  If the action im-
poses a high frequentist risk, relative to the canonical dosing class, but 
 
388 Railton, supra note 273, at 106-07. 
389 But see THOMSON, supra note 282, at 210 (“[W]hile lack of respect for one’s 
claims can insult, it cannot be the insult itself that makes an act be an infringement of 
a claim.”). 
390 See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law:  A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1363, 1387-88, 1393-96 (2000) (summarizing speaker’s-meaning and sentence-
meaning accounts of linguistic meaning). 
391 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A Gen-
eral Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1523-27 (2000) (arguing that governmental 
action can be expressive even if it lacks a linguistic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Lin-
guistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic “Expression,” and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism:  A Re-
ply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000) (analyzing the An-
derson and Pildes account). 
392 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 391, at 1525 (“Expressive meanings are so-
cially constructed. . . . Although these meanings do not actually have to be recognized 
by the community, they have to be recognizable by it, if people were to exercise enough 
interpretive self-scrutiny.”). 
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the onlooker is better informed and believes that the risk is lower, why 
would she read contempt into the action (where the riskiness, rather 
than P ’s subjective contemptuousness or language rules, licenses the 
reading)?  In short, here as elsewhere, the relevant probabilities would 
seem to be Bayesian—in this case, a measure of the onlooker’s be-
liefs—not frequentist. 
McCarthy does not pursue the dignitary idea.  He proposes a ge-
neric constraint against risk imposition, expressive or not, apparently 
on the grounds that such a constraint explains our intuitions in Rus-
sian roulette and other cases where no one has been physically 
harmed and yet, we intuit, a wrongdoing has occurred.393  Thus he 
avoids my objection that the risks relevant for the expressivist would 
be Bayesian, not frequentist.  But other problems await McCarthy.  
First, any account which claims that the imposition of frequentist risk 
is a rights infringement must identify the relevant reference class (or 
groups of reference classes).394  A’s action will have a high risk of caus-
ing P ’s death relative to some descriptions, a low risk relative to oth-
ers, and perhaps a zero risk relative to yet others.  The description 
identified as relevant by the deontological account will either be con-
ventional (it will take into consideration social facts) or natural.  But 
there is only one nonarbitrary natural class—namely the class identify-
ing all of the causally relevant features of A and P.  Incorporating that 
reference class in the deontological account will have the upshot that, 
where the applicable causal laws are deterministic, A’s action imposes 
a nonzero risk of death on P if and only if the action will actually 
cause P ’s death—so that the constraint reduces to a no-killing con-
straint.395  What about variants of the no-risking constraint that define 
risk relative to conventional classes?396  One wonders why risk, thus de-
fined, would be morally problematic apart from its expressive signifi-
cance.  In any event, the most straightforward way to conceptualize 
conventional reference classes—namely, as those classes that are so-
cially salient—leads us back to Bayesian probabilities.  A’s action will 
have a high conventional risk of causing P ’s death if the “ordinary” or 
“reasonable” member of P and A’s society would view the action as fal-
ling in a class of actions that frequently cause death.  But we can then 
 
393 See McCarthy, supra note 380, at 208. 
394 See Stephen Perry, Imposing Risk 55-58 (unpublished paper, on file with au-
thor) (criticizing McCarthy and arguing that the imposition of frequentist risk is not a 
rights-infringement, given the reference-class relativity of frequentist risk). 
395 See id. at 57-58. 
396 Cf. id. at 59-67 (considering “social facts” version of McCarthy’s view). 
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imagine cases in which the “ordinary observer” will ascribe a low 
Bayesian probability to P ’s death, even though its conventional fre-
quency (as just defined) is high.  Why, in such a case, would we care 
morally about the conventional frequency?  Why look partly but not 
completely to the “ordinary observer”—to determine what reference 
class to apply to A’s action, but not to determine what the observer be-
lieves about the chances of that action killing P? 
A different problem for McCarthy is the threshold problem. 
Whatever the reference class, a constraint against all actions that im-
pose some nonzero frequentist risk of death relative to that class will 
presumably be sweeping in its coverage.397  For example, I impose a 
death risk on my neighbor (relative to the conventionally salient class) 
by turning on my light switch, driving my car down the driveway, or 
starting the stove.  Events in the classes of all light-switch-turnings, car-
down-driveway-drivings, or stove-startings result in disastrous fires, 
crashes, or explosions with a nonzero frequency.  One route around 
this problem is to restrict the no-risking constraint to the imposition 
of high risks.  But McCarthy rejects that alternative for the following 
reasons:  any particular threshold would be arbitrary; purposeful risk-
ings below the threshold would be permissible, which is counterintui-
tive; imposing below-threshold risks on many people would be uncon-
strained while imposing above-threshold risks on a few would be 
constrained, again counterintuitive; and the problem of the perva-
siveness of risking can be handled another way.398  McCarthy’s solution 
to that problem is complex but, roughly, involves the idea that A can 
permissibly infringe P ’s right not to be risked if (1) the benefits of risk 
imposition to A exceed the costs to P, (2) it is difficult to secure P ’s 
consent to the risk imposition, and (3) A compensates P for the risk.399  
This solution would suggest that enforcement of the no-risking con-
straint—if such a constraint does exist, and government is morally 
obliged to enforce it, both doubtful points—is a matter for the tort 
system, not regulatory agencies.400  Imagine that a toxic exposure im-
poses a 1 in 10,000 frequentist death risk on the maximally exposed 
 
397 See THOMSON, supra note 282, at 244-45; Railton, supra note 273, at 107-08. 
398 See McCarthy, supra note 380, at 212-14. 
399 See id. at 210-12, 215-16, 218-19; see also David McCarthy, Liability and Risk, 25 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238, 259 (1996) (arguing that “if X performs an action that she 
knows or ought to know will impose a risk of harm to Y, then, roughly speaking, . . . X 
is liable to Y for the risk”). 
400 See also Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing 
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 473-77 (1990) (arguing that risk imposition should be tor-
tious if the administrative costs of adjudicating risk imposition claims are low). 
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individual, relative to the canonical dosing class, and that this class is 
(somehow) the relevant one for McCarthy’s purposes.  Then (on 
McCarthy’s account) this risk is not grounds for banning the expo-
sure, even prima facie grounds, if the exposure passes a cost-benefit 
analysis.  Rather, it would warrant a money judgment against the per-
son who releases the toxin, in favor of the risked individual, to com-
pensate him for bearing the risk.401 
C.  Contractualist Views 
The contractualist insists on unanimous hypothetical agreement.  It 
must be the case that each and every individual, suitably informed, 
would agree, hypothetically, to the policy choice or to a set of underly-
ing principles authorizing that choice.402 
Naive contractualism says this:  where a governmental official is 
choosing among options {Ai} at time T, she should choose the option 
A* such that everyone in the population, given her actual beliefs at 
time T, would agree to A* as opposed to the other options in {Ai}.
403  
In effect, the official’s choice must be ex ante Pareto-superior to her 
other possible choices.  This view would routinely create moral di-
lemmas for governmental officials (since, for many choice situations, 
no option is Pareto-superior to the others given actual citizen beliefs) 
and thus contractualist theorists have typically proposed other, more 
sophisticated variants of contractualism.  One variant was offered by 
the economists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks (in the days when 
welfare economists were deeply uncomfortable with interpersonal 
comparisons and thus advanced views that were closer to contractual-
ism than consequentialism in structure).  Kaldor and Hicks’s pro-
posal, of course, was that governmental choices are required if poten-
 
401 It might be argued that McCarthy’s account warrants a hybrid institutional 
structure:  (1) regulatory prohibition of frequentist risks that aren’t permissible (be-
cause the benefits don’t outweigh the costs or consent ought to have been secured), 
and (2) tort liability for permissible risks.  If so, frequentist risk would function as a de-
cisional trigger for regulatory consideration of prohibition, but might not have any 
additional regulatory role—since the probabilities relevant for cost-benefit analysis, at 
least the kind of CBA I discuss above, are Bayesian not frequentist.  See supra text ac-
companying notes 306-14. 
402 See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 240-56 (surveying contractualist views). 
403 Cf. Adler, supra note 306, at 1272-74 (arguing that governmental officials do 
not have consent-based moral grounds for choosing the “ex ante efficient” option, i.e., 
the option that maximizes each individual’s subjective expected utility given her actual 
beliefs at the time of choice). 
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tially Pareto-superior.404  What this means in the case at hand 
(roughly) is that the official should choose A* just in case there exists a 
scheme of transfer payments such that everyone in the population, 
given her actual beliefs at T plus the belief that the scheme would be 
implemented, would agree to A* over the other options in {Ai}. 
A different route around the difficulties of naive contractualism, 
suggested by Rawls’s405 and Scanlon’s406 work, is to change the informa-
tional or motivational structure of the citizens whose hypothetical 
consent to governmental choices is at issue.407  One might stipulate 
that the official should choose A* over the other options in {Ai} just in 
case every citizen operating under some kind of “veil of ignorance” 
and advancing her own interests would choose A* ; or, alternatively, 
just in case every citizen basing her choice on her actual beliefs but 
choosing less selfishly would agree to A*. 
All the variants of contractualism I have thus far described, both 
naive contractualism and more sophisticated versions, are act based.408  
One imagines citizens, with actual or counterfactual information, and 
with actual or counterfactual motivational sets, agreeing or not to par-
ticular governmental choices (either the actual choices at hand, or 
those choices paired with transfer payment schemes).  What sort of 
regulatory decision procedure would implement these act-contractualist 
views?  Presumably the regulator should attempt to determine how 
various members of the population, characterized in greater or lesser 
detail, would evaluate the choices at hand if the choices were suitably 
modified, the individuals were suitably motivated and informed, and 
so on.  That determination, in turn, partly depends on what the indi-
viduals believe about the choices.  Choices are a product of beliefs and 
preferences409 (be they self-interested preferences or morally moti-
vated preferences).  So “individual risk” might be part of the act-
contractualist decision procedure.  But it would be “individual risk” in 
 
404 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 190-91 
(explaining the Kaldor-Hicks criterion). 
405 See RAWLS, supra note 354. 
406 See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
407 See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 243-45 (explaining that the rationality, knowl-
edge, and motivation of the contractors might be specified in different ways); Adler, 
supra note 35, at 272-73 (summarizing Rawls’s and Scanlon’s specifications of the con-
tracting scenario). 
408 See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 242 (distinguishing between act and rule contrac-
tualism). 
409 See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 38-41 (1996). 
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the first-party Bayesian sense:  probability numbers measuring the be-
liefs of the individuals in the contracting scenario, not numbers 
measuring the beliefs of the regulator, or frequentist risks. 
Perhaps a concrete example might help.  Imagine that some 
natural contaminant is poisoning a community’s drinking water.  Ten 
thousand people live, and will remain for their lifetimes, in the com-
munity.  An agency official is determining whether to spend $500,000 
to correct the contamination affecting this cohort, raised through a 
special levy of $50 per head.  If the correct moral view is welfare con-
sequentialism, and the correct decision procedure within this view is 
cost-benefit analysis, then the official’s decision depends on her be-
liefs about the toxicity of the contaminant.  Third-party, rather than 
first-party, Bayesian risk comes into play.410  For example, if the official 
after consulting a risk assessor believes to degree 1 in 1 million that 
any individual drinking water from the source for his lifetime will die 
as a result, while each individual believes to degree 1 in 10,000 that he 
will die, it is the 1 in 1 million Bayesian risk, not the 1 in 10,000 Bayes-
ian risk, that should figure in the CBA analysis of the cleanup.411  Pre-
sumably it won’t pass the CBA test. 
By contrast, an act-contractualist view would instruct the official to 
think about a hypothetical referendum.412  Would the citizenry, hypo-
thetically, agree to the cleanup?  The official might answer that ques-
tion by surveying a sample of the community, providing them the kind 
of information stipulated by the underlying act-contractualist view, 
 
410 See supra note 306. 
411 Third-party and first-party Bayesian risks surely can differ.  See, e.g., Ted Gayer 
et al., Private Values of Risk Tradeoffs at Superfund Sites:  Housing Market Evidence on Learn-
ing about Risk, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 439 (2000) (finding that individuals’ perceived 
probabilities of cancer from Superfund sites are changed by EPA’s release of informa-
tion from its remedial investigations of the sites); Mary Riddel et al., Environmental Risk 
and Uncertainty:  Insights from Yucca Mountain, 43 J. REGIONAL SCI. 435, 437 (2003) 
(finding that the perceived risk of an accident during the transportation of high-level 
radioactive waste, among residents of Southern Nevada, is generally much higher than 
the Department of Energy’s risk estimate).  See generally HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 
309 (discussing lay probability mistakes). 
412 Cf. Kevin J. Boyle & John C. Bergstrom, Doubt, Doubts, and Doubters:  The Genesis 
of a New Research Agenda?, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES:  THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US, EU, AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 183, 195-96 (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth J. Willis eds., 1999) (discussing 
“referendum format” for contingent-valuation surveys); Alan Randall & Warren Krie-
sel, Evaluating National Policy Proposals by Contingent Valuation, in ECONOMIC VALUATION 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES:  ISSUES, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 153 (Rebecca L. Johnson 
& Gary V. Johnson eds., 1990) (discussing design of contingent valuation survey to 
elicit citizen valuations of national environmental policies). 
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and inducing the requisite motivation.413  Or, if the view stipulates that 
the contractors are rational, the official might think about whether 
the citizens would rationally be willing to pay for the cleanup, given 
their probability beliefs and the possible costs and benefits.  That in-
quiry would focus the official on the citizens’ Bayesian probabilities—
what I am calling “first-party” Bayesian probabilities.  If each person in 
the population believes to degree 1 in 10,000 that he will die as a re-
sult of the contamination, and is willing to pay $600 to avoid a 1 in 
10,000 risk of death, then the cleanup passes this act-contractualist 
test414 even though it fails a CBA test.  Further, and quite obviously, 
first-party Bayesian probabilities are not the same as frequentist prob-
abilities.  A contractor might believe to degree 1 in 10,000 that he will 
die from the contamination even if his frequentist risk, relative both 
to the canonical dosing class and to a more finely specified class in-
corporating the features that the official knows about him, or that he 
knows about himself, is much lower. 
So much for act-contractualism.  I said earlier that the work of 
Rawls and Scanlon suggests a modification to naive contractualism, 
namely placing citizens under a veil of ignorance or assuming them to 
be other regarding (to some degree) rather than purely self inter-
ested.  The actual theories advanced by Rawls and Scanlon do incor-
porate these informational or motivational assumptions, but they also 
depart from naive contractualism in another way.  Rawls and Scanlon 
are rule-contractualists.415  Rawls does not imagine a new “behind the 
veil” bargaining session for each governmental choice; rather, Rawl-
sian contractors agree once-and-for-all to certain basic principles that 
will regulate the structure of government and society.416  Similarly for 
Scanlon:  his account uses the contractualist device to identify moral 
principles (specifically, those that no person reasonably could reject) 
and then evaluates choices by applying the winning set of principles.417 
My argument above that contractualist risk assessment would de-
pend upon Bayesian, not frequentist, probabilities does not work for 
rule-contractualists.  For even though it is an individual’s beliefs 
 
413 Cf. VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 412 (generally discuss-
ing the use of contingent-valuation surveys to determine individuals’ monetary valua-
tions of nonmarket goods, for purposes of cost-benefit analysis). 
414 On the premise that contractors are appropriately self-interested. 
415 See KAGAN, supra note 258, at 242 (noting that philosophers commonly think of 
contractualism in rule-contractualist terms). 
416 See RAWLS, supra note 354, at 60-65. 
417 See SCANLON, supra note 406, at 197-202. 
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(hence Bayesian probabilities) and preferences that rationalize and 
explain her choices, it is possible that contractors would choose rules 
that, in turn, somehow incorporate frequentist probabilities.  For ex-
ample, it is possible that P, given his Bayesian probabilities about the 
results of different possible rule choices, would choose a moral rule 
incorporating a prohibition on risk imposition in the frequentist 
sense.  Or, he might choose a rule that looked to the “fair” distribu-
tion of frequentist risk, not Bayesian risk, across the population.418 
But would such a possibility be realized?  This is much too large a 
question for me to address here, because it entails both a specification 
of the correct contracting scenario, and an analysis of what rules 
would be chosen in that scenario.  Rawls does not address the morality 
of risk imposition—his focus in A Theory of Justice is the “basic struc-
ture” of society, not moral rules governing individuals419—and Scanlon 
addresses it only briefly.  Since Rawlsian contractors are self inter-
ested—guided, behind the veil, by their own welfare420—a plausible 
conjecture is that the rules of individual morality emergent from a 
Rawlsian contract would not regulate frequentist risk.  Frequentist risk 
is welfare-irrelevant, or so I have tried to show.421 
Scanlonian contractors are not constrained to focus on welfare.  
For example, Scanlon notes, the pretheoretical “unfairness” of a pos-
sible rule might motivate a contractor to reject the rule even though 
the rule does not harm him.422  Specifically, a contractor might see a 
rule permitting the imposition of frequentist risks on him as somehow 
unfair, albeit welfare neutral.  This makes Scanlon’s view murkier than 
Rawls’s and extremely hard to apply.423  Scanlon’s very brief comments 
on the issue of risk suggest skepticism about a broad rule against risk 
imposition—he notes that “the cost of avoiding all behavior that in-
volves risk of harm would be unacceptable”424—and willingness to en-
tertain narrower rules, precluding certain kinds of risks of serious 
harms.425  Whether Scanlon means, here, to suggest that contractors 
 
418 Cf. Adler, supra note 20, at 1423-31 (discussing view, within risk-regulation 
scholarship, that distributive justice concerns the distribution of “individual risk”). 
419 See RAWLS, supra note 354, at 60-65, 109-18. 
420 See id. at 136-50. 
421 See supra notes 272-90 and accompanying text. 
422 See SCANLON, supra note 406, at 191-97, 213-18. 
423 See generally Oberdiek, supra note 273, at 91-193 (employing framework similar 
to Scanlon’s to evaluate morality of risk imposition). 
424 SCANLON, supra note 406, at 209. 
425 See id. (noting that “it is intuitively obvious that the likelihood that a form of 
behavior will lead to harm is an important factor in determining its permissibility”). 
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might converge on a rule prohibiting frequentist (rather than Bayes-
ian) risks of serious harms is unclear. 
D.  Democratic Views 
All plausible moral views, certainly consequentialist ones, recog-
nize the benefits of democratic legal structures, including popularly 
elected legislative bodies and some version of legislative supremacy vis-
a-vis regulatory agencies.  Utilitarians, for example, can certainly ap-
prove the framing of a democratic constitution, given the predictable 
benefits of these structures as opposed to monarchy or other alterna-
tives with respect to overall welfare.  But there is no bedrock role for 
democratic responsiveness within utilitarianism, the other consequen-
tialist views considered to this point, or classic deontology.426  By con-
trast, a foundationally democratic account of risk regulation would 
give regulators an independent (perhaps overriding) moral reason to 
respond to citizen views427—a reason distinct from the welfare costs of 
nonresponsiveness.428 Such an account could, of course, specify “de-
mocratic responsiveness” in a multitude of ways.  Must citizens be pub-
lic-regarding?429  Is the responsiveness of administrative agencies ap-
propriately direct, or mediated by statutes?  Does the view care about 
responsiveness to majorities or supermajorities?430  How are Arrow 
problems resolved?431 
 
426 See generally Adler, supra note 35, at 267-88 (arguing against “proceduralist” 
theories of regulation, which accord intrinsic moral significance to certain democratic, 
governmental procedures). 
427 Under the rubric of “foundationally democratic” accounts of governmental 
choice (including, presumably, risk regulation), I include recent scholarship on “de-
liberative democracy” and related scholarship on “civic republicanism.”  See DELIBERA-
TIVE DEMOCRACY:  ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg 
eds., 1997); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
(1996); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
801 (1993) (surveying civic-republican scholarship).  For a deliberative-democratic 
view of risk regulation, see RICHARD P. HISKES, DEMOCRACY, RISK, AND COMMUNITY:  
TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LIBERALISM 132-58 (1998). 
428 See Paul J. Weithman, Contractualist Liberalism and Deliberative Democracy, 24 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 314, 314-17 (1995) (emphasizing deliberative democrats’ aim to present a 
noninstrumental justification for democracy). 
429 See Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:  ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, 
supra note 427, at x-xii (contrasting economic and pluralist models of democracy, 
which see citizens as advancing their interests, with deliberative-democratic views, 
which envision them deliberating about the public good) 
430 Compare ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1-33 (1962) (defending a majoritarian conception of 
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Recent work within legal and political theory suggests that the 
most plausible democratic views look to citizen judgments rather than 
preferences—suitably impartial judgments about the “public good” or, 
more precisely, about which governmental choices are morally re-
quired.432  Given the intractability of moral disagreement, governmen-
tal responsiveness to judgments is (arguably) an independent moral 
requirement.433  Within this judgment-focused class of views, we might 
further distinguish between idealized and actualized views.  Democ-
ratic accounts that demand responsiveness to idealized citizen judg-
ments are not likely, I suggest, to warrant regulatory attention to fre-
quentist risk.  Idealized judgments should be relatively good (if not 
necessarily perfect) in tracking true moral requirements. But my ar-
gument in preceding Sections has (I hope) provided strong reason to 
believe that morality doesn’t truly attend to frequentist risk. 
We are left, then, with accounts that demand some kind of direct 
or indirect regulatory responsiveness to actual citizen judgments.  If 
citizens widely judge (incorrectly) that the level of frequentist risk is a 
morally relevant feature of toxins and other possible targets for regu-
latory intervention, then, according to the kind of democratic view 
now under consideration, regulators have a moral reason to attend to 
frequentist risk, or at least legislators have a moral reason to direct 
regulators to do that.  But do citizens, in fact, typically reach this 
judgment?  This is an empirical question—one that implicates the 
psychological literature on “risk perception,” a literature much too 
large for me systematically to engage here.434  Let me merely note that 
the best-known and most influential scholarship in this area, that of 
Paul Slovic and his collaborators,435 calls into question whether the 
level of frequentist “individual risk” is judged by citizens to be an im-
 
democracy), with 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 54-55, 266-94 (1991) (defending 
a supermajoritarian conception). 
431 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).  For a 
recent survey of the literature on “cycling” and related features of majority rule, see 
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 79-127, 147-58 (2003). 
432 That politics should (in some way) be public-regarding is a key claim advanced 
by deliberative democrats and civic republicans.  See Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DE-
MOCRACY, supra note 427, at xiii-xiv; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 
YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-51, 1554-55 (1988). 
433 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10-17 (1999). 
434 For an introduction to this literature, see Nick F. Pidgeon & Jane Beattie, The 
Psychology of Risk and Uncertainty, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 289, 296-301. 
435 This work is collected in PAUL SLOVIC ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Ragnar 
E Löfstedt ed., 2000). 
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portant determinant of appropriate regulatory choice.  Slovic’s stan-
dard technique is to elicit, from lay survey respondents, quantitative 
judgments of the overall “riskiness” of various hazards, plus assess-
ments of each hazard with respect to a host of different dimensions, 
and then to determine which dimensions best explain perceived riski-
ness.436  For example, in one study, respondents were asked to rank 
ninety hazards (such as home gas furnaces, home appliances, micro-
wave ovens, or nuclear weapons) on a 0-100 scale from “not risky” to 
“extremely risky,” and to rank each hazard on a 1-7 scale for eighteen 
different dimensions:  the hazard’s observability; the degree to which 
those exposed are aware of the hazard; the number of people exposed 
to the hazard; the degree to which the hazard is widely feared; the de-
gree to which the hazard is catastrophic; the threat to future genera-
tions; and so on.437 
Slovic’s general finding is that lay judgments of riskiness are not 
solely determined by lay beliefs about the number of people exposed 
to some hazard or the aggregate deaths resulting from some hazard.  
Rather, two other broad factors (each combining a host of correlated 
dimensions) also are important in explaining perceived riskiness.  
These factors are termed, by Slovic, “dread” and “familiarity”.  “Dread” 
subsumes the risk’s controllability, the fear it provokes, whether it has 
catastrophic consequences, whether it has fatal consequences, the eq-
uity of its distribution, the threat to future generations, the ease of re-
duction, whether the risk is increasing over time, and whether it’s in-
voluntary.  The “familiarity” factor subsumes the risk’s observability, 
the awareness of those exposed, whether its effects are delayed, its 
novelty, and whether the risk is known to science.438  Although a few of 
the dimensions underlying “dread” and “familiarity” may, in turn, de-
pend on “individual risk”—for example, this may be true of the equity 
dimension—many seemingly do not.  “Individual risk” to the maximal, 
highly exposed, or representative individual, so crucial to agency risk 
assessments, does not (if Slovic’s results are accurate)439 play much of a 
role in determining actual citizen judgments about the riskiness of 
hazards and the need for government intervention. 
 
436 See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in SLOVIC ET AL., supra note 435, at 220-22. 
437 Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears:  Understanding Perceived Risk, in SLOVIC ET AL., 
supra note 435, at 137-39. 
438 See id. at 139-41. 
439 See Pidgeon & Beattie, supra note 434, at 299-301 (noting that Slovic’s factor 
structure is confirmed by some, but not all, subsequent work on psychology of risk per-
ception). 
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VI.  RISK ASSESSMENT AND POPULATION SIZE 
My analysis, to this point, has sought to demonstrate that “individ-
ual risk” in the frequentist sense should be irrelevant to regulatory 
evaluation of toxic and other possibly fatal hazards.  “Individual risk” 
in the Bayesian sense, be it first-party or third-party Bayesian risk, may 
well have an appropriate role in regulatory choice.  But frequentist 
risk and Bayesian risk are different, and neither welfare consequen-
tialism, nor competing moral views—safety consequentialism, deon-
tology, contractualism, or democratic views—focus the regulator on 
frequentist risk. 
I now want to argue for a second and distinct claim:  that risk as-
sessment should be sensitive to population size.440 Regulatory tech-
niques for evaluating hazards should incorporate information about 
the numbers of persons at risk of dying from the hazards.  The regula-
tory practices described in Part II—where agencies such as EPA, 
OSHA, FDA, NRC, and CPSC employ the frequentist risk to the 
maximally exposed, highly exposed, or average exposed individual as 
a partial determinant of regulatory choice—are doubly misguided.  
These practices are misguided, first, because they focus on frequentist 
rather than Bayesian risk and, second, because a regulatory criterion 
that looks to the level of “individual risk” incurred by the maximal, 
high-end, or average individual is insensitive to population size.441 
 
440 I am certainly not the first to argue that risk regulation should be sensitive to 
population size.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON:  SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 214-16 (2002); HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 21-23.  However, my 
demonstration that the demand for size-sensitivity is robust across plausible moral 
views, both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist, is (I believe) novel. 
441 By “size insensitive,” I mean a regulatory criterion that indicates the very same 
regulatory response to hazards that have identical distributions of risk across the ex-
posed populations and that are otherwise identical, but differ in the size of those popu-
lations.  Ceteris paribus, changes in the number of persons exposed to a hazard do not 
change what the criterion instructs regulators to do. 
  To be sure, a population-size-insensitive criterion might be embedded in a 
broader regulatory practice that is sensitive, in some way, to population size.  For ex-
ample, satisfying an “individual risk” test focused on the risk level incurred by the aver-
age, high-end, or maximal individual might be a necessary condition for regulating 
some hazard; “population risk” considerations might then inform the level of regula-
tion for hazards that satisfy the initial condition.  Some of the regulatory practices de-
scribed in Part II are population-size sensitive in this broader sense.  But they still in-
corporate a size-insensitive, “individual risk”-based criterion-–and that itself is hard to 
justify. 
 It might also be objected that looking to the level of “individual risk” incurred by 
some person in the exposure distribution is population-size sensitive where the entire 
U.S. population is seen as “exposed” to the hazard.  Cf. Rhomberg, supra note 53, at 
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To put the point another way:  the practices described in Part II 
cannot be salvaged by substituting Bayesian for frequentist risks.  
Regulating foods, waste dumps, pesticides, air pollutants, nuclear 
plants, or other hazards by ensuring that the maximally exposed, 
highly exposed, or average exposed individual has a first-party or 
third-party Bayesian risk below some threshold (be it 1 in 1 million, 1 
in 10,000, or something else) would be morally arbitrary.  This claim, 
like the claimed irrelevance of frequentist risk, is (with a few excep-
tions) robust across plausible moral views.  Both welfare consequen-
tialism and alternative moral views generally demand that regulatory 
criteria for addressing hazards attend to the number of persons incur-
ring various levels of (Bayesian) risk from the hazards. 
My argument for this claim will be relatively brief.  Because I have 
already characterized the moral views, and the regulatory decision 
procedures they support, in some detail, it should be pretty clear that 
population-size insensitive procedures are generally problematic.  Wel-
fare consequentialism employs cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as its decision 
procedure.442  CBA, in turn, has both “population risk” and “individual 
risk” versions.443  The “population risk” version predicts the mean 
number of deaths resulting from toxic or other hazards, and ascribes a 
monetary price to each death; these are aggregated, counted as costs 
of the hazard and benefits of intervention, and then added to the 
overall sum of monetized costs and benefits to determine whether 
regulatory intervention has net costs or benefits.  The “individual risk” 
version describes the distribution of (third-party) Bayesian “individual 
risk” resulting from the hazard, across the population, and ascribes a 
monetary cost to each risk, based on individual willingness to pay to 
avoid the risk of death; these monetized risks are aggregated and then 
added, once more, to the overall sum of monetized costs and benefits. 
 
1055-59 (describing FDA exposure assessments, which look at the entire U.S. food-
consuming population).  But this point, too, is incorrect.  Imagine that FDA will ap-
prove an additive if the “individual risk” to the average U.S. citizen is less than 1 in 1 
million.  Then this criterion requires the very same result regardless of the total num-
ber of U.S. citizens. 
442 See supra text accompanying notes 297-99.  Admittedly, this is not true for cer-
tain egalitarian variants of welfare consequentialism.  One imagines, however, that 
even these variants would require size-sensitive procedures.  Compare two cases in 
which a hazard lowers the expected welfare of an exposed population that is already 
worse off than nonexposed persons:  in one case the exposed population has many 
more members than the non-exposed group; in the other case, it has many fewer.  Pre-
sumably the egalitarian would (or at least might) treat the two cases as differentially 
serious departures from strict equality. 
443 See supra text accompanying notes 300-04. 
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Both versions of CBA are sensitive to population size.  The “popu-
lation risk” version is size sensitive, obviously, because the number of 
deaths predicted to result from a hazard depends on the number of 
exposed individuals.  The “individual risk” version is size sensitive be-
cause the aggregate willingness to pay to avoid the risks created by a 
hazard depends on the number of persons incurring those risks as 
well as the distribution of personal characteristics such as wealth and 
age that influence willingness to pay. 
Safety consequentialism focuses on longevity and health, not the 
other sources of welfare.  Thus, it counsels regulators to employ “risk-
risk” analysis, or some such procedure, rather than CBA.444  Most 
straightforwardly:  regulators would evaluate a proposed intervention 
by determining whether intervention is likely to produce a net de-
crease or increase in the number of premature deaths, or a net in-
crease or decrease in the population’s aggregate life years or health-
adjusted life years.  All these procedures would require risk assessment 
techniques that are sensitive to the numbers of persons at various lev-
els of risk from hazards.  A workplace toxin, say, which is used in one 
hundred specialized workplaces, with an average risk to exposed 
workers of 1 in 1000 (OSHA’s level of clear significance), will likely 
produce many fewer deaths than a toxin used in one hundred times 
more workplaces at the same average risk. 
The deontological view of risk regulation asserts that regulators have 
a (prima facie) obligation to enforce deontological rules, including 
the classic no-killing constraint and perhaps a separate no-risking con-
straint.  As for the no-killing constraint, I have suggested that this con-
straint, if enforceable by government, would warrant a decision-
procedure that enjoins the regulator:  “ceteris paribus, intervene to pre-
vent any hazardous activity that you believe, to degree p or higher, 
would kill at least one person.”445  This decision procedure is sensitive 
to population size.  That point is subtle, but crucial.  There is a crucial 
distinction between the probability of a killing, and the probability 
that some particular individual will be killed.  My suggestion is that a 
risk assessment practice enforcing the deontological rule against kill-
ing would focus on the former probability, not the latter, and thus 
would be sensitive to the numbers of individuals at various (Bayesian) 
levels of risk of being killed. 
 
444 See supra text accompanying notes 361-63. 
445 See supra text accompanying notes 377-78. 
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Imagine, for example, that the Bayesian risk threshold set forth by 
the deontological decision procedure is 1 in 1 million.  The enforce-
ment rule says:  “intervene, ceteris paribus, to stop some hazardous ac-
tivity when you believe to a degree greater than 1 in 1 million that at 
least one person will be killed.”  Crucially, this rule is not the same as a 
rule that instructs the regulator to intervene if the “individual risk” to 
the maximally at-risk person, or any other person, exceeds 1 in 1 mil-
lion.  If a hazardous activity exposes everyone in a population of two 
hundred million to a toxin, and the regulator’s degree of belief that 
any given person will die is 1 in 10 million, then the Bayesian risk to 
the maximally exposed person (and also the average and high-end 
person) is less than 1 in 1 million, but the regulator’s Bayesian prob-
ability that the toxin will kill at least one person is virtually one.446  
What the deontological probability threshold for the no-killing con-
straint concerns, again, is the probability that some person will be 
killed, and that probability increases as increasing numbers of individ-
ual persons are each exposed to a nonzero risk of being killed. 
What about the putative deontological constraint against risk im-
position?  I have evinced skepticism that any such constraint exists.  
Risk imposition need not be harmful, invasive, or manipulative, the 
hallmarks of deontological violations.  It need not reduce the physical 
or emotional well-being of the person put at risk, invade her body or 
property, or manipulate her. 447  But perhaps risk imposition involves a 
more intangible, dignitary harm.  Thus the “expressive” view of the 
no-risking constraint:  risk imposition is a kind of insult.  Yet is it, nec-
essarily?  A concern with insults could justify a constraint against ac-
tions that the actor intends to be insulting or that are conventionally 
insulting given existing linguistic rules.  More puzzling is why risking, 
as such, should be constrained.  Perhaps social meaning comes into 
play:  any action that the ordinary member of the relevant society be-
lieves, to a  degree greater than q, will be a killing of a given person, 
has the “social meaning” of insulting that person.448  So perhaps there 
is a no-risking constraint that invokes the Bayesian probabilities of or-
dinary observers—reasonable persons—and a matching decision pro-
cedure that tells regulators, “intervene ceteris paribus to prevent some 
 
446 At the limiting point where the probability threshold p equals zero, the no-
killing rule does generate a size-insensitive procedure:  the regulator’s Bayesian prob-
ability that some person will be killed is nonzero just in case the maximally exposed 
individual has a nonzero probability of being killed. 
447 See supra text accompanying notes 381-85. 
448 See supra text accompanying notes 386-92. 
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hazard if the ‘reasonable person’ would believe, to a degree greater 
than q, that the hazard will kill any given individual.”  This deonto-
logical decision procedure would license population–size  insensitive 
risk assessment practices.  Specifically, it would warrant regulatory at-
tention to the Bayesian “individual risk” imposed on the maximally 
exposed individual.  If a hazardous activity creates a Bayesian risk 
greater than q (as judged from the epistemic standpoint of the rea-
sonable person) that the maximally exposed individual will be killed, 
then the hazard “expresses” contempt for that person and, ceteris pari-
bus, should be stopped; if, conversely, the Bayesian risk to the maxi-
mally exposed individual is less than q, then no one suffers a risk level 
exceeding q, and no one has been insulted. 
The deontological no-risking constraint thus creates an exception 
to my claim about population-size sensitivity.  But it is a dubious ex-
ception, since even those sympathetic to deontology and the classic, 
no-killing constraint have good cause to wonder whether a no-risking 
constraint really exists; and even those sympathetic to the view that 
government should enforce some deontological constraints might 
wonder whether a no-insult rule is important enough to fall in the 
category of enforceable constraints. 
Contractualism, at least in the act-contractualist variants, asks the 
regulator to imagine a hypothetical referendum among the citizenry:  
as between various options, perhaps paired with hypothetical transfer 
payments, which option would the citizens unanimously agree upon 
if suitably informed and motivated?449  It might seem that act-
contractualism is insensitive to population size, because any person—
even a single one—has a veto in the hypothetical referendum.  But 
the issue is more subtle than that. First, the Kaldor-Hicks variant of 
act-contractualism is actually size sensitive.  The fewer persons there 
are at risk from some hazard, the smaller the hypothetical transfer 
payment needed to compensate them for the risk.  Indeed, econo-
mists have suggested that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion should be im-
plemented through CBA (presumably a CBA procedure employing 
first-person rather than third-person Bayesian probabilities).450  The 
intuition, here, is that the aggregate monetized benefits associated 
with a regulatory choice track the transfer payment that the benefici-
aries from that choice could afford to pay, and the aggregate 
 
449 See supra text accompanying notes 402-14. 
450 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 190-91 (de-
scribing Kaldor-Hicks defense of CBA); FREEMAN, supra note 300, at 222-29 (discussing 
implications of Kaldor-Hicks approach for CBA under uncertainty). 
  
2005] AGAINST “INDIVIDUAL RISK” 1245 
monetized costs associated with the choice track the transfer payment 
that the losers would require as compensation. 
Second, and more generally, act-contractualist views do not justify 
the kinds of regulatory practices described in Part II.  In determining 
whether any given person would exercise her “veto” over some regula-
tory choice, we would need to consider all the effects of the choice on 
her, not simply its effect on her risk of premature death.  The fact that 
the average (Bayesian) risk imposed by some hazard, and a fortiori the 
risk imposed on the maximally exposed person, exceeds some thresh-
old, does not imply that these particular persons would “veto” the 
regulatory option of inaction.  That depends on whether the hazard 
has countervailing benefits for these persons, and whether the other 
options have countervailing costs.451  Workers exposed to a risky toxin 
might be willing to bear the risk, if the alternative is lower risk but 
lower wages (given the cost of containing the toxin or finding a substi-
tute); food consumers exposed to a risky food might be prepared to 
eat it, if they like the way it tastes and lower-risk substitutes are pricier. 
Consider, finally, democratic views of risk regulation, which posit a 
bedrock moral obligation on the part of regulators to respond to citi-
zen judgments.452  If the citizenry is sufficiently concerned about risk 
imposition itself, apart from death, injury, pain, fear, or catastrophe, 
then risk regulation practices focusing (in part) on “individual risk” to 
the maximally exposed, highly exposed, or average individual could 
be justified.  But if, instead, citizen judgments about risk regulation 
tend to focus on particular kinds of deaths, for example “dreaded” or 
“unfamiliar” deaths—as seems more likely453—then risk regulation 
should be keyed to a function of “population risk.”  The requisite 
practice would not be a straightforward minimization of premature 
death or maximization of longevity, as per safety-consequentialism, 
but rather a more democratically attuned procedure where different 
types of deaths are given different weights in line with their popular 
characterization.  Preventing the 1000 deaths caused by a radioactive 
release from a faulty nuclear reactor would take priority over prevent-
ing 1000 deaths from poorly designed consumer products.  Still, the 
likely number of deaths from a reactor release depends on the size of 
the population adjacent to the plant, and the likely number of con-
 
451 Here, I’m assuming the self-interested variant of act-contractualism.  In the 
case where contractors are more public-regarding, insofar as the moral views motivat-
ing them are population-size sensitive, the act-contractualist criterion also is. 
452 See supra text accompanying notes 432-33. 
453 See supra text accompanying notes 434-39. 
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sumer deaths depends on the total number purchasing the flawed 
goods. 
CONCLUSION 
“Individual risk” has come to play a large role in federal health 
and safety regulation.  This is particularly true for toxic chemicals, 
both carcinogens and noncarcinogens, regulated at the federal level 
by EPA, FDA, and OSHA, as well as by other agencies (for example 
CPSC).  EPA employs an “individual risk” test as a decisional trigger in 
the air pollution context; as a standard-setting criterion in the water 
pollution context, for both ambient and drinking water toxins; in de-
termining when a substance containing toxic chemicals is a “hazard-
ous waste” and therefore subject to various stringent regulatory con-
straints; in licensing and setting tolerances for toxic pesticides; in 
evaluating whether and, if so, how aggressively to clean up waste 
dumps; in policing “environmental justice”; and elsewhere.454  FDA re-
lies heavily on an “individual risk” approach in licensing toxic food 
additives and, to a lesser extent, in regulating food safety more gener-
ally.455  OSHA, since the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Indus-
trial Union (1980),456 has taken the position that workplace toxins can-
not be regulated unless they impose a sufficiently high “individual 
risk” on workers.457  These three agencies also have a role in regulating 
pathogens:  “individual risk” comes into play there,458 as it does for 
NRC and other bodies in regulating radiation459 and, recently, for 
OSHA in addressing safety hazards.460 
This Article has argued that the range of regulatory practices just 
mentioned, and described at much greater length in Part II, are dou-
bly misguided—indeed, doubly misguided across a range of moral 
theories, both consequentialist theories (including but not limited to 
the welfare-centered consequentialism that grounds cost-benefit 
analysis and dominates modern economics) and nonconsequentialist 
theories (specifically deontological, contractualist, and democratic 
theories).  First, the practices just mentioned focus on “individual 
 
454 See supra Part II.A. 
455 See supra Part II.B.1. 
456 Industrial Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality 
opinion). 
457 See supra text accompanying notes 186-88. 
458 See supra note 93; supra text accompanying notes 165, 199. 
459 See supra Part II.B.3. 
460 See supra text accompanying notes 193-97. 
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risk” in the frequentist rather than Bayesian sense; second, they are 
insensitive to population size.  Neither feature is morally supportable. 
Risk assessment practices that invoke frequentist risk, and are in-
sensitive to population size, are now pervasive.  So this Article is a cri-
tique of risk assessment.  But it is a sympathetic critique—a critique of 
the methodology as it’s now (mis)used, not generically.  Nothing in 
the laudable ambition to quantify health and safety threats entails fre-
quentism, or a focus on the risk to some individual in the exposure 
distribution rather than, say, aggregate deaths, aggregate killings, ag-
gregate loss of life years (quality adjusted or not), or the total numbers 
of individuals incurring various “individual risk” levels.461 
My analysis has been critical, not constructive.  I have not pro-
posed a specific decision procedure that health and safety regulators 
should employ in evaluating regulatory measures or, at the threshold, 
in deciding whether to regulate at all or to deliberate about regula-
tion.  It is ludicrous to think that different moral views would converge 
on the same, specific procedure.  Indeed they would not:  welfare con-
sequentialists care about deaths and much else; safety consequential-
ists, about deaths and little more; deontologists, about killings; de-
mocrats, about whatever citizens care about.462  What is not ludicrous is 
to imagine that thoughtful observers, rooted in different moral tradi-
tions, might all converge in rejecting some particular practice.  My ar-
gument, in effect, has been for a negative version of what Rawls calls 
an “overlapping consensus”:463  we may not be able to come to over-
lapping consensus on how health and safety threats should be regu-
lated, but we can (I think) come to agree that the regulatory status 
quo should change.  Relatedly, we can come to consensus, in a very 
general way, on what the change should be.  Whatever the moral view, 
probabilities do have a role to play in regulatory choice, but those 
should be measures of belief, not proportions or frequencies.  More 
radically:  the level of “individual risk” (Bayesian or frequentist) im-
posed on the average, high-end, or maximal individual should have 
no function (even a prima facie one) in regulatory decision proce-
dures. 
It might be objected that my analysis has been moral, not legal.  
This is a function of the generality of the analysis.  There is a for-
est/trees problem:  an analysis focused (say) on the Clean Air Act, or 
 
461 See supra text accompanying notes 442-46 (discussing these alternative possible 
procedures). 
462 See supra Parts III.B., V. 
463 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993). 
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even on the environmental statutes generally, would miss the broader 
point that current risk regulation practices in many different statutory 
contexts have common, problematic features.  Surely the objection 
can’t be that moral and legal considerations are wholly separate.464  
Moral argument is one legally appropriate source—although not the 
only source—of statutory interpretation.465  So think of the analysis, 
here, as a starting point in interpreting a wide range of statutes:  the 
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
RCRA, CERCLA, FIFRA, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Atomic Energy Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act, the motor vehicle safety laws, and others.466  
Some of these statutes give high priority to safety; others do not.  But 
the statutory priority given to safety is orthogonal to the issues analyzed 
here.  The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, for example, demands that 
food additives be “safe,”467 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
tells the agency to regulate toxins so as “to assure[], to the extent fea-
sible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health 
or functional capacity.”468  By contrast, FIFRA instructs EPA to license 
pesticides that will not cause “any unreasonable risk to man or the en-
vironment, taking into account the economic, social, and environ-
mental costs and benefits”469 of the pesticides; and the Consumer 
Product Safety Act employs a similar “unreasonable risk of injury” 
standard.470  Yet “population risk” tests are no less legally permissible—
 
464 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (arguing that law and mo-
rality are necessarily connected); Kenneth Einer Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125-66 (2002) 
(summarizing debate about “inclusive legal positivism,” the view that law possibly in-
corporates moral considerations). 
465 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 111-59 (1990). 
466 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(2000) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000) (Safe Drinking Water 
Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000) (CER-
CLA); 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000) (Toxic 
Substances Control Act); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000) (Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); 
29 US.C. §§ 651-678 (OSH Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 2297h-13 (2000) (Atomic Energy 
Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2085 (2000) (Consumer Product Safety Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1261-1278 (2000) (Federal Hazardous Substances Act); 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 
(2000) (motor vehicle safety provisions). 
467 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000). 
468 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000). 
469 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5) (2000). 
470 15 U.S.C. §2056(a) (2000). 
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I have suggested—under the first pair of statutes than under the sec-
ond pair.  It is perfectly plausible for FDA and OSHA to take the posi-
tion, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that an additive or work-
place toxin causing fewer than some threshold number of deaths is 
legally safe.471 
Safety priority does not moot my analysis, legally speaking.  Other 
statutory language would.  If health and safety statutes explicitly man-
dated population-size insensitive regulatory procedures for evaluating 
hazards, and instructed agencies to focus on frequentist rather than 
Bayesian risk, then agencies would be legally obliged to do both re-
gardless of the moral difficulties.  I have not suggested that current 
practices are so deeply immoral that a statutory requirement under-
girding them would be unconstitutional, or justify civil disobedience 
by regulators.  But in fact these practices typically do not flow from 
explicit statutory mandate.  The Clean Air Act is an exception, and 
even here what is mandated is EPA’s use of the 1 in 1 million risk test 
as a decisional trigger and a criterion for exempting sources from 
regulation, without any requirement that the risk be frequentist rather 
than Bayesian.472 
In any event, and more importantly, the Clean Air Act is virtually 
the only federal health and safety regulatory statute that I’m aware of 
where an agency is required by clear statutory text to attend to “indi-
vidual risk” in reaching some decisions and further to employ popula-
tion-size insensitive procedures or a frequentist conception of “indi-
vidual risk.”473  In general, then, a shift to a Bayesian and population-
size sensitive approach to risk regulation is both morally and legally 
warranted.  And it is a shift that regulators, legislators, legal scholars, 
policy analysts, and the risk assessment community need to start con-
templating.  Given the size and impact of the federal regulatory estab-
 
471 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
472 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i), (f)(2)(A) (2000); supra text accompanying 
notes 99-102 (explaining these provisions). 
473 EPA is instructed to use a 1 in 1 million “individual risk” test for setting pesti-
cide tolerances by a congressional committee report, but not by the statutory text of 
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996.  See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.  A 
different provision of that statute, permitting higher tolerances under special condi-
tions, does mandate a size-insensitive, “individual risk” test.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
346a(b)(2)(B) (2000); Madigan, supra note 137, at 202-04 (describing this provision).  
Other possible examples of statutory language requiring agencies to employ popula-
tion-size insensitive, “individual risk” tests for evaluating hazards are 21 U.S.C. § 
360ll(a)(2) (2000) (radiation risks from electronic products); and 42 U.S.C. § 
263b(h)(2) (2000) (mammography facilities).  I have identified no statutory language 
mandating risk assessment procedures keyed to frequentist rather than Bayesian risk. 
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lishment, how these agencies should go about their business is no triv-
ial matter.  The choices between “individual risk” and “population 
risk,” and between frequentism and Bayesianism, are too significant to 
remain the esoterica of risk assessors and toxicologists. 
 
